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ARTICLES

The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations
Anthony J. Bellia Jrt & Bradford R. Clarktt
Courts and scholars have struggled to identify the original meaning of the Alien
Tort Statute (A TS). As enacted in 1789, the A TS provided "[that the district courts ...
shall ... have cognizance ... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The statute was rarely
invoked for almost two centuries. In the 1980s, lower federal courts began reading the
statute expansively to allow foreign citizens to sue other foreign citizens for all
violations of modern customary international law that occurred outside the United
States. In 2004, the Supreme Court took a more restrictive approach. Seeking to
implement the views of the First Congress, the Court determined that Congress wished
to grant federal courts jurisdiction only over a narrow category of alien claims
"correspondingto Blackstone's three primary [criminal] offenses [against the law of
nations]: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy." In this Article, we argue that neither the broaderapproach initially endorsed by
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lower federal courts nor the more restrictive approach subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court fully captures the originalmeaning and purpose of the ATS. In 1789,
the United States was a weak nation seeking to avoid conflict with other nations. Every
nation had a duty to redress certain violations of the law of nations committed by its
citizens or subjects against other nations or their citizens-from the most serious
offenses (such as those against ambassadors) to more commonplace offenses (such as
violence against private foreign citizens). If a nation failed to redress such violations,
then it became responsible and gave the other nation just cause for war. In the
aftermath of the Revolutionary War, Congress could not rely upon states to redress
injuries suffered by aliens (especially British subjects) at the hands of Americans.
Accordingly, the First Congress enacted the ATS as one of several civil and criminal
provisions designed to redress law of nations violations committed by United States
citizens. The A TS authorized federal court jurisdiction over claims by foreign citizens
against United States citizens for intentionaltorts to person or personalproperty.At the
time, both the commission of-and the failure to redress-such "torts" violated "the
law of nations." The statute thus employed these terms to create a self-executing means
for the United States to avoid military reprisals for the misconduct of its citizens.
Neither the A TS nor Article III, however, authorizedfederal court jurisdictionover tort
claims between aliens. Indeed, federal court adjudicationof at least one subset of such
claims-alien-alienclaims for acts occurring in anothernation's territory- would have
contradictedthe statute'spurpose by putting the United States at risk offoreign conflict.
Despite suggestions that the true import of the ATS may never be recovered, the
original meaning of the statute appears relatively clear in historical context: the ATS
limited federal court jurisdiction to suits by aliens against United States citizens but
broadly encompassed any intentionaltort to an alien's person or personalproperty.
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INTRODUCTION

Although courts and commentators have offered a wide range of
theories regarding the Alien Tort Statute' (ATS), the original
meaning of the statute has remained elusive. As enacted in 1789, the
ATS provided that "the district courts ... shall [ ] have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts,
as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."2 The
statute was rarely invoked for almost two centuries. Courts and
commentators have struggled to recover the original meaning of the
ATS and to apply the statute in light of changed circumstances,
particularly changes in the scope and content of customary
international law. The statute identifies the plaintiff as an alien, but
does not specify the nationality of the defendant. Nor does the statute
expound the meaning of "a tort only in violation of the law of
nations."' In 1980, lower federal courts began the modern practice of
reading the ATS expansively to allow foreign citizens to sue other
foreign citizens for violations of modern customary international law
that occurred outside the United States.' In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,'
the Supreme Court took a more restrictive approach. Without
expressly addressing the propriety of the party alignment, the Court
rejected a claim by a Mexican citizen suing another Mexican citizen as
outside the scope of the ATS.' Specifically, the Court concluded that
Jose Francisco Sosa's claim for arbitrary detention did not constitute a

I

Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76-77, codified as amended at 28 USC § 1350.
2 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76-77.
3 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77.
4 See, for example, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 878 (2d Cir 1980).
5 542 US 692 (2004).
6

Id at 697.
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tort in violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the
statute. Although the Court interpreted the statute to leave the door
"open to a narrow class of international norms [existing] today,"' it
stressed the need for "judicial caution when considering the kinds of
individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by
the early statute."' According to the Court, the ATS should be
interpreted in accordance with the views of the First Congress. Under
this approach, "federal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was
enacted."'

Neither the broader approach initially endorsed by lower federal
courts nor the more restrictive approach subsequently adopted by Sosa
fully captures the original meaning and purpose of the ATS. The ATS,
understood in historical context, was meant to cover a narrower set of
party alignments than those allowed by lower federal courts but a
broader range of torts than those identified in Sosa. Read in light of
Article III, the common law forms of action applicable to intentional
torts against aliens, and the background law of nations principles that
informed the statute, the ATS restricted suits to those against US
citizens but allowed aliens to sue for any intentional tort involving force
against their person or personal property. At the time, only such "torts"
committed by US citizens against aliens would have been understood to
violate "the law of nations." Despite suggestions that the true import of
the ATS may never be recovered, the legal and historical background of
the statute suggests that its original meaning has been hiding in plain
sight.
In 1789, every nation had a duty to redress certain violations of
the law of nations committed by its citizens or subjects against other
nations or their citizens." Such violations included interfering with the
rights of ambassadors, violating safe conducts, impairing neutral use
of the high seas, and committing intentional torts against the citizens
of another nation. If a nation failed to redress such violations, then it
became responsible to the other nation under the law of nations and

Id at 729.
Id at 725-28.
9 Sosa, 542 US at 732. According to the Court, these paradigms consisted of "torts
corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses [against the law of nations]: violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Id at 724. See William
7
8

Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 68 (Chicago 1979).

1o We use the term "citizens" in this Article to refer to citizens of the United States or a
US state and to citizens or subjects of another nation.
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gave the other nation just cause for war. The First Congress was
undoubtedly aware of these principles and enacted several statutory
provisions-including the ATS-in order to comply with the United
States' obligations under the law of nations to redress violations by its
citizens. This context helps to illuminate the original meaning and
purpose of the ATS.
In 1789, the United States was a weak nation seeking to avoid
conflict with foreign nations. The Constitution was designed to
enhance the United States' ability to comply with its various
obligations under the law of nations-and thus prevent conflict with
other nations. For example, Article I gave Congress power to define
and punish offenses against the law of nations." The First Congress
exercised this power to enact important federal criminal prohibitions
designed to deter and punish certain violations of the law of nations,
including violations of the rights of ambassadors and violations of safe
conducts." In addition, Article III authorized federal court jurisdiction
over a variety of civil cases implicating the law of nations and US
foreign relations, including admiralty disputes, cases affecting
ambassadors, and controversies between foreign citizens and citizens of
the United States." The Judiciary Act of 1789 implemented this
jurisdiction by authorizing federal courts to hear suits by ambassadors,
admiralty and maritime disputes, and controversies between aliens and
US citizens.14 Within the last category, the Act gave federal circuit
courts general foreign diversity jurisdiction (with a $500 amount in
controversy requirement)" and-by virtue of the ATS-federal
district courts jurisdiction over alien claims "for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" (with
no amount in controversy requirement)." Without the ATS, the
amount in controversy requirement would have prevented federal
courts from hearing most claims for intentional torts committed by
US citizens against aliens. Such torts, however, constituted violations
of the law of nations that the United States had an obligation to
redress. Thus, by enacting the ATS, the First Congress enabled the
United States to remedy an important category of law of nations
violations committed by US citizens against aliens.

11

USConstArtl,§8,cl1O.
See notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
13 Article III refers to controversies between "Citizens" of "a State" and "foreign ...
Citizens or Subjects." US Const Art III, § 2. Accordingly, we use the phrases "citizens of the
United States" or "US citizens" in this Article to refer to citizens of US states.
14 Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat at 76-79.
15 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat at 78-79.
16 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77.
12
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Although the practice has been largely forgotten today, a nation
became responsible under the law of nations for injuries that its
citizens inflicted on aliens if it failed to provide an adequate means of
redress-by punishing the wrongdoer criminally, extraditing the
offender to the aggrieved nation, or imposing civil liability. Failure to
redress such injuries in one of these ways gave the alien's home nation
just cause for war." In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War,
members of Congress did not believe that they could rely upon states
to redress injuries suffered by British subjects at the hands of
Americans. To ensure that the United States would not violate the
law of nations, the First Congress enacted both criminal and civil
statutes to redress harms inflicted by US citizens against aliens."
Because early federal criminal jurisdiction did not clearly encompass
all such harms, the ATS operated as a fail-safe provision. The ATS
gave British subjects (and all other aliens) a right to sue Americans in
federal court for torts that, if not redressed through a civil or criminal
action, would render the United States responsible for its citizens'
violations of the law of nations." By authorizing civil redress under
the ATS, the United States simultaneously signaled to other nations
its intent to comply fully with its obligations under the law of nations
and established a self-executing means of avoiding military reprisals
for the misconduct of its citizens.
The First Congress did not have the same incentives to authorize
the adjudication of tort suits between aliens in federal court. In this
regard, it is useful to analyze suits between aliens based on where the
tort occurred. First, consider violence between aliens that took place in
the United States. It is not clear that the United States had the same
obligation under the law of nations to redress such violence as it did to
redress violence by US citizens. Nor is it clear that such alien-alien
violence occurred with any frequency in the 1780s. If suits of this kind
arose, moreover, state courts were available to hear them. There does
not appear to be any evidence that states failed to adjudicate such
suits fairly (unlike suits by aliens against US citizens). Accordingly,
even assuming that the United States had an obligation to redress
17 At the time, the violation of certain rights-known as "perfect rights"-gave the
aggrieved nation just cause for war. For a discussion of the origin and importance of perfect
rights under the law of nations and the US Constitution, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford
R. Clark, The FederalCommon Law of Nations, 109 Colum L Rev 1, 16-19 (2009).
18 See notes 315-68 and accompanying text.
19 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va J Intl L 587, 630-31
(2002) (describing how the ATS was "consistent with the law of international responsibility in
the late 1700s"); Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 Va J Intl
L 649, 652 (2002) (describing a sovereign's obligation to remedy citizens' law of nations
violations).
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violence in its territory by one alien against another, redress in state
court would have satisfied that obligation. Absent evidence that such
claims arose frequently or that state courts failed to adjudicate them
fairly, Congress had no obvious reason to assign them to federal
courts. Had it wished to do so, moreover, it could not have relied on
foreign diversity jurisdiction. Rather, it would have had to employ
"arising under" jurisdiction by creating a federal cause of action.
Second, consider violence between aliens that occurred in foreign
nations (a routine scenario in modern ATS cases). The law of nations
imposed no obligation on the United States to provide aliens with a
forum for adjudicating such claims against one another. Thus, failure
to adjudicate such claims would not have subjected the United States
to reprisals by foreign nations. Indeed, at the time the ATS was
adopted, adjudication of such claims arguably would have infringed
upon the territorial sovereignty of foreign nations under the law of
nations.' Under these circumstances, the First Congress had no
reason to authorize-and good reason to exclude-suits between
aliens in federal court for acts occurring in other nations.2 1
The limited nature of federal judicial power under the
Constitution also suggests that the ATS was meant to encompass only
claims by aliens against US citizens. Article III extends the judicial
power to only nine categories of cases and controversies. The first
three categories are defined by reference to the subject matter of the
case. The last six categories are defined by reference to the identities
of the parties. Suits by aliens against US citizens fall within diversity
jurisdiction over controversies "between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."22 By contrast, suits
by aliens against other aliens do not fall within Article III's diversity
jurisdiction. Thus, to uphold jurisdiction over such suits (other than
perhaps cases affecting ambassadors and cases of admiralty and

20 Historically, the law of nations recognized that "every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory." Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and
Especially in Regardto Marriages,Divorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgments 19 (Hilliard, Gray
1834). See also id at 21.
21
Perhaps for this reason, courts have been reluctant to apply federal statutes
extraterritorially absent a clear congressional intent to do so. See, for example, Morrison v
National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2878 (2010) ("When a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."); EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co,
499 US 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."'), quoting Foley Bros, Inc v Filardo,336 US 281, 285 (1949).
22
US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.

452

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:445

maritime jurisdiction'), one would have to conclude that they
constitute cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority."24 At the time the ATS was enacted, however, the law of
nations was understood to be general law. After the Constitution was
ratified and the ATS enacted, judges and other public officials sharply
debated whether federal courts had power in the exercise of their
Article III jurisdiction to adopt and apply a municipal common law of
the United States (including those parts of the law of nations
incorporated by the common law). Ultimately, this question was
resolved in 1812 when the Supreme Court decided that the
constitutional structure precludes federal courts from unilaterally
recognizing and applying common law crimes on behalf of the United
States.
For these reasons, the First Congress would not have understood
an alien claim "for a tort only in violation of the law of nations" to
arise under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United
States.' Moreover, although- scholars continue to debate aspects of
Sosa's precise holding, the Supreme Court affirmed, as a matter of
historical understanding, that "the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action."' On this understanding, the statute
merely gave aliens a federal forum to adjudicate common law claims
for law of nations violations that happened to fall within Article III
jurisdiction, such as controversies between a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and a citizen of an American state. The ATS did not
create an independent cause of action arising under federal law.'
These considerations suggest that the ATS was originally enacted
to enable the United States to remedy a specific, but important, law of
nations violation-the intentional infliction of harm by a US citizen
upon the person or personal property of an alien. In the parlance of
the time, such harms constituted "torts" "in violation of the law of
nations." The statute's inclusion of the term "only" following "tort"
23 Article III extends the federal judicial power "to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public ministers and Consuls," and "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." US
Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
24
US Const Art 111, § 2, cl 1. Of course, claims by aliens arising under a treaty would fall
within federal question jurisdiction. Our focus is on claims by aliens arising under the law of nations.
25
See notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
26 See Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 597-616 (cited in note 19) (arguing that the First Congress
did not understand the law of nations to be part of the "Laws of the United States" under
Article III).
27
542 US at 724.
28 Although ATS suits for torts in violation of "a treaty of the United States" may, in
theory, have arisen under such treaty, it is difficult to conceive of an alien-alien tort claim that
would have violated a US treaty.
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was probably meant to emphasize a subcategory of all potential
torts-that is, only those common law torts that violated the law of
nations, in context a class limited to intentional torts committed with
force by US citizens against aliens or their personal property.
Understanding the ATS as one of the means employed by the
First Congress to fulfill the United States' duties under the law of
nations is consistent with the Constitution's allocation of powers to
conduct war and foreign relations. Historically, this allocation of
powers has led the Supreme Court to read federal statutes to avoid
conflict with foreign nations absent a clear indication from the
political branches that they intended to initiate such conflict. The
Supreme Court famously endorsed this approach in Murray v
Schooner Charming Betsy,29 and the same constitutional concerns
animate the Court's adherence to traditional sovereignty-respecting
rules like the act of state doctrine.' By understanding the ATS as a
means of satisfying the United States' obligations under the law of
nations, courts would avoid usurping the constitutional prerogatives
of the political branches."
Courts and scholars have advanced various claims about the
ATS, but none has fully recovered the original meaning of the
statute in its historical context. Some scholars have suggested that
the ATS was originally understood to authorize federal court
jurisdiction over all alien tort claims for law of nations violations,
regardless of the citizenship of the parties.32 These theories are too
broad because they not only fail to account for the jurisdictional
limitations of Article III but also contradict important principles of
the law of nations, which the ATS was meant to uphold. Others have
argued that the ATS was intended to give federal courts jurisdiction
over only particular kinds of paradigmatic law of nations
violations-for example, violations of safe conducts" or certain kinds
6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 84-90 (cited in note 17). The act of state
doctrine dictates that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino,
376 US 398, 416 (1964), quoting Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897).
31 See David H. Moore, Medellin, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of
InternationalLaw, 50 Va J Intl L 485, 498 (2010) (arguing that Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491
(2008), reinforces Sosa's separation of powers approach to reading the ATS).
32 See, for example, William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute:
Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 Va J Intl L 687, 691-96 (2002); William S. Dodge,
The HistoricalOrigins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 Hastings Intl
& Comp L Rev 221, 252-53 (1996); Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding
of the Constitution, 82 Am J Intl L 62,65 (1988).
33 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum L Rev
830, 871 (2006).
29
30
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of admiralty torts.' Similarly, the Supreme Court itself has concluded
that the ATS encompasses only a narrow class of international torts
closely analogous to the three international crimes recognized by
Blackstone." These theories are too narrow because they do not
include certain basic tort claims by aliens that members of the
Founding generation would have understood the ATS to encompass
in order to satisfy the United States' basic obligations under the law of
nations." Still other scholars have contended that history reveals
interpretive presumptions that courts should apply to the ATS,
including a presumption that courts should interpret the ATS
expansively in favor of alien claims because the Founders aspired to
give the law of nations broad effect in the United States." These
theories, however, are anachronistic. Had courts interpreted the ATS
too broadly in 1789, they could have violated distinct principles of the
law of nations recognizing the territorial sovereignty of independent
states.
This Article offers an interpretation of the ATS informed by
well-known principles of the law of nations at the time of its adoption,
by available common law forms of action, and by the limits of
Article III. In 1789, the most natural way to read the ATS, given its
full legal and historical context, was as a grant of jurisdiction to
federal district courts to hear common law tort claims by aliens
against United States citizens for intentional injuries to person or
property. Such harms violated the law of nations and, if not redressed
by the perpetrator's nation, gave the victim's nation just cause for war.
In light of these background principles, the ATS is best understood as
a self-executing, fail-safe measure that enabled the United States to
avoid responsibility for law of nations violations by permitting aliens
to sue US citizens for intentional torts in federal court.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains present-day
confusion surrounding the scope and meaning of the ATS. First, it
34 Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Hastings
Intl & Comp L Rev 445, 451 (1995).
35 Sosa, 542 US at 724-25 (suggesting that Congress had in mind Blackstone's three
primary offenses when drafting the ATS).
36 For instance, John Rogers has argued that the ATS gave jurisdiction for a tort that a US
citizen committed against an alien in the United States for which, if unredressed, the United
States would bear responsibility to another nation. John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and
How Individuals "Violate" InternationalLaw, 21 Vand J Transnatl L 47, 51 (1988). Like others,
however, Professor Rogers does not account for the fact that in 1789 the United States would
have borne responsibility for any unredressed tort committed by a United States citizen against
a foreign citizen, whether committed in the United States or abroad.
37 See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdictionover Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn L Rev 467,489-501 (1986); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor,83 Am J Intl L 461,477-80 (1989).
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describes modern judicial applications of the ATS, culminating in
Sosa. Further, it observes how, after Sosa, courts and scholars have
continued to struggle to understand the proper scope of the ATS.
Finally, Part I explains the methodology by which this Article
analyzes the ATS. The Sosa Court attempted to discern the meaning
of the ATS as it would have been understood by the First Congress in
1789. Most scholars who have analyzed the meaning of the ATS have
considered historical understandings determinative of, or at least
relevant to, how courts should interpret it today. Following this line of
inquiry, this Article examines what, in 1789, was the most reasonable
understanding of the text of the ATS in light of the full legal and
political context surrounding its adoption.
Part II explains the background principles of the common law
and the law of nations against which Congress enacted the ATS and
related statutory provisions. The ATS gave federal district courts
jurisdiction of "all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty."" Well-known principles of
the law of nations established when a tort by a citizen against an alien
would be imputed to the citizen's sovereign. If a citizen of one nation
intentionally inflicted an injury upon the person or personal property
of a citizen of a nation at peace with the first, then the offender
violated the law of nations and the offender's nation became
responsible for the violation if it failed to redress the injury. The
offender's nation could redress the injury by imposing a criminal
punishment on the offender, requiring the offender to make civil
redress, or, if appropriate, extraditing the offender to the offended
nation. Writers on the law of nations-well known to members of the
First Congress -recognized that any of these mechanisms was an
acceptable way for the perpetrator's nation to redress the injury and
to avoid responsibility under the law of nations. In certain instances, a
civil remedy was the only available means of redress. The law of
nations did not require extradition, and a nation might be unable or
unwilling to extradite an offender for a variety of reasons. Moreover,
when a nation's citizen inflicted an injury within another nation's
territorial jurisdiction, the law of nations itself forbade criminal
prosecution, leaving civil remedies as the only means of redress.
In light of this legal framework, Part III describes the political
context that gave rise to the ATS. Members of the Founding
generation were genuinely concerned that violence by US citizens
against aliens would violate the law of nations and lead the United
States into a war that it might not survive. During the Confederation
38

Judiciary Act of 1789

§9, 1 Stat at 77.
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era, British officials linked the treatment of loyalists in the United
States to Britain's refusal to vacate Northwest forts after the
Revolution. The United States could not rely on states to redress
violence against British subjects, as the states had proven themselves
unwilling to do so. Accordingly, the First Congress enacted the ATS
as part of a broader framework to redress offenses against other
nations by US citizens. Although criminal prosecution, extradition, or
civil redress in state court would have satisfied the United States'
obligations under the law of nations, these remedies were often
unavailable or unreliable. A tort suit under the ATS provided a failsafe mechanism that allowed aliens to obtain relief from US citizens in
federal court.
Part IV explains the meaning of the ATS within the larger
context of the first Judiciary Act and Article III. Members of the
Founding generation were aware of the mechanisms by which nations
avoided responsibility under the law of nations for the acts of their
citizens. The First Congress enacted the ATS as part of a larger effort
to redress law of nations violations, modeled on the role of English
courts in upholding the law of nations. The Judiciary Act of 1789
enabled federal courts to redress offenses that US citizens might
commit against ambassadors or against other nations on the high
seas-serious offenses against other nations. It also gave federal
circuit courts criminal jurisdiction over offenses against the United
States. Nonetheless, without more, the Act had gaps and uncertain
application. The Act did not specifically define criminal offenses
against the United States. (That would come later in the Crimes Act
of 1790" and subsequent statutes.) In addition, in the absence of the
ATS, federal courts would have been limited to hearing suits between
aliens and US citizens when the amount in controversy exceeded
$500. Finally, it was unclear in 1789 how the political branches would
proceed when other nations requested extradition of US citizens.
Accordingly, with states unwilling or unable to redress offenses
against other nations, the United States had no reliable mechanism in
1789 to redress injuries that US citizens inflicted against aliens-a
serious and well-known problem under the Articles of Confederation.
The ATS provided just such a mechanism.
Having yet to define statutory crimes or establish extradition
proceedings, the First Congress ensured through the ATS that at least
one means would always be available for the United States to avoid
responsibility under the law of nations for acts of violence committed
39 Act of Apr 30, 1790 ("Crimes Act of 1790"), 1 Stat 112, codified as amended in various
sections of Title 18.
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by its citizens against aliens. The First Congress gave federal courts
jurisdiction over such alien claims in the ATS (§ 9 of the Judiciary Act)
and authorized federal courts to provide appropriate legal remedies
both in § 14 of the Judiciary Act and in the Process Acts of 17894 and
1792.4' The mere availability of these remedies prevented torts against
aliens from being attributed to the United States under the law of
nations because it placed the burden upon the injured alien to seek
redress in federal court. In other words, the mechanism was selfexecuting -it did not require the United States affirmatively to marshal
resources for prosecuting or extraditing an offender. In hindsight, it
may not be surprising that aliens rarely, if ever, invoked ATS
jurisdiction throughout most of US history. There is evidence that, over
time, state court discrimination against aliens dissipated, many loyalists
assimilated into the US population, and state courts became convenient
venues for tort litigation. In practice, the ATS remained a little-usedbut symbolically important - backstop, authorizing redress of law of
nations violations whenever state courts, federal criminal prosecutions,
or extradition proceedings failed to provide it.
The primary goal of this Article is to identify what the ATS
meant at the time of its enactment. The implications of that meaning
for present-day applications of the ATS present problems of
translation and interpretation that are beyond the scope of this
Article. Yet because the Supreme Court in Sosa attempted to apply
the original meaning of the ATS to modern circumstances, Part V
revisits the Court's historical analysis in light of the meaning we have
uncovered. In particular, the Sosa Court made several discrete
determinations about the historical meaning of the ATS, ultimately
instructing courts to allow only claims "defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms." 42 We
examine each of these determinations, explaining which ones fairly
reflect the original meaning of the ATS and which ones run counter to
such meaning. Additionally, we identify other questions regarding the
original meaning of the ATS that Sosa did not resolve but that remain
important for present-day ATS litigation. Although this Part does not
purport to resolve all outstanding questions under the ATS, it
highlights the importance of the ATS's original legal and political
context to any attempt to understand the statute today.43
Act of Sept 29, 1789 ("Process Act of 1789"), 1 Stat 93.
Act of May 8, 1792 ("Process Act of 1792"), 1 Stat 275.
42 Sosa, 542 US at 725.
43 This Article does not address Congress's power to create federal causes of action for
alien plaintiffs in US courts. We assume that Congress has significant power to create federal
causes of action in favor of aliens in the exercise of its enumerated powers. This Article
40

41
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I. MODERN CONFUSION REGARDING THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Courts had few occasions to interpret and apply the ATS for
most of US history. In the early years of the Republic, aliens rarely
brought cases in federal district court seeking a remedy for torts
suffered at the hands of Americans. Had such suits been brought, they
would have fallen within the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction over
controversies between US citizens and foreign citizens or subjects."
Beginning in 1980, however, lower federal courts began interpreting
the ATS to permit aliens to sue other aliens for actions taken outside
the United States in violation of modern norms of customary
international law. They justified this use of the statute by relying on
the assumption that the law of nations "has always been part of the
federal common law,"" and that suits between aliens under the ATS
therefore arise under federal law for purposes of Article 1 11 .
In 2004, the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first time
in Sosa. The Court held that the ATS was solely a jurisdictional
statute and did not create a federal cause of action. At the same time,
the Court assumed that the statute permitted aliens to bring claims
like those that the First Congress had in mind when it enacted the
ATS. Although the opinion is not a model of clarity," the Court
repeatedly emphasized the importance of historical context to a
proper understanding of the ATS. We agree with the Court's
emphasis on historical context, but believe that the Court did not fully
recover the relevant context.
A. Early Invocation of the ATS
Prior to the recent resurgence of the ATS, the only significant
invocation of the statute in federal court occurred in 1795. In Bolchos
v Darrel,' a French privateer brought an enemy Spanish vessel that it
had captured on the high seas into port in South Carolina." The ship
had on board slaves that a Spanish subject had mortgaged to Savage, a

addresses only the question of what jurisdiction Congress in fact conferred on federal courts in
1789 through the ATS.
44 US Const Art III, §2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.").
45 Filartigav Pena-Irala,630 F2d 876, 885 (2d Cir 1980).
46 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority.").
47
See Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporationof InternationalLaw, 120 Harv L
Rev F 28,28 (2007) (observing that the Sosa opinion "has become something of a Rorschach blot").
48 3 F Cases 810 (D SC 1795).
49 Id at 810.
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British subject.' Darrel, apparently a US citizen, seized the slaves on
behalf of Savage. Bolchos was a suit in admiralty brought against
Darrel by a French privateer who claimed that the ship, including its
cargo of slaves, was a lawful prize. District Judge Thomas Bee "was at
first doubtful whether [the district court] had jurisdiction, Darrel's
seizure, under the mortgage, having been made on land."" He
concluded, however, that "as the original cause arose at sea, every
thing dependent on it is triable in the admiralty."52 "Besides," he
remarked, "as the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress gives this
court concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of
the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law
of nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all doubt upon
this point."" In other words, the court concluded that it had two
alternative bases for jurisdiction: admiralty or the ATS. The predicate
tort under the ATS, as Professor Thomas Lee has noted, was
"Darrel's seizure of the slaves on American soil."" To the extent the
ATS conferred jurisdiction, federal courts had authority to provide a
French citizen with a remedy for a US citizen's wrongful conduct
aimed at the plaintiff's claimed property. Such jurisdiction would have
prevented France from imputing Darrel's tort to the United States
under the law of nations. Although at least one early attorney general
had occasion to interpret the ATS," Bolchos contains the only
significant judicial discussion of the statute in the early Republic."
B.

Filartigaand the Modern Expansion of the ATS

Starting in 1980, some lower courts began interpreting the ATS
to permit aliens to sue other aliens for violations of international law
that occurred outside the United States. In the first such case, Filartiga
v Pena-Irala,"the Second Circuit allowed citizens of Paraguay to sue
another citizen of Paraguay for wrongfully causing their son's death

Id.
Id.
52
Bolchos, 3 F Cases at 810.
53
Id.
54
Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 893 (cited in note 33).
55 See text accompanying notes 369-72.
56 The only other reference to the ATS came in Moxon v The Fanny, 17 F Cases 942 (D Pa
1793). There, the British owners of a ship captured by a French vessel in US waters libeled the ship
and sought restoration thereof in US district court. Although the court acknowledged that the
capture was an offense against the US as a neutral power, it declined to adjudicate the dispute on
the ground that the offense must be left to the executive branch. Id at 947. In dicta, the court also
noted that the case did not fall within the ATS because "[i]t cannot be called a suit for a tort only,
when the property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for." Id at 948.
57 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
50

51
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by the use of torture. The court concluded that "deliberate torture
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of
the nationality of the parties."' The court reasoned that if the alleged
torturer is found and served with process by an alien in the United
States, then the ATS provides federal jurisdiction because the alien is
suing for a tort in violation of the law of nations.' Without further
explanation, the court held that its exercise of jurisdiction was
consistent with the limits of Article III because the case arose under
"the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal
common law."' The court recognized that its "reasoning might also
sustain jurisdiction under the general federal question provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1331," but indicated that it preferred to rest its decision on
the ATS given the close coincidence between the subject matter of the
statute and "the jurisdictional facts presented in this case.""
Although several circuits have followed Filartiga'slead,' the DC
Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's approach in Tel-Oren v Libyan
Arab Republic.6 Israeli citizens sued several Palestinian organizations,
alleging that they were responsible for an armed attack on a civilian
bus in Israel that killed and injured numerous civilians and thus
amounted to tortious acts in violation of the law of nations." The DC
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint in a
brief per curiam opinion, and all three judges wrote separate
concurrences. Judge Harry Edwards indicated that the ATS allowed
federal courts to hear some cases alleging violations of established
international law-such as genocide, slavery, and systematic racial
discrimination- but concluded that terrorism against civilians was not
sufficient to support a claim under the statute." The other judges on
the panel took an even more restrictive approach. Judge Robert Bork
concluded that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute that does not
itself create a private cause of action." In his view, separation of
powers precludes federal courts from inferring a cause of action from

58
59

Id at 878.

64
65

Id at 775.

See id at 878-79.
60 Id at 885-86.
61 Filartiga, 630 F2d at 887 n 22 (attributing the "paucity of suits successfully maintained
under [the Alien Tort Statute]" to the difficulty of establishing a violation of the law of nations,
rather than a controversy over proper jurisdiction).
62 See, for example, Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 848 (11th Cir 1996); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir 1994).
63 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984) (per curiam).

66

Id at 781, 796 (Edwards concurring).
Id at 811 (Bork concurring).
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the ATS or creating a federal common law cause of action for
violations of customary international law. He reasoned that
recognition of a cause of action in this context should be left to the
political branches because the decision "would necessarily affect the
foreign policy interests of the nation."" Judge Roger Robb concurred
on the ground that the dispute presented a nonjusticiable political
question. He thought that courts lacked judicially manageable
standards for determining the international legal status of terrorism
and that they should leave such politically sensitive issues to the
executive branch for diplomatic resolution.'
Courts and commentators continued to debate the meaning of
the ATS prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa. The Second
Circuit took an expansive approach to the statute and allowed aliens
to sue other aliens for a variety of claims.6 The DC Circuit, by
contrast, took a more restrictive approach." Scholars were similarly
divided. Some maintained that the ATS created a federal cause of
action-and hence triggered federal question jurisdiction -because
the law of nations was a form of federal common law." Others argued
that the ATS was a purely jurisdictional statute that created no
federal cause of action.' This uncertainty led Congress to enact the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 199113 (TVPA). The Act gives
individuals (including aliens) an express federal statutory cause of
action against other individuals (including aliens) for acts of torture
and extrajudicial killing taken under color of law of any foreign
nation.4 But the Act did not amend-or resolve the uncertainty
surrounding-the ATS. Accordingly, the lower courts continued to
struggle to interpret and apply the ATS.'
Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 801 (Bork concurring).
Id at 826-27 (Robb concurring).
69 See Kadic v Karadi6,70 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir 1995) (holding that an individual can be
sued in his private capacity for "genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity").
70 See Al Odah v United States, 321 F3d 1134, 1144-45 (DC Cir 2003) (denying jurisdiction
to foreign detainees).
71 See Dodge, 42 Va J Intl L at 710-11 (cited in note 32); Ryan Goodman and Derek P.
Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
Fordham L Rev 463, 480 (1997).
72 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, and David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
InternationalLaw, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv L Rev 869, 887-88 (2007);
Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 597-98, 616 (cited in note 19).
73 Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (1992).
74 TVPA § 2, 106 Stat at 73.
75 Even after Sosa, lower courts continue to struggle with the ATS. In particular, lower
courts have struggled to decide whether the ATS applies to corporate defendants or imposes
aiding and abetting liability. See, for example, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 621 F3d 111,
145 (2d Cir 2010) (holding that the ATS does not create jurisdiction over suits against corporate
defendants because corporate liability is not a universal norm of international law); Lizarbe v
67
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Sosa and the ATS

The Supreme Court addressed the ATS for the first time in 2004.
Sosa arose out of the kidnapping of Humberto Alvarez-Machain in
Mexico in order to force him to stand trial in the United States for the
murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent. The agent was
captured in Mexico by members of a drug cartel, tortured for several
days, and then murdered. The United States alleged that Alvarez, a
Mexican doctor, treated him in order to prolong his torture and
interrogation.' A federal grand jury indicted Alvarez for murder, but
Mexican authorities refused to extradite the defendant to the United
States. The DEA approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to
capture Alvarez in Mexico and bring him to the United States for
trial. Jose Francisco Sosa and several others abducted Alvarez from
his home in Mexico and transported him to Texas, where he was
taken into US custody to stand trial.' At the close of the government's
case, the district court granted the defendant's motion for acquittal,
thereby taking the case from the jury and preventing any appeals."
The defendant returned to Mexico and filed suit in federal court
under the ATS and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against
Sosa, several other Mexican nationals, the United States, and four US
DEA agents for their participation in bringing him to the United
States. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the district court
awarded Alvarez $25,000 in damages against Sosa but disposed of the
ATS claims against the DEA agents and the United States by
substituting the United States for the individual defendants and then
dismissing the FTCA claim against the United States.' The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the award under the ATS but reversed the dismissal
of the FTCA claim against the United States."
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on both points,
leaving Alvarez without a remedy in federal court. First, it concluded
that the FTCA claim against the United States fell within the
statutory exception for claims arising in a foreign country.' Second, it
Rondon, 642 F Supp 2d 473,491 (D Md 2009) ("[C]ase law recognizes causes of action for aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, and joint criminal enterprise under the ATS."). See also Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc, 244 F Supp 2d 289, 320-21 (SDNY 2003) (holding that
the ATS creates a cause of action against a corporation for aiding and abetting crimes against
humanity, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing).
76 Sosa, 542 US at 697.
77
Id at 697-98.
78 Alvarez-Machain v United States, 107 F3d 696,699 (9th Cir 1996).
79 28 USC §§ 1346(b), 2671-80.
8o Alvarez-Machain v United States, 266 F3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir 2001).
81 See Alvarez-Machain v UnitedStates, 331 F3d 604, 610,620,641 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc).
82 Sosa, 542 US at 699.
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held that the ATS did not authorize Alvarez to sue Sosa for his
abduction and detention in Mexico.' In the course of deciding the
case, the Court undertook an extensive analysis of the ATS. The
Court began by concluding that "the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action."' The Court rejected the idea,
however, that the First Congress passed the ATS "as a jurisdictional
convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress.""
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the ATS was designed to
permit adjudication of a narrow class of torts in violation of the law of
nations that would have been recognized within the common law of
the time.' In the Court's view, Congress enacted the jurisdictional
grant "on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations
with a potential for personal liability at the time."
Applying this understanding to the case, the Court concluded
that Alvarez's claim for arbitrary detention fell outside the narrow
range of violations contemplated by the ATS. According to the Court,
the historical record suggests that the First Congress enacted the ATS
simply to redress those torts corresponding to three primary criminal
offenses against the law of nations under English law identified by
Blackstone: "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy."" In the Court's view, this meant that
"courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the [three] 18th-century paradigms."" Applying this
standard, the Court concluded that Alvarez's claim based on "a single
illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody
to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation
of a federal remedy.""
The Sosa Court identified several reasons "for great caution in
adapting the law of nations to private rights."" At the same time, the
Court rejected Justice Antonin Scalia's position that the ATS permits

8

Id at 738.
Id at 724.
Id at 719.
See Sosa, 542 US at 714, 720.
Id at 724.

88

Id.

89

Id at 725.

90
91

Sosa, 542 US at 738.
Id at 725-28. See notes 454-59 and accompanying text.
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no new claims for violations of modern customary international law.'
As the Court put it, whereas Justice Scalia would "close the door to
further independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms, other considerations persuade us that the judicial power should
be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international
norms today."" According to the Court, this approach prevents courts
from overstepping their role vis-A-vis the political branches but fulfills
the First Congress's assumption "that federal courts could properly
identify some international norms as enforceable in the exercise of
§ 1350 jurisdiction.""
The Court's opinion in Sosa leaves a number of important
questions unanswered. The Court did not directly address the
Article III basis for subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims. The
Court simply stated several times that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional
statute that creates no federal cause of action.' It also denied the
assertion in Justice Scalia's concurrence that ATS claims (as
contemplated by the Court) necessarily arise under federal law and
are thus supported by 28 USC § 1331." Technically, the Court did not
have to address the Article III issues in Sosa because it held that
Alvarez's claim was outside the scope of the ATS." As a related
matter, the Court did not expressly resolve whether the ATS
encompasses claims between aliens that arise in foreign nations, which
Article III allows only if such claims arise under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
Since Sosa, courts and scholars have continued to debate the
scope and meaning of the ATS." Lower federal courts have focused
See Sosa, 542 US at 746-47 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id at 729 (majority).
94 Id at 730.
95
Id at 724.
96
Sosa, 542 US at 731 & n 19.
In addition, Sosa itself began as a diversity action by an alien against a US citizen (with
97
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim against a fellow alien).
98 See Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore, 120 Harv L Rev at 893-901 (cited in note 72)
(stating that Sosa authorized courts to create some federal causes of action under the ATS but
suggesting that the scope of these causes of action remains ambiguous); Beth Stephens, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain "The Door Is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70
Brooklyn L Rev 533, 535 (2005) (describing Sosa as a "clear victory" for human rights activists);
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the
Futureof InternationalHuman Rights Litigationin U.S. Courts, 57 Vand L Rev 2241, 2255 (2004)
(arguing that Sosa reaffirmed the continued applicability of international law norms to federal
law after Erie); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain What Piracy
Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L Rev 111, 155-56 (2004)
(arguing that modern international norms are inconsistent with historical antecedents and thus
do not meet Sosa's requirements for a cause of action under the ATS).
9

93
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primarily on the kinds of international torts that qualify under the
ATS and have permitted or dismissed suits on this basis. These
decisions reveal continued confusion regarding the kinds of
international law violations that trigger the statute.
D.

The ATS in Historical Context

In keeping with Sosa's methodology, we examine how a person
knowledgeable of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Constitution, and the
general legal and political context of the day would have understood
the text of the ATS in 1789. We agree with the Sosa Court's general
conclusion that the ATS should be interpreted to fulfill its historic
function of allowing aliens to bring suits for violations of the law of
nations. The historical context surrounding its adoption, however,
reveals that the Sosa Court defined the statute's scope too narrowly.
The relevant legal and political context suggests that the statute
authorized suits by aliens against US citizens for law of nations
violations that, if left unredressed, would be attributed to the United
States. Sosa is too restrictive in suggesting that the ATS originally
encompassed only torts corresponding to a narrow class of law of
nations violations that English law criminalized-violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. In
1789, Congress would have reasonably understood the ATS to
encompass all tort claims for intentional injuries that a US citizen
inflicted upon the person or property of an alien. The United States
would have been responsible to the victim's nation for all such
violations of the law of nations if it failed to redress them, and the text
of the ATS reflects that concern." On the other hand, Sosa is too
broad if the opinion is read-as some lower courts have done-to

assume that the ATS originally permitted one alien to sue another in
US courts for conduct occurring outside the territory of the United
States. Although Sosa did not expressly address this question, some
lower courts have understood the opinion to permit such suits. The
law of nations did not obligate the United States to provide a remedy
in such cases and, to the contrary, arguably prohibited adjudication of
such disputes."
Our account of the ATS is consistent with the original purpose of
the statute: to prevent US violations of the law of nations and reduce
friction with other nations. By providing aliens with a means of
redressing intentional harms inflicted by Americans, the United States
avoided responsibility under the law of nations. This understanding of
99 See notes 341-51 and accompanying text.
100 See Part II.C.
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the ATS also accords with the jurisdictional limits of Article III because
every suit by an alien against a US citizen- regardless of the nature of
the claim or the amount in controversy -falls squarely within the
federal courts' jurisdiction over controversies "between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.,,... After
examining the original meaning of the ATS in Parts II through IV, we
evaluate Sosa in light of this understanding in Part V.
II. ALIEN CLAIMS AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS

Recovering the meaning of the ATS requires an appreciation of
the larger legal and historical context in which it was adopted. In the
1780s, following the War of Independence, states and their citizens
took a range of actions that violated the law of nations. A
foundational principle of the law of nations at the Founding required
that each nation reciprocally respect certain rights of every other
nation to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct diplomatic relations,
exercise neutral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty." In addition, the
law of nations obliged each nation to respect every other nation's
sovereign duty to protect its members."'o Various important law of
nations rules followed from these foundational principles, including
rules protecting treaty rights, rights of ambassadors, neutral use of the
high seas, and the personal security of aliens from acts of violence.
Various actions by US states violated such law of nations rules. In
particular, states failed to uphold the rights of British creditors under
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783," interfered with the rights of
ambassadors, mishandled admiralty cases, and failed to redress acts of
violence by their citizens against British subjects." Even where states
acted to redress law of nations violations, the inability of the
Confederation Congress to do so was manifest." In the 1780s, two
101 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
102 See Emmerich de Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature:
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk III, § 26 at 10-11 (Coote 1759)
(concluding that violations of a nation's perfect rights provide just cause for war).
103 See Emmerich de Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature:
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk I, § 17 at 13 (Newberry 1759)
(explaining that a nation is "obliged carefully to preserve all its members ... since the loss even
of one of its members weakens it, and is injurious to its preservation"); id at bk II, §§ 71-72 at
144 (describing the responsibilities of a state "not to suffer" its citizens-subjects injuring citizenssubjects of another state, for to do so would offend the foreign state, "which ought to protect
[its] citizen[s]").
104 Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and His Britannic
Majesty, 8 Stat 80, Treaty Ser No 104 (1783) ("Paris Peace Treaty"). See notes 259-77 and
accompanying text.
105 See notes 278-91 and accompanying text.
106 See notes 292-304 and accompanying text.
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famous incidents occurred involving the rights of foreign diplomats, a
special concern under the law of nations. Although not directly
relevant to the ATS, these incidents illustrate a broader public
concern with the Confederation Congress's inability to uphold the law
of nations after independence. First, in 1784, a French subject, Charles
Julian de Longchamps, insulted and physically assaulted the French
General Counsel and Secretary of Legation in Philadelphia, Francois
de Barbee Marbois. A Pennsylvania state court convicted and
sentenced Longchamps for the offense, but denied Marbois's request
for Longchamps's extradition." The Confederation Congress lacked
power to do anything to address this incident other than pass
resolutions and make recommendations to the states." Second, in
1787, during the Federal Convention, a New York city constable
created a similar incident by entering the residence of the Dutch
minister plenipotentiary to the United States, Pieter Johan van
Berckel, with a warrant to arrest a member of his household." Van
Berckel protested to John Jay, the American foreign affairs secretary,
who reported to Congress that "the foederal Government does not
appear ... to be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the
Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.".. These incidents highlight
public awareness of the Confederation Congress's general inability to
redress law of nations violations in the states."
The Confederation's inability to remedy or curtail violations like
these was a significant factor precipitating the Federal Convention of
1787. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked effective
power to countervail state violations of the law of nations. As
Professors David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch have observed, "a
core purpose of American constitution-making was to facilitate the
107 Respublica v De Longchamps, 1 US (1 Dali) 111, 116 (Pa Ct Oyer & Terminer 1784)
(acknowledging that extradition might nonetheless be appropriate in extreme cases).
108 See John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 28 Journals of the ContinentalCongress, 1774-1789 314-15
(GPO 1933).
109 See Roscoe R. Hill, ed, 34Journalsof the ContinentalCongress,1774-1789109 (GPO 1937).
110 Id at 111. For detailed discussion of these incidents, see, for example, Lee, 106 Colum L
Rev at 860-62 (cited in note 33); Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 637-42 (cited in note 19); Dodge, 19
Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev at 229-30 (cited in note 32); Casto, 18 Conn L Rev at 491-94 (cited
in note 37).
111 The Continental Congress did create a federal court of appeals to review prize cases
initially adjudicated in state court. See Henry J. Bourguignon, The First Federal Court: The
Federal Appellate Prize Court of the American Revolution, 1775-1787 115 (American
Philosophical Society 1977). Some states, however, refused to recognize the federal court's
authority to revise state court judgments. See, for example, Ross v Rittenhouse, 2 US (2 Dalil)
160, 163 (Pa 1792). Although the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the early federal court's
appellate authority, see United States v Peters, 9 US (5 Cranch) 115, 140 (1809), exclusive federal
jurisdiction over prize cases was not established until the adoption of the Constitution and the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
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admission of the United States into the European-based system of
sovereign states governed by the law of nations."" Accordingly, "[tihe
Constitution employed a number of devices" to advance this
purpose"'-including assigning foreign relations powers to the
political branches and excluding states from the exercise of such
powers." Moreover, the Constitution "incorporated a series of
mechanisms designed both to ensure, and to manifest to foreign
governments, that the new federal government would observe treaties
and the law of nations."" The Constitution allocated "a portion of
that duty to the courts" by giving them jurisdiction over cases likely to
involve the law of nations."' Federal court jurisdiction as a mechanism
for upholding the law of nations "could be less explicit" than other
mechanisms "because the framers borrowed it from British
practice.""..
By the 1780s, England had adopted much of the law of nations as
English municipal law. In the late eighteenth century, English judges
thus routinely applied the law of nations to the extent it was
incorporated as "part of the law of England.""' (After independence,
American states adopted the common law-and, by extension,
principles of the law of nations that it incorporated-as part of state
law."') English courts upheld their nation's obligations under the law
of nations in various ways. "It was well understood," Professors
Golove and Hulsebosch explain, "that the greatest number of cases
raising questions under the law of nations would fall under admiralty
jurisdiction." English admiralty courts applied the law of nations in

112 David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of InternationalRecognition, 85 NYU L Rev
932, 935 (2010).
113 Id at 991.
114 Id at 991-94.
115 Id at 994-95.

116 Golove and Hulsebosch, 85 NYU L Rev at 1000 (cited in note 112).
117 Id at 1000-01.

118 See Triquet v Bath, 97 Eng Rep 936, 938 (KB 1764) (Mansfield) (explaining that "Lord
Talbot declared a clear opinion [in 1736]-'That the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of
the law of England"'), quoting Buvot v Barbut, 25 Eng Rep 777, 778 (Ch 1736). See also
Blackstone, 4 Commentariesat 67 (cited in note 9) ("The law of nations (wherever any question
arises which is properly the object of [its] jurisdiction) is here adopted in [its] full extent by the
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land."); Philip Hamburger, Beyond
Protection, 109 Colum L Rev 1823, 1942 (2009) ("Even higher laws were understood to be
legally binding in England only to the extent they were recognized by the common law."); Philip
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 62, 349-50 & n 43 (Harvard 2008) (explaining how the law
of nations applied in English courts in the eighteenth century insofar as English law
incorporated it).
119 See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 29 (cited in note 17).
120 Golove and Hulsebosch, 85 NYU L Rev at 1002 (cited in note 112).
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various kinds of cases arising on the high seas, including prize. 21 The
Founders regarded prize cases, in particular, as the "most important
part" of admiralty jurisdiction,m because jurisdiction over such cases
was "a necessary appendage to the power of war[] and negotiations
with foreign nations."'" Moreover, English law recognized the rights
and immunities of foreign ambassadors and other diplomatic officials
in common law cases." Finally, and of most relevance to the ATS,
English courts provided various forms of redress for harms that
English subjects inflicted upon foreign citizens. The laws of England
provided not only criminal punishments but also civil remedies against
British subjects who used force to injure the person or personal
property of aliens. Both citizens and lawfully visiting aliens in amity
generally could claim the protection of a nation's laws.l" Aliens within
protection could pursue both actions arising locally and transitory
actions against citizens of the host nation." (Alien enemies, in
contrast, were generally not entitled to the protection of a nation's
laws and thus could not seek redress in its courts. 27 ) By exercising

See notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
Federalist 80 (Hamilton), in The Federalist534, 538 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
123 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 615 (Hilliard, Gray
1833). Prize courts had the responsibility of applying the law of nations to resolve disputes
involving captures on the high seas. "If justice be there denied, the nation itself becomes
responsible to the parties aggrieved," and the nation to which the aggrieved parties belong "may
vindicate their rights, either by a peaceful appeal to negotiation, or by a resort to arms." Id. See
also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,144 U Pa L Rev
1245, 1334-40 (1996) (explaining the importance of prize jurisdiction in the early Republic).
124 See notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
125 Hamburger, 109 Colum L Rev at 1847 (cited in note 118). Protection and allegiance
were reciprocal obligations: foreign citizen-subjects present in another nation at peace with their
own were presumed to have submitted to the government and laws of that nation and thus
entitled to its protection. Id.
126 See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 372 (cited in note 9) (describing the right of aliens to
bring personal actions, including transitory ones). For a description of the difference between
local and transitory actions, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr, CongressionalPower and State Court
Jurisdiction,94 Georgetown L J 949, 955-66 (2006).
127 See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 372 (cited in note 9) (explaining that "alien enemies
have no rights, no privileges, unless by the king's special favour, during the time of war"). The
same rule obtained in American states. See Cruden v Neale, 2 NC (1 Haywood) 338, 344 (NC
Super Ct L & Eq 1796) ("All persons in general, as well foreigners as citizens, may come into
this court to recover rights withheld, and to obtain satisfaction for injuries done, unless where
they are subject to some disability the law imposes. Foreigners are in general entitled to sue,
unless a war exists between our country and theirs."); Bayard v Singleton, 1 NC (1 Mart) 5, 9
(NC Super Ct L & Eq 1787) ("The law of England, which we have adopted,... does not allow
an alien ENEMY any political rights at all."); Arnold v Sergeant, 1 Root 86, 86 (Conn Super Ct
1783) ("The defendant plead in abatement-That Amos Arnold one of the plaintiffs was an
alien enemy, etc. which plea was judged sufficient."); Wilcox v Henry, 1 US (1 Dall) 69, 71 (Pa
1782) ("An alien enemy has no right of action whatever during the war; but by the law of
nations, confirmed by universal usage, at the end of the war, all the rights and credits, which the
121
122
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jurisdiction over claims for injuries inflicted by its citizens on the
persons or property of aliens in amity, a nation avoided responsibility
under the law of nations for its citizens' misconduct. Such
responsibility left a nation open to retaliation-including military
retaliation-by the victim's nation.
The First Congress enacted a number of jurisdictional provisions
that mimicked the jurisdiction of English courts in order to enable the
United States to comply with its various obligations under the law of
nations. Most importantly, the First Congress gave federal district
courts admiralty jurisdiction, enabling them to uphold the law of
nations in prize, piracy, and other cases involving the neutral rights of
other nations to use the open seas. The Congress also gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors
and appellate jurisdiction in cases involving treaty rights. Finally, in
the ATS, the First Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction to provide
civil redress for harms that United States citizens inflicted upon
foreign citizens. Although such harms were not as momentous for
foreign relations as cases involving ambassadors or prize, the United
States had to provide some form of redress if it wished to comply fully
with the law of nations and avoid responsibility (and even war).
Seen in this light, the ATS, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789, authorized district courts to hear alien tort claims for which the
United States would become responsible under the law of nations if
not adequately redressed. The ATS was enacted against a well-known
background understanding of when the law of nations held nations
responsible for the torts of their citizens. Private citizens were said to
violate the law of nations if they engaged in certain acts that breached
the peace of nations by triggering an obligation on the part of their
nation to provide redress or face reprisals. One act constituting such a
law of nations violation was the intentional infliction of injury upon
the person or personal property of an alien friend-that is, a citizen of
another nation at peace with the first. Under the law of nations, the
transgressor's nation was responsible for the violation if it failed to
redress the injury. A nation could redress the injury by providing
criminal punishment, a civil remedy, or extradition of the offender.
Common law courts gave aliens tort remedies against citizens of the
forum, thereby enabling the forum nation to avoid responsibility for
law of nations violations and potential military reprisals. The First
Congress regarded state courts as unable or unwilling to provide such

subjects of either power had against the other, are revived; for, during the war, they are not
extinguished, but merely suspended.").
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remedies, and thus enacted the ATS in order to assign this function to
newly minted federal courts.
This Part describes the circumstances under which an injury that
a nation's citizen inflicted upon the citizen of another nation could be
imputed to the offender's nation. It further explains how the law of
England avoided responsibility for such offenses by providing
criminal punishment and civil remedies. Those knowledgeable of the
Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the general legal and
political context of the time would have reasonably understood the
ATS to serve the similar function of preventing the United States
from being held responsible by other nations for torts committed by
US citizens against aliens. The historical context recounted in this Part
provides essential background for understanding the original meaning
of the ATS.
A.

State Responsibility for Individual Offenses under the Law
of Nations

In accordance with the law of nations, English law avoided
friction with other nations by redressing British subjects' offenses
against other nations and their citizens. To appreciate how members
of the Founding generation understood these aspects of the law of
nations, it is important to examine the writings of Emmerich de
Vattel. As many have observed, Vattel's treatise, The Law of Nations,
was well known in England and the American states at the time of the
Founding." Vattel specifically addressed "the Concern a Nation may
have in the Actions of its Citizens."l 29 "Private persons," he observed,
"who are the members of one nation, may offend and ill-treat the
citizens of another, and may injure a foreign sovereign."" He thus
128 See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 15-16 (cited in note 17); Mark Weston Janis,
The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations, 1789-1914 57 (Clarendon
2004) ("Those meeting at Philadelphia to draft the document were not deficient in formal
training in the law of nations."); Douglas J. Sylvester, InternationalLaw as Sword or Shield?
Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1, 67 (1999)
(explaining that, in early American judicial decisions, "in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were
nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius, twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and a staggering
ninety-two to Vattel"); David Gray Adler, The President's Recognition Power, in David Gray
Adler and Larry N. George, eds, The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy
133, 137 (Kansas 1996) ("During the Founding period and well beyond, Vattel was, in the
United States, the unsurpassed publicist on international law."); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law
of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U Pa L Rev 26, 35 (1952)
(explaining that this treatise and the writings of Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and JeanJacques Burlamaqui "were an essential and significant part of the minimal equipment of any
lawyer of erudition in the eighteenth century").
129 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, ch 6 at 144 (cited in note 103).
130 Id at bk II, § 71 at 144.
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examined the question of "what share a state may have in the actions
of its citizens," and, correspondingly, "what are the rights and
obligations of sovereigns in this respect."" Vattel explained, first, that
any person who harms a citizen of another nation harms that citizen's
nation: "Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which
ought to protect this citizen."132 A nation owed its members a duty of
protection.' A person who harmed a citizen of another nation thereby
offended that nation, which was duty-bound to protect its members
from harm. According to Vattel, a nation so offended "should revenge
the injuries, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make
intire satisfaction; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great
end of the civil association, which is safety.""
An infringement of the rights of ambassadors and other public
ministers was a particularly egregious offense against a nation.
Ambassadors and other public ministers represented "the person and
dignity of a sovereign."" Public ministers were "necessary
instruments in affairs which sovereigns have among themselves, and
to that correspondence which they have a right of carrying on."" The
right to send public ministers-and thus the rights, privileges, and
immunities of public ministers-were inviolable because "[a] respect
due to sovereigns should reflect on their representatives, and chiefly
on their ambassadors, as representing his master's person in the first
degree."' Thus, an offense to an ambassador or other public minister
was an offense against the state itself. Violence or insult to, or an
arrest of, an ambassador or public minister, or his household
members, violated the law of nations.
Of particular relevance to the ATS, a nation had a duty to
prevent its citizens from harming not only ambassadors and public

131

Id.
Id. Pufendorf similarly explained that "a result of the union into a civil body is that an
injury done to one of its members by foreigners is regarded as affecting the entire state." Samuel
von Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo bk VIII, ch 6, § 13 at 1305 (Clarendon
1934) (C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather, trans) (originally published 1688).
133 According to Pufendorf, "the chief end of states is that men should by mutual
understanding and assistance be insured against losses and injuries which can be and commonly
are brought upon them by other men, and that by these means they may enjoy peace or have
sufficient protection against enemies." Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae at bk VII, ch 4, § 3 at 1011
(cited in note 132).
134 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 71 at 144 (cited in note 103).
135 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk IV, § 78 at 140 (cited in note 102).
136 Id at bk IV, § 57 at 133.
137 Id at bk IV, § 80 at 142.
138 Id at bk IV, § 81 at 142; id at bk IV, § 110 at 160-61.
132
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ministers whom it received,"' but all foreign citizens whom it admitted
within its borders:
[T]he nation or the sovereign, ought not to suffer the citizens to
do an injury to the subjects of another state, much less to offend
the state itself. And that not only because no sovereign ought to
permit those who are under his command to violate the precepts
of the law of nature, which forbids all injuries; but also because
nations ought mutually to respect each other, to abstain from all
offence, from all abuse, from all injury, and, in a word, from
every thing that may be of prejudice to others."
Vattel elaborated that as soon as the sovereign admits foreigners, "he
engages to protect them as his own subjects, and to make them enjoy,
as much as depends on him, an intire security.""' A nation also had a
duty not to harm foreigners in their own country" and a duty not to
interfere with their use of the open seas."' A key inquiry for Vattel
was under what circumstances a nation became responsible for an
offense that its citizen committed against another nation. Vattel
recognized that not all actions of citizens could be imputed to their
nation: "[I]t is impossible for the best regulated state, or for the most
vigilant and absolute sovereign, to model at his pleasure all the
actions of his subjects, and to confine them on every occasion, to the
most exact obedience."" A nation would be responsible, however, if
it sanctioned the harm that its citizen inflicted. As Vattel explained, a
nation "ought not to suffer his subjects to molest the subjects of

139 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk IV, § 82 at 142 (cited in note 102) ("To admit a
minister, to acknowledge him in such quality, is engaging to grant him the most particular
protection, and that he shall enjoy all possible safety.").
140 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 72 at 144 (cited in note 103).
141 Id at bk II, § 104 at 154.
142 Id at bk II, § 72 at 144.
143 See id at bk I, § 282 at 114 (describing "[t]he right of navigating and fishing in the open
sea" as "a right common to all men," the violation of which furnishes a nation with "a sufficient
cause for war").
144 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk 1I, § 73 at 144 (cited in note 103). Pufendorf similarly
observed that

a community, whether civil or of any other kind, is not responsible for the actions of
individual members, except by some culpable act of commission or omission on its own
part, for no matter how much a state may threaten, there is always left to the wil of citizens
the natural liberty to do otherwise, so that in no way can a state stand good for the actions
of its individual subjects.
Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae at bk VIII, ch 6, § 12 at 1304 (cited in note 132) (emphasizing that
a state will not be deemed responsible or accountable for every action by a citizen-subject). See
also Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 454 (Innys, et al, 1738) (Jean Barbeyrac, ed)
("No civil Society, or other publick Body, is accountable for the Faults of its particular
Members, unless it has concurred with them, or has been negligent in attending to its Charge.").
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others, or to do them an injury, much less should he permit them
audaciously to offend foreign powers."1 4 If a nation "approves and
ratifies the [act] committed by a citizen, it makes the act its own: the
offence ought then to be attributed to the nation, as the author of the
true injury, of which the citizen is, perhaps, only the instrument."'"
Vattel identified two ways in which a nation could approve or
ratify the act of its citizen, and thus be responsible for an offense
against another nation. First, a nation would be responsible for the
transgression of its citizen against another nation if it authorized the
transgression ex ante. "[T]he nation in general, is guilty of the base
attempt of its members," Vattel explained, "when by its manners or
the maxims of its government it accustoms, and authorizes its citizens
to plunder, and use ill foreigners indifferently, or to make inroads into
the neighbouring countries, &c."..
Second, a nation would be responsible if it failed to attempt to
redress its members' transgressions ex post. Vattel identified various
means by which a nation could redress a private offense against a
foreign nation. They included criminal punishment, a civil remedy, or
extradition of the offender to the offended nation. A nation, Vattel
explained, "ought to oblige the guilty to repair the damage, if that be
possible, to inflict on him an exemplary punishment, or, in short,
according to the nature of the case, and the circumstances attending it,
Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 76 at 145 (cited in note 103).
Id at bk II, § 74 at 144-45. See also Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae at bk VIII, ch 6, § 12 at
1304 (cited in note 132) ("Now of those ways by which the heads of states become exposed to
war because of injuries done by their citizens, two come in for special consideration, namely,
sufferance and reception."); Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, 1 The Principles of Natural and Politic
Law 353 (Bumstead 4th ed 1792) (Thomas Nugent, trans) (originally published 1748)
(explaining that for an injury by a nation's member upon another nation's member to be
imputed to the first nation, "we must necessarily suppose one of these two things, sufferance, or
reception; viz. either that the sovereign has suffered this harm to be done to the stranger, or that
he afforded a retreat to the criminal"); Grotius, Rights of War and Peace at 454 (cited in
note 144) ("Now among those Methods that render Governours the Accomplices in a Crime,
there are two of very frequent Use, and which require to be particularly considered, viz.
Toleration and Protection.").
147 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 78 at 146 (cited in note 103) (explaining that, if a
sovereign encourages its citizens to commit crimes against foreigners, those crimes can be
ascribed to the sovereign). Pufendorf and Burlamaqui both believed that a nation, knowing its
members were committing such harms, would be responsible for failure to prevent them. See
Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae at bk VIII, ch 6, § 12 at 1304 (cited in note 132) ("As for
sufferance it must be held that he who knows a wrong is being done, and is able and obligated to
prevent it, when that does not involve the probable danger of a greater evil, is held to have been
guilty himself of the wrong."); Burlamaqui, 1 Principles of Natural and Politic Law at 353 (cited
in note 146) ("Now it is presumed, that a sovereign knows what his subjects openly and
frequently commit; and as to his power of hindering the evil, this likewise is always presumed,
unless the want of it be clearly proved."). See also Grotius, Rights of War and Peace at 454 (cited
in note 144) (explaining that one "who is privy to a Fault and does not hinder it, when in a
Capacity and Under an Obligation of so doing, may properly be said to be the Author of it").
145
146
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to deliver him up to the offended state, there to receive justice."'" If a
nation refused to take one of these measures, it would become
responsible to the other nation for an injury inflicted upon the other's
citizen-and, by extension, upon the foreign nation. "If a sovereign,
who might keep his subjects within the rules of justice and peace,
suffers them to injure a foreign nation, either in its body or its
members, he does no less injury to that nation, than if he injured them
himself."1 49 Thus, "[t]he sovereign who refuses to cause a reparation to
be made of the damage caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty,
or, in short, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it."s. But if the
sovereign of the transgressor provides appropriate redress, then "the
offended has nothing farther to demand from him."' In these
passages, Vattel clearly explained that a nation was responsible for
redressing injuries that its citizens inflicted upon the person or
property of foreign citizens."
Significantly, Vattel limited his discussion of when a nation would
become responsible for an injury to an alien to instances in which one
of its citizens inflicted the injury. Vattel did, of course, acknowledge
the distinct proposition that nations had an obligation to treat all
aliens within their protection fairly (a predecessor to the modern
principle that nations not deny justice to such aliens). On this point,
148 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 76 at 145 (cited in note 103). According to
Burlamaqui, "[t]he other way, in which a sovereign renders himself guilty of the crime of
another"-in addition to consenting to infliction of the injury-"is by allowing a retreat and
admittance to the criminal, and skreening him from punishment." Burlamaqui, 1 Principles of
Natural and Politic Law at 353 (cited in note 146). See also Grotius, Rights of War and Peace at
458 (cited in note 144) ("[A] Prince or People is not absolutely and strictly obliged to deliver up
an Offender, but only, as we said before, must either punish him or deliver him up.").
149 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 72 at 144 (cited in note 103).
150 Id at bk II, § 77 at 145.
151 Id. In the case of an offense against an ambassador, Vattel explained:

Whoever affronts or injures a public minister commits a crime the more deserving a severe
punishment, as thereby the sovereign and his country might be brought into great
difficulties and trouble. It is just that he should be punished for his fault, and that the state
should, at the expence of the delinquent, give a full satisfaction to the sovereign affronted
in the person of his minister.
Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk IV, § 80 at 142 (cited in note 102). Vattel observed, by way of
example, that when King Demetrius "delivered to the Romans those who had killed their
embassador," it was "unjust" for the Romans, having received such redress, "to reserve to
themselves the liberty of punishing that crime by revenging it on the King himself, or on his
dominions." Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 77 at 145-46 (cited in note 103).
152 Vattel did not expressly address whether an injury that an alien within the nation's
territorial jurisdiction (and within its protection and subject to its laws) inflicted upon another
alien within that jurisdiction would be attributed to that nation if it failed to redress the injury.
This may not have been a matter of sufficient frequency and importance to warrant treatment in
his treatise.

476

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:445

we understand Vattel to say that a nation had to provide an alien
injured within its territory (even if injured by another alien) with a fair
opportunity for redress, without prejudice or a manifestly unjust
result.' A nation's denial of justice in this regard gave rise to a distinct
injury to the alien (and to his nation). It did not, however, render the
forum nation responsible for the underlying injury. This duty of
fairness, therefore, was distinct from the duty that a nation owed to
aliens injured by its own citizens, under which the nation became "an
accomplice in the injury" if it failed to provide appropriate redress.
If a nation failed to redress injuries by its citizens upon the
citizens of another nation, the perpetrators' nation violated the
"perfect rights" of the other nation. The law of nations recognized a
limited number of perfect rights, including the right to exercise
territorial sovereignty, the right to conduct diplomatic relations, the
right to exercise neutral rights, and the right to peaceably enjoy
liberty."' These rights were so important that interference with them
provided the offended nation with just cause for reprisals or war."' A
nation, Vattel explained, has the "right ... not to suffer any of its

privileges to be taken away, or any thing which lawfully belongs to
it."' Indeed, "[t]his right is perfect, that is, accompanied with the
right of using force to make it observed."" In other words, if one
153 This approach attempted to balance a nation's right to exercise jurisdiction within its
own territory and its obligation to treat foreigners fairly. Accordingly, each nation was required
to respect other nations' adjudication of disputes arising in their territories "except[] in the cases
of a refusal of justice, palpable and evident injustice, a manifest violation of rules and forms; or,
in short, an odious distinction made to the prejudice of his subjects, or of foreigners in general."
Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 84 at 148 (cited in note 103).
154 Id at bk II, § 77 at 145.
155 Id at bk I, §§ 281-83 at 113-14; id at bk II, §§ 49, 54-55, 84 at 137-39, 147-48. See also
Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 15-19 (cited in note 17) (discussing perfect rights under
the law of nations).
156 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, §§ 24-26 at 10-11 (cited in note 102).
157 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 65 at 142-43 (cited in note 103).
158 Id at bk II, § 66 at 143. See also Emmerich de Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations or,
Principlesof the Law of Nature; Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns,
preliminaries, § 17 at 54 (Pomroy 1805) ("The perfect obligation is that which produces the right
of constraint; the imperfect gives another only a right to demand."). A perfect right, under the
law of nations, was a right that the holder-nation could carry into execution-including by
force-without legal restrictions. If one nation violated the perfect rights of another, then the
aggrieved nation had just cause to compel the corresponding duty by waging war. Id at
preliminaries, § 22 at 55-56 (suggesting that all nations have a perfect right to those things
necessary to their preservation).
This idea of perfect rights was deeply rooted in writings on the law of nations and well
known to members of the Founding generation. See, for example, Burlamaqui, 1 Principles of
Naturaland Politic Law at 348 (cited in note 146) ("Offensive wars are those which are made to
constrain others to give us our due, in virtue of a perfect right we have to exact it of them.");
Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae at bk I, ch 7, § 15 at 127 (cited in note 132) ("Now an unjust act,
which is done from choice, and infringes upon the perfect right of another is commonly
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nation failed to redress an injury that its citizen inflicted on an alien,
the aggrieved nation could retaliate with force. The most prominent
writers on the law of nations all recognized that a nation's failure to
respond appropriately to injuries its members inflicted on foreigners
or ambassadors gave the other nation just cause for war." For this
reason, Vattel observed that "the safety of the state, and that of
human society, requires this attention from every sovereign" -that it
not "suffer the citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another
state."'6 As we shall see, the ATS was one of the primary means by
which the First Congress attempted to meet this obligation.
B.

Redress for Offenses against the Law of Nations in England

England, which had incorporated the foregoing principles of the
law of nations into the common law, redressed injuries that its
subjects inflicted upon foreign citizens through both criminal and civil
designated by the one word, injury."); id at bk VIII, ch 6, § 3 at 1294 (listing, as "causes of just
wars," "to assert our claim to whatever others may owe us by a perfect right" and "to obtain
reparation for losses which we have suffered by injuries"). See also G.F. von Martens, Summary
of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe
bk VIII, ch 2, § 3 at 273 (Bradford 1795) (William Cobbett, trans) ("Nothing short of the
violation of a perfect right ... can justify the undertaking of war.... [But] every such violation
... justifies the injured party in resorting to arms."); Christian Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium Methodo
Scientifica Pertractatum§§ 73-75 at 43-44 (Clarendon 1934) (Joseph H. Drake, trans) (originally
published 1764) (explaining that nations have "imperfect rights" to external commerce and
describing how by agreement nations can obtain "perfect rights" to commerce); Alberico
Gentili, 2 De lure Belli Libri Tres bk I, ch 22, § 170 at 106 (Clarendon 1933) (John C. Rolfe,
trans) (originally published 1612) ("[Blecause [the Sanguntines] had aided and received the
enemies of Hannibal, he had a perfect right to make war upon them."). For a discussion of the
historical importance of "perfect rights," see Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 16-19 (cited
in note 17).
159 See Burlamaqui, 1 Principlesof Natural and PoliticLaw at 353 (cited in note 146) ("[I]n
civil societies, when a particular member has done an injury to a stranger, the governor of the
commonwealth is sometimes responsible for it, so that war may be declared against him on that
account."); id ("[A] sovereign, who knowing the crimes of his subjects, as for example, that they
practise piracy on strangers; and being also able and obliged to hinder it, does not hinder it,
renders himself criminal, because he has consented to the bad action, the commission of which
he has permitted, and consequently furnished a just reason of war."); Pufendorf, 2 De Jure
Naturae at bk VIII, ch 6, § 12 at 1304 (cited in note 132) (examining "those ways by which the
heads of states become exposed to war because of injuries done by their citizens"); Grotius,
Rights of War and Peace at 458 (cited in note 144) ("Thus we read, that the Eleans made War on
the Lacedemonians, because they would take no Notice of those who had injured them, that is,
would neither inflict condign Punishment nor deliver them up. For the Obligation is either to
one or the other.").
160 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 72 at 144 (cited in note 103). He warned that
"[i]f you let loose the reins of your subjects against foreign nations, these will behave in the same
manner to you; and instead of that friendly intercourse, which nature has established between all
men, we should see nothing but one nation robbing another." Id. As an ancient matter, he
observed that when nations treated strangers ill, "[a]ll other nations had a right to unite their
forces in order to chastize them." Id at bk II, § 104 at 154.
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means. In so doing, it avoided responsibility for its subjects' violations
of the law of nations.
1. Criminal punishment to prevent violations of the law
of nations.
Blackstone, like Vattel, described certain private acts of violence
against foreigners as offenses against the law of nations. He explained,
moreover, that the offender's nation would be responsible for the
offense-and thus subject to military retaliation-if it failed to redress
the offense. It is worth quoting Blackstone at length on this point:
But where the individuals of any state violate this general law, it
is then the interest as well as duty of the government under
which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming
severity, that the peace of the world may be maintained. For in
vain would nations in their collective capacity observe these
universal rules, if private subjects were at liberty to break them
at their own discretion, and involve the two states in a war. It is
therefore incumbent upon the nation injured, first to demand
satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to
which he belongs; and, if that be refused or neglected, the
sovereign then avows himself an accomplice or abettor of his
subject's crime, and draws upon his community the calamities of
foreign war."'
Thus, an individual's unauthorized offense against another nation did
not itself give that nation just cause for war; rather, it was the home
sovereign's failure to redress the offense that subjected the home
nation to "the calamities of [a] foreign war."
Criminal punishment was one important way for a nation to
redress injuries to foreigners and avoid responsibility for its citizens'
offenses to other nations. The English common law applied generally to
punish British subjects who committed wrongs against foreign citizens
or their personal property. Such crimes included homicide, mayhem,
assault, battery, wounding, false imprisonment, kidnapping, larceny,
and malicious mischief." In addition, Blackstone specifically identified
three "principal offences against the law of nations" that the English
common law criminalized generally and that the English Parliament
criminalized by statute in particular circumstances: "1. Violation of
safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and

161
162

Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 68 (cited in note 9).
See id at 176-219, 229-50.
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3. Piracy."" Criminal punishment in such cases ensured that England
would not be held responsible for its subjects' violations of the law of
nations.'" Because the Supreme Court placed emphasis on these three
offenses in Sosa, we examine them in greater detail below.
a) Violation of safe conducts. The first offense that Blackstone

identified was "[v]iolation of safe-conducts." He explained:
As to the first, violation of safe-conducts or passports, expressly

granted by the king or his embassadors to the subjects of a
foreign power in time of mutual war; or, committing acts of
hostility against such as are in amity, league, or truce with us,
who are here under a general implied safe conduct; these are
breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which
there can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation
and another: and such offenses may, according to the writers
upon the law of nations, be a just ground of a national war."
A safe conduct or a passport was a privilege that a nation granted
a foreigner to pass safely within its borders or within territory that it
controlled abroad.'" A safe conduct privileged a person who
otherwise could not travel safely within a nation's territory. A foreign
subject could not enter the realm if that subject's nation was at war
with England or if that subject suffered some other disability to entry,
unless that person held a safe conduct or a passport. As Vattel
explained, "[a] safe-conduct is given to those who otherwise could not
safely go to the places where he who grants it is master: for instance,
to a person charged with some misdemeanor, or to an enemy."'67 A
passport, in contrast, generally privileged persons who had no
particular disabilities from traveling in a foreign land; it simply
rendered doubtless their security in traveling through that country.'"
Id at 68.
Id.
165 Blackstone, 4 Commentariesat 68-69 (cited in note 9).
16
See Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 871-73 (cited in note 33).
167 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, § 265 at 102 (cited in note 102). See also
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 252 (cited in note 9):
163
164

But no subject of a nation at war with us can, by the law of nations, come into the realm,
nor can travel himself upon the high seas, or send his goods and merchandize from one
place to another, without danger of being seized by our subjects, unless be has letters of
safe-conduct.
168 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, § 265 at 102 (cited in note 102) ("The word
passport is used, in some occurrencies, for persons in whom there is no particular exception
against their coming or going in safety, and whom it the better secures for avoiding all debate.").
Consider William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 260 (Clarendon 4th ed
1770) ("But passports under the king's sign-manual, or licences from his embassadors abroad,
are now more usually obtained [than safe conducts], and are allowed to be of equal validity.").
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Blackstone recognized that safe conducts could be "express" or
"implied." An express safe conduct was protection "expressly granted
by the king or his embassadors" through papers issued to a particular
subject of a foreign country." An implied safe conduct was protection
granted not by documentation given to individuals, but by a positive
municipal act in favor of a class of persons."o By criminalizing violence
against aliens lawfully protected in English territories through safe
conducts or passports, England avoided responsibility under the law
of nations to the offended nation for such acts.
b) Infringements of the rights of ambassadors. The second

offense identified by Blackstone involved infringements of the rights
of ambassadors under the law of nations. Vattel had described the
rights to send and receive public ministers as inviolable because such
rights were necessary to effectuate all other rights of nations."'
Blackstone explained that the common law of England recognized the
full rights of ambassadors under the law of nations "by immediately
stopping all legal process, sued out through the ignorance or rashness
of individuals, which may intrench upon the immunities of a foreign
minister or any of his train."'" In addition, individuals pursuing
process against ambassadors or their servants "though wantonness or
insolence" were "violaters of the laws of nations, and disturbers of the
public repose; and shall suffer such penalties and corporal punishment
as [the lord chancellor and the chief justices], or any two of them, shall
think fit.""' Insulting or arresting ambassadors, other public ministers,
or their domestics also qualified as offenses against the law of
nations."'
c) Piracy. Finally, English law punished piracy. Blackstone
explained that "the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon
the high seas, is an offense against the universal law of society."' As
the pirate "has renounced all the benefits of society and government,
and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by
declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war
In certain instances, it appears, a passport could exempt a foreigner from a general prohibition
on passage through a nation. See Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, § 265 at 102 (cited in
note 102) (explaining that a "passport" could operate to exempt a person "from some general
prohibition").
169 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 68 (cited in note 9).
170 Id.

171 See text accompanying notes 135-38.
172 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 70 (cited in note 9).

173

Id at 70-71.

174 See In the Matter of Count Haslang, 21 Eng Rep 274, 274 (Ch 1755) (explaining that
insulting or arresting ambassadors was a violation of the law of nations and a disturbance of the
public repose).
175 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 71 (cited in note 9).
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against him.""' Piracy constituted a grave offense against countries in
a state of peace with the transgressor. Each nation had an equal right
to use the open sea, the violation of which justified the use of force."
If a nation failed to redress an act of piracy committed by one of its
citizens, the injured nation had just cause to retaliate through war. In
England, piracy was a serious criminal offense, tried by special
procedure in the court of admiralty."' Because piracy threatened the
entire world, the law of nations also gave a nation the right to punish
pirates with no allegiance to, or affiliation with, the nation in question.
Such universal jurisdiction served to punish and deter piracy, but the
law of nations imposed no obligation on bystander nations to punish
piracy committed by aliens.

After describing violations of safe conducts, infringements of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy, Blackstone concluded that "[tihese
are the principal cases, in which the statute law of England interposes,
to aid and enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common law; by
inflicting an adequate punishment upon offences against that
universal law, committed by private persons.""'9 The common law
itself, of course, punished subjects who committed other, more
mundane crimes against aliens, such as assault and battery. By
punishing subjects who committed both statutory and common law
crimes against foreigners, England prevented itself from becoming an
accomplice or abettor of such crimes, thereby denying the offended
nation just cause to pursue satisfaction and justice through war.
2.

Civil remedies as redress.

The Supreme Court in Sosa regarded the foregoing criminal
offenses as highly relevant to understanding the civil liability provided

176

Id.
See Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk I, § 283 at 114 (cited in note 103).
The Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen VIII, ch 15 (1536), in 3 Statutes of the Realm 671,
provided that piracy be tried before special commissioners-the admiral (or his deputy) and
three or four others, typically including two common law judges-and that "the course of
proceedings should be according to the law of the land," in other words the common law.
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 265-66 (cited in note 9) (noting that piracy was considered so
grave an offense that the English Parliament provided for special jurisdiction, process, and
remedy in the court of admiralty). See also id at 71 (describing this procedure). The reason for
this special procedure was that, in this context, "the rules of the civil law" were "inconsistent
with the liberties of the nation, that any man's life should be taken away, unless by the judgment
of his peers, or the common law of the land." Id.
179 Blackstone, 4 Commentariesat 73 (cited in note 9).
177
178
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by the ATS. English law, however, complied with the law of nations
not only by punishing those specific criminal offenses, but also by
giving aliens independent common law civil remedies for all injuries
to person or personal property suffered at the hands of British
subjects. These civil remedies were much broader than Blackstone's
three crimes; indeed, they covered a broad range of intentional torts
to person or personal property recognized at common law.
English writers recognized that an alien from a nation not at war
with England could bring a common law action in an English court
against a British subject for any intentional harm to person or
personal property.'" For example, a common law action was available
to aliens for assault, battery, wounding, mayhem, false imprisonment,
wrongful taking of goods, and deprivation of possession."' In many
instances, a civil remedy supplemented criminal penalties. In some
instances, however, a civil remedy was the only available redress,
short of extraditing the offender, because the criminal law did not
extend to injuries that British subjects inflicted upon foreign citizens
outside the territorial jurisdiction of England. Under the law of
nations, as adopted in England, one nation's criminal jurisdiction did
not extend to acts committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
another sovereign. Vattel explained that it is the province of the
sovereign "to take cognizance of the crimes committed" within its
jurisdiction, and that "[o]ther nations ought to respect this right."'"
English law considered crimes and other penal actions to be local,
meaning that the nation in which such actions arose had exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate them." One reason for this principle was
that the offended nation had exclusive jurisdiction to determine what

180 See John Comyns, 4 A Digest of the Laws of England 429 (Strahan and Woodfall 1780)
("If a Subject attaches the Person or Goods of any one, who comes by Way of Amity, Truce, or
Safe-conduct, the Chancellor, calling to him any Justice of the one Bench or the other, on a Bill
of Complaint, may make Process against the Offender; and may award Delivery and Restitution
of the Person, Ship, or Goods."); Comyns, 1 Digest of the Laws of England at 301 (explaining
that "if an Alien be within the Kingdom with a Safe-Conduct, or under the King's Protection, he
may have an Action, tho' his King be in Enmity," and that "[a]n Alien Friend may have all
Personal Actions, for his Goods, or Property"); Matthew Bacon, 1 A New Abridgment of the
Law 5-6 (Strahan 5th ed 1798) (explaining that an alien enemy cannot bring any action in
English courts unless "he comes here under letters of safe conduct, or resides here by the king's
license," while an alien friend "may maintain personal actions").
181 Blackstone, 3 Commentariesat 118-21, 127-28, 144-54 (cited in note 9).
182 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 84 at 147-48 (cited in note 103).
183 See Wolff v Oxholm, 105 Eng Rep 1177, 1180 (KB 1817) ("[N]o country regards the
penal laws of another."); Ogden v Folliott, 100 Eng Rep 825, 829 (KB 1790) (Buller) ("It is a
general principle, that the penal laws of one country cannot be taken notice of in another.");
Rafael v Verelst, 96 Eng Rep 621, 622 (KB 1776) (De Grey) ("Crimes are in their nature local,
and the jurisdiction of crimes is local.").
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penalty fit the crime and to collect the penalty owing for the crime.
For another country to exercise such jurisdiction would in itself give
offense to the nation with territorial jurisdiction over the act.
Accordingly, criminal punishment was not always an available means
of redressing acts of violence committed by British subjects against
foreigners.
For such acts committed outside of Great Britain, the only
appropriate forms of redress under the law of nations were
extradition or a civil remedy. In East India Co v Campbell," the Court
of Exchequer, recognizing that England would not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over an offense committed in another nation, observed
that "the government may send persons to answer for a crime
wherever committed, that he may not involve his country; and to
prevent reprisals."" But if the government chose not to extradite,
then its only remaining option was to provide redress through a civil
remedy. Foreign citizens in amity injured abroad by a British subject
could come to England, receive the protection of its laws, and pursue
a transitory action in an English court against a British subject."
Rafael v Verelste provides an example. Rafael, an Armenian, brought
an action against Verelst, a British subject, for a false imprisonment
inflicted in foreign parts." Chief Justice William De Grey explained
that "[t]he place where the imprisonment happened; viz. the
dominions of a foreign prince," did not bar the action, as it was
transitory: "Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of
crimes is local. And so as to the rights of real property, the subject
being fixed and immovable. But personal injuries are of a transitory
nature."m.
Thus, where the criminal law was unavailable to remedy a law of
nations violation, a civil tort remedy remained an available means of
redress. Moreover, even when criminal prosecution was an optionfor acts of violence committed within British territory by British
subjects against foreigners-a civil tort action was available and
provided aliens with an additional means of redress.
As Part IV explains, courts and scholars have erred by
attempting to interpret the ATS-a provision for civil jurisdiction184 See Bellia, 94 Georgetown L J at 961-64 (cited in note 126) (describing these and other
reasons why penal actions were understood to be local).
185 See note 192 and accompanying text.
186 27 Eng Rep 1010 (Ex 1749).
187 Id at 1011.
188 See text accompanying notes 24041.
189 96 Eng Rep 621 (KB 1776).
190 Id at 621-22.
191 Id at 622-23 (De Grey) (emphasis added).
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solely by reference to the three English crimes against the law of
nations that Blackstone described. These three offenses were but an
important subset of a much broader range of civil and criminal
remedies that English law provided to foreigners injured by British
subjects. This entire range of remedies was essential if England
wished to avoid responsibility to foreign nations for all such offenses.
C.

Refraining from Interfering with Other Nations' Sovereignty

While England provided both criminal punishments and civil
remedies to redress law of nations violations by British subjects, it is
significant to a proper understanding of the ATS that England refused
to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction that would have infringed
upon other nations' territorial sovereignty. Under the law of nations,
each nation was bound to respect the territorial sovereignty of other
nations. Vattel explained:
The empire united to the domain, establishes the jurisdiction of
the nation in its territories, or the country that belongs to it. It is
that, or its sovereign, who is to exercise justice in all the places
under his obedience, to take cognizance of the crimes committed,
and the differences that arise in the country. Other nations ought
to respect this right."
Within its territorial domain, each nation had sovereign governing
authority, free from interference by other nations:
It is a manifest consequence of the liberty and independence of
nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper,
and that none have the least authority to interfere in the
government of another state. Of all the rights that can belong to
a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that
which others ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they
would not do it an injury.*
As explained in Part I, present-day courts have invoked the
ATS to exercise jurisdiction over disputes between foreign citizens
for acts occurring in foreign countries. In 1789, adjudication of such
disputes not only was not required by the law of nations, but in fact
would have stood in tension with the principles of territorial
sovereignty described by Vattel. In particular, under the law of
nations, nations declined to exercise jurisdiction over actions that
were local to another nation-in other words, within that other
192
193

Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 84 at 147-48 (cited in note 103).
Id at bk II, § 54 at 138.
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nation's exclusive territorial sovereignty." As discussed, it was well
established that common law courts would not entertain penal actions
arising within the territory of another nation. In addition, aliens could
not bring actions in English courts asserting rights to real property in
other nations. Reflecting the law of nations, English law understood
actions asserting rights in real property to be local.'9 (Moreover,
under the common law, an alien could not bring an action in an
English court asserting a permanent interest in real property in
England.")
Most relevant for present purposes, judges and other writers
were reluctant to have local courts embrace claims between aliens for
See Bellia, 94 Georgetown L J at 957 (cited in note 126).
See Rafael, 96 Eng Rep at 622-23 (De Grey) (explaining that jurisdiction over real
property is local, "the subject being fixed and immoveable"); Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 294
(cited in note 9) (describing actions for recovery of possession of land and damages for trespass
as local); Comyns, 1 Digest of the Laws of England at 117 (cited in note 180) (explaining that
"[e]very Action for Recovery of the Seisen, or Possession of Land, shall be brought in the
County where the Land lies").
As Blackstone explained, "territorial suits must be discussed in the territorial tribunal. I may
sue a Frenchman here for a debt contracted abroad; but lands lying in France must be sued for
there; and English lands must be sued for in the kingdom of England." Blackstone,
3 Commentaries at 384 (cited in note 9). Real property, Vattel explained, "ought to be enjoyed
according to the laws of the country where [it is] situated, and as the right of granting the
possessions is vested in the superior of the country, the disputes relating to them can only be
decided in the state on which they depend." Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 103 at 154
(cited in note 103).
196 As Blackstone explained, "[i]f an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he
must owe an allegiance, equally permanent with that property, to the king of England; which
would probably be inconsistent with that, which he owes to his own natural liege lord."
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 360 (cited in note 9). Blackstone also thought that alien
ownership of real property in England might subject the nation "to foreign influence." Id. Thus,
to protect England's territorial sovereignty, an alien could acquire only "a property in goods,
money, and other personal estate," not real property. Id. Because aliens could not acquire real
property, they could not bring claims to establish real property rights. These rules accorded well
with the law of nations. Writers on the law of nations, including Vattel, explained that a nation
should decide for itself whether aliens can own real property there. See Vattel, 1 The Law of
Nations at bk II, § 114 at 158 (cited in note 103). An alien could, however, bring an action in
English courts asserting personal property interests. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 360-61
(cited in note 9). After independence, states initially adopted the common law rule that aliens
could not hold a permanent interest in real property in the state. For example, in 1788, in an
opinion joined by Judge Oliver Ellsworth, the Connecticut Superior Court explained that "[a]
state may exclude aliens from acquiring property within it of any kind, as its safety or policy may
direct; as England has done, with regard to real property, saving that in favor of commerce, alien
merchants may hold leases of houses and stores ..... Apthorp v Backus, 1 Kirby 407, 413 (Conn
Super Ct 1788). See also Bayard, 1 NC (1 Mart) at 9 (explaining "[tihat it is the policy of all
Nations and States, that the lands within their government should not be held by foreigners,"
and thus, "by the civil, as well as by the common law of England, aliens are incapacitated to hold
lands"). As in England, aliens could not assert actions in state court to establish a freehold in
real property. See, for example, Barges v Hogg, 2 NC (1 Haywood) 485, 485 (NC Super Ct L &
Eq 1797) (holding that "[an alien cannot maintain ejectment, or any action for the recovery of a
freehold," as "aliens are not allowed to acquire real property").
194

195
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acts occurring abroad because they could implicate foreign
sovereignty and therefore foreign relations. In discussing the
territorial sovereignty of nations, Vattel presumed that it would be
improper for a nation to exercise jurisdiction over an alien-alien claim
arising abroad unless the defendant alien had established domicile in
the forum territory. He explained that "disputes that may arise
between the strangers, or between a stranger and a citizen," ought to
be decided by a judge of the place, and by the laws of the place,
"where this defendant has his domicil, or that of the place where the
defendant is, when any sudden difficulty arises, provided it does not
relate to an estate in land, or to a right annexed to such an estate."'" In
other words, the dispute should be resolved only by the judge of the
place in which the defendant was domiciled or where the cause of
action arose (if the defendant was present there). By implication, Vattel
suggested that a judge should not hear the case if he were in a place
where the defendant was not domiciled or where the cause of action did
not arise. Unless a defendant had settled in the forum nation, the forum
nation should not exercise jurisdiction of an alien-alien claim arising
abroad. Vattel justified these jurisdictional principles, in part, by
observing that "the jurisdiction of a nation ought to be respected by the
other sovereigns.""
Nations paid particular attention to these principles because they
implicated peace among nations.'
Historically, if one nation
interfered with the sovereignty of another to govern within its own
territory, then the interfering nation violated the offended nation's
perfect rights and gave it just cause for war. According to Vattel, a
nation had "a right of refusing to suffer"' such interference because
"[t]o govern itself according to its pleasure[] is a necessary part of its
independence."201 Unless a nation had granted a right of interference
by treaty, "a sovereign has a right to treat as enemies those who
endeavor to interfere, otherwise than by their good offices, in his
domestic affairs."
Not surprisingly, English judges and other writers were sensitive
to the territorial sovereignty implications of exercising jurisdiction
over claims between aliens for acts occurring in other nations. In 1774,
Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 103 at 154 (cited in note 103).
Id.
199 A nation had a perfect right in its own territorial sovereignty. Modern treatises contain
little or no discussion of perfect rights because they are no longer recognized under international
law. Perfect rights, however, played an important role in shaping the common law. See Bellia
and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 9 (cited in note 17).
200 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 57 at 140 (cited in note 103).
201 Id.
202 Id.
197
198
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Lord Mansfield suggested that English courts
in Mostyn v Fabrigas,m
may have no jurisdiction over personal trespass actions arising abroad
between nonresident foreigners because such actions were local to the
foreign state, just as crimes were local. Anthony Fabrigas brought an
action of trespass for an assault and imprisonment that occurred on
the island of Minorca against John Mostyn, the English governor of
Minorca.' Mostyn argued, among other things, that the cause of
action could not be tried in England because it arose abroad.
Mansfield rejected this argument, holding that a transitory action
arising abroad against a British subject may be brought in an English
court.206 In the process, however, Mansfield distinguished a case
arising abroad between nonresident foreigners:

[T]here are some cases that arise out of the realm, which ought not
to be tried anywhere but in the country where they arise; as ... if

two persons fight in France, and both happening casually to be
here, one should bring an action of assault against the other, it
might be a doubt whether such an action could be maintained here
... because, though it is not a criminal prosecution, it must be laid
to be against the peace of the King; but the breach of the peace is
merely local, though the trespass against the person is transitory.2 0
Because a tort action arising abroad between foreigners breached
only the local peace, Mansfield questioned whether English courts
could hear such an action. 20
Mansfield never had occasion squarely to consider a tort action
arising abroad between foreigners because apparently no such
actions were brought in English courts. 209 Given eighteenth-century
203 98 Eng Rep 1021 (KB 1774).
204 Id at 1026-27 (Mansfield).
205 Id at 1029.
206 See id at 1030.

207 Mostyn, 98 Eng Rep at 1030 (Mansfield).
208 See id. In his Commentaries,Blackstone stated that a dilatory plea could be made "[t]o
the jurisdiction of the court: alleging, that it ought not to hold plea of this injury, it arising in
Wales or beyond sea." Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 301 (cited in note 9). He did not provide
any further explanation of the grounds for this plea.
209 In 1859, a New York court observed that "no case will be found in the whole course of
English jurisprudence in which an action for an injury to the person, inflicted by one foreigner
upon another in a foreign country, was ever held to be maintainable in an English court."
Molony v Dows, 8 Abb Prac 316, 329-30 (NY Ct Corn Pleas 1859). Regarding Mostyn, the New
York court explained:
The only thing bearing upon the subject is the remark of Lord Mansfield in Mostyn a.
Fabrigas (1 Cowp., 161), in which he questions the existence of the right. The absence of all
authority in England upon such a point is almost as conclusive as an express adjudication
denying the existence of such a right.
Id at 330.
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transportation and communication, it would have been unusual for
two Frenchmen with a dispute arising exclusively in French territory
to both be in England at the same time and for one to pursue legal
redress there rather than in France. Ordinarily, a lack of such cases
might suggest that the question whether courts had jurisdiction over
such claims simply never arose. In this context, however, the absence
of such cases reflects a deeper point about territorial sovereignty
under the law of nations.
Like Mansfield, other judges and writers suggested that exercising
jurisdiction over claims between foreigners for acts occurring abroad
would offend the territorial sovereignty of the nation in which the
action arose. Over a century before Mostyn, the Scottish Court of
Session explained that it would not hear a contract action between two
Englishmen that arose entirely outside of Scotland. In Vernor v
Elvies,21' the court stated that "[tihe Lords will not find themselves
Judges betwixt two Englishmen, being in this country not animo
remanendi sed negocianditantum [with the intention of remaining, but

just on business], specially in matters of debt contracted forth of this
country."2 . Only if a debt had been contracted to be paid in Scotland
would the court "be judges in that case." 2
English and continental treatises illuminate the territorial
sovereignty concerns implicated by cases like Vernor and Mansfield's
hypothetical in Mostyn. In his seventeenth-century treatise De Jure
Maritimo et Navali, Charles Molloy described the French equivalent
of Mansfield's hypothetical-that of an Englishman pursuing an
action in France, arising within the English realm, against another
Englishman.13 Hieron, a London merchant and British subject,
brought an action against other British subjects in a French court "for
certain Injuries supposed by them to be made within the Jurisdiction
of the King of England at Calice."214 France ultimately dismissed the
action on the ground that it rested within the exclusive jurisdiction of
England. Specifically, the parliament at Paris dismissed the
defendants "by a Judicial Sentence, for that they had no Cognizance
or Ground to inquire or examine matters committed within the
215
Molloy's discussion highlights
Jurisdiction of the King of England."
England's longstanding interest in protecting its own territorial
21

2

6 Dict Dec 4788 (Sess 1610).
Id at 4788.
212 Id.
213 See Charles Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali: or, a Treatise of Affairs Maritime and
of Commerce 475-76 (Walthoe 1722) (originally published 1676).
214 Id at 475.
215 Id.
210
211
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jurisdiction-and its appreciation, as Mansfield evinces in Mostyn, of
other nations' reciprocal interest.216
Respect for the territorial sovereignty of other nations applied
even in admiralty cases. For example, in 1817 the British Court of
Admiralty was careful not to extend its admiralty jurisdiction into the
penal jurisdiction of France. 2 17 Admiralty courts were also cognizant of
other nations' interests in adjudicating local disputes between their
own citizens. Admiralty courts generally had jurisdiction to resolve
disputes between aliens arising on the high seas. Nonetheless, such
cases could implicate the territorial sovereignty of the aliens' nations.
In 1799, the Court of Admiralty was mindful that it could intrude
upon the territorial jurisdiction of another nation by resolving local
218
disputes between its citizens. In The "Two Friends,"
the court, in an
opinion delivered by Sir William Scott, addressed whether it had
jurisdiction over a case of salvage when the crew of an American ship
recaptured the vessel from the French."' One objection to the court's
jurisdiction was that the salvage claim should "be enforced in

216 Molloy further explained that the king's "Subjects there inhabiting in a Foreign Court
... was an act so derogating from the Law, and of so high a Contempt," that a statute forbade it.
Id at 475-76. Molloy referred to the Statute of Praemunire, 27 Edw III, ch 1 (1353), which
provided that any subject who pursued an action within the king's cognizance in a foreign court
would suffer forfeiture and imprisonment, or outlawry. The statute was originally aimed to
check papal patronage. See William Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 585-86 (Little,
Brown 3d ed 1922).
217 In "Le Louis," 165 Eng Rep 1464 (Adm 1817), the Court of Admiralty reversed the
sentence of a vice-admiralty court that had condemned a French ship for being employed in the
slave trade. Id at 1482. "[W]hat is to be done," Sir William Scott asked, "if a French ship laden
with slaves for a French port is brought in?" Id at 1479. In answering this question, the court was
aware that imposing a penalty upon the slave trade would interfere with France's ability to
enforce its own penal laws and right to receive penalties owed to it:

I answer without hesitation, restore the possession which has been unlawfully divested:rescind the illegal act done by your own subject; and leave the foreigner to the justice of his
own country. What evil follows? If the laws of France do not prohibit, you admit that
condemnation cannot take place in a British Court. But if the law of France be what you
contend, what would have followed upon its arrival at Martinique, the port whither it was
bound? That all the penalties of the French law would have been immediately thundered
upon it. If your case be true, there will be no failure of justice. Why is the British judge to
intrude himself in subsidium juris, when everything requisite will be performed in the
French Court in a legal and effectual manner? Why is the British judge, professing, as he
does, to apply the French law, to assume cognisance for the mere purpose of directing that
the penalties shall go to the British Crown and its subjects, which that law has appropriated
to the French Crown and its subjects, thereby combining, in one act of this usurped
authority, an aggression upon French property as well as upon French jurisdiction?
Id. As this passage reveals, British courts, including admiralty courts, were aware of limitations
that the law of nations imposed upon their jurisdiction, including that nations should not
exercise the penal jurisdiction of other nations.
218

165 Eng Rep 174 (Adm 1799).

219

Id at 174.
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America, because the ship is an American ship, and the parties are
The court rejected this objection on two
American sailors."
grounds-first, that crew members were in fact British subjects and,
second, that "salvage is a question of the jus gentium," which courts of
admiralty jurisdiction are competent to resolve." The court observed,
however, that this question was "materially different from the
question of a mariner's contract, which is a creature of the particular
institutions of each country, to be applied and construed, and
explained by its own particular rules."m Thus, the court explained,
"[t]here might be good reason ... why this Court should decline to

interfere in such cases, and should remit the foreign parties to their
own domestic forum."m "Between parties who were all Americans,"
Scott continued,
if there was the slightest disinclination to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court, I should certainly not incline to
interfere; for this Court is not hungry after jurisdiction, where
the exercise of it is not felt to be beneficial to the parties between
whom it is to operate. At the same time, I desire to be
understood to deliver no decided opinion, whether American
seamen rescuing an American ship and cargo, brought into this
country, might not maintain an action in rem in this Court of the
law of nations.
This case further illustrates that English judges were aware that
adjudication of claims between aliens could implicate the territorial
sovereignty of the aliens' nation.
US courts were also cognizant that the law of nations recognized
jurisdictional limitations respecting the territorial sovereignty of other
nations. For example, federal courts sitting in admiralty followed a
''general rule not to take cognizance of disputes between the masters
and crews of foreign ships," and instead to refer "them to their own
courts." As one district court explained in 1801, "[r]eciprocal policy,
and the justice due from one friendly nation to another, calls for such
conduct in the courts of either country." Similarly, the Supreme
220
221

Id at 176.
Id at 176-77.

222

The "Two Friends," 165 Eng Rep at 177.

223
224

Id.
Id.

225

Willendson v Forsoker, 29 F Cases 1283, 1284 (D Pa 1801).

Id. See also Thompson v The Catharina, 23 F Cases 1028, 1028 (D Pa 1795) (stating that
the court has "avoided taking cognizance, as much as possible, of disputes in which foreign ships
and seamen, are concerned," and has, "in general, left them to settle their differences before
their own tribunals").
226
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Court and state courts routinely recited the law of nations' prohibition
on adjudicating penal actions arising within another nation's
territorial jurisdiction.'
Although alien-alien claims for acts occurring in foreign territory
were unusual in the late eighteenth century, there is some evidence
that judges and lawyers in the states appreciated that adjudication of
such suits might also offend the law of nations. For example, in
Brinley v Avery, m the Connecticut Superior Court held in 1786 that
Connecticut courts lacked jurisdiction over a contract action arising in
British territory between two British subjects.' George Brinley,
commissary general of Nova Scotia, brought an action on the case
against Avery, a British subject resident in Connecticut, to enforce a
written agreement. Avery pleaded in abatement that, at the time the
contract was made and allegedly breached, "both the plaintiff and
defendant were inhabitants of [ ] Halifax, subjects of [the] king of
Great Britain; both under the allegiance of [the] king, and owing go
allegiance to this state, or to said United States."' Because Halifax
was "governed by the laws and statutes of the kingdom of Great
Britain," the plaintiff's claim "ought to be tried and determined in and
by the courts of said king of Great Britain, according to the laws,
statutes and usages of said kingdom."" Avery claimed that no such
actions can be maintained "by the law of nations" or "by the laws of
England." 2 Finally, Avery argued that a British court would not
respect a Connecticut judgment in his case, allowing the plaintiff to
pursue a second judgment there.23

227 In 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 US (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825). See also Rose v Himely,
8 US (4 Cranch) 241, 280 (1808) (Marshall) (stating that "this court, having no right to enforce
the penal laws of a foreign country, cannot inquire into any infraction of those laws"). For state
cases, see, for example, Simmons v Commonwealth, 5 Binn 617, 620 (Pa 1813) (Yeates)
("Offences are local in their nature, and must by common law be tried in the county where they
were committed."); Sturgenegger v Taylor, 5 SCL (3 Brev) 7, 7 (SC 1811) ("[Crimes, and the
rights of real property, are local.").
228 1 Kirby 25 (Conn Super Ct 1786).
229 Id at 25.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Brinley, 1 Kirby at 26.
233 Id. Vattel stated that one nation generally should respect foreign judgments, even
against its subject, unless (1) the decision was not "within the extent of [the judge's] power," or
(2) "in the cases of a refusal of justice, palpable and evident injustice, a manifest violation of
rules and forms; or, in short, an odious distinction made to the prejudice of his subjects, or of
foreigners in general." Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, §§ 84-85 at 148 (cited in note 103).
Thus, if a foreign nation perceived a Connecticut court to exceed the bounds of its permissible
jurisdiction over foreigners under the law of nations, it could refuse to respect its judgment.
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Brinley's argument in replication was that he, being an alien
friend-a subject of Britain, which was "at amity, and in league with
this state"-had a right under the Paris Peace Treaty and law of
nations to bring personal, transitory actions against citizens of
Connecticut or resident British aliens.'
The court ruled for Avery and refused to adjudicate the dispute.
The reported decision was simply: "The plea in abatement ruled
sufficient."" The court likely accepted Avery's argument that British
courts had exclusive jurisdiction of a claim arising between British
subjects in British territory. In his reports of Connecticut Superior
Court cases, Ephraim Kirby listed "authorities important" to this
case.' The first authority that he cited was Lord Kames's Historical
Law-Tracts, noting: "Court of Sessions refused to judge between the
two foreigners concerning a covenant made abroad-but judged
where the debt by agreement was to be paid in Scotland for that gave
jurisdiction."" As Kames described, the nation in which a contract
was made and to be performed had territorial sovereignty over the
debt it created. Only if British subjects were involved or the debt was
to be paid in England would English courts employ the fiction that the
debt arose in England.'
In contrast to alien-alien claims arising abroad, a nation's courts
did not implicate other nations' territorial sovereignty under the law
of nations when they heard actions by aliens against their own
citizens. Indeed, adjudication of such claims was often necessary to
avoid violating the rights of foreign nations. Under the law of nations,
a nation had a right to regulate its own citizens or subjects wherever
they might be. In exchange for the sovereign's protection, citizens
owed allegiance to their sovereign at home and abroad.' A sovereign
234

Brinley, 1 Kirby at 26-27.

Id at 27.
See Brinley v Avery, 2 Kirby 22, 22 (Conn Super Ct 1786).
Id, citing Henry Home (Lord Kames), 1 Historical Law-Tracts 234 (Kincaid 2d ed 1761).
238 See Home, 1 Historical Law-Tracts at 237 (cited in note 237).
239 As Blackstone explained, being "under the king's protection ... [a]n Englishman who
removes to France, or to China, owes the same allegiance to the king of England there as at
home, and twenty years hence as well as now." See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 357-58 (cited
in note 9). Joseph Story explained that a nation's sovereignty over its citizens extended to their
actions both within and beyond its territorial jurisdiction. "In regard to [citizens], while within
the territory of their birth, or adopted allegiance, the jurisdiction of the sovereignty over them is
complete and irresistible. It cannot be controlled; and it ought to be respected everywhere."
Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws at 451 (cited in note 20). Regarding citizens absent
from their nations' territorial jurisdiction:
It is true, that nations generally assert a claim to regulate the rights, duties, obligations, and
acts of their own citizens, wherever they may be domiciled. And, so far as these rights,
duties, obligations, and acts afterwards come under the cognizance of the tribunals of the
235

236
237
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had an interest in protecting its citizens' rights and enforcing their
duties, arising at home or abroad, when they properly came within the
jurisdiction of its tribunals. Thus, an English court would hear an alien
tort claim arising abroad against a British subject both to enforce the
duties that the nation imposed on its subjects and to avoid national
responsibility to the plaintiff's nation for the defendant's misconduct.
This was the actual case of Mostyn v Fabrigas-anaction brought by
an alien against a British subject in an English court for an injury
inflicted abroad.' Rafael v Verelst, mentioned earlier, provides
another example. The King's Bench exercised jurisdiction over a
transitory personal action for an injury inflicted by a British subject
upon an alien abroad. Chief Justice William De Grey held that the
plaintiff's alienage did not bar the action, "for this is no objection in
personal actions."241 In addition to adjudicating tort claims, English
courts heard actions on debts and contracts arising abroad between an
alien and a British subject, employing the fiction that the debt arose in
England.242 Moreover, if a debt or contract-even between alienswas to be performed in England, English courts would have territorial
jurisdiction over the cause of action, as it would arise in English
territory.243
sovereign power of their own country, either for enforcement, or for protection, or for
remedy, there may be no just ground to exclude this claim.
Id.
98 Eng Rep at 1026-27 (Mansfield).
Rafael, 96 Eng Rep at 622-23 (De Grey).
242 See Holman v Johnson, 98 Eng Rep 1120, 1121 (KB 1775) (Mansfield) (enforcing a
contract for goods sold and delivered at Dunkirk that was not illegal under the laws of England
and remarking that "[d]ebt follows the person, and may be recovered in England, let the
contract of debt be made where it will; and the law allows a fiction for the sake of expediting the
remedy"); Odwyer v Salvador, 21 Eng Rep 313, 313 (Ch 1763) (requiring an alien merchant
plaintiff to give security to answer costs before the alien's claims would proceed in English
court); Freeman v King, 84 Eng Rep 196, 196 (KB 1666) ("[A] bond dated at Paris in France,
may be laid at Paris in France in Islington [County of Middlesex]; but where it's dated at Paris
within the kingdom of France, it's not triable at all."); Bacon, 1 New Abridgment of the Law at
58 (cited in note 180) (explaining that "[ain action may be brought on a contract or matter which
arose beyond sea" by alleging it was made in England, and that if the contract alleges it was
made in a particular place abroad, the plaintiff should allege that that place is in the County of
Middlesex in London); Home, 1 HistoricalLaw-Tracts at 248-49 (cited in note 237) (explaining
how fictions came to be used for trying actions between British subjects upon contracts or debts
arising in foreign parts).
243 As Lord Kames described Vernor v Elvies in his HistoricalLaw-Tracts, "[t]he court of
session, [ ] though they refused to sustain themselves judges betwixt two foreigners, with relation
to a covenant made abroad, thought themselves competent, where it was agreed the debt should
be paid in this country." Home, 1 Historical Law-Tracts at 234 (cited in note 237). Kames
additionally explained:
240

241

A covenant bestows a jurisdiction upon the judge of the territory where it is made, provided
only the party be catched within the territory, and be cited there. The reason is, that if no
other place for performance be specified, it is implied in the covenant, that it shall be
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All in all, English law was finely attuned to avoiding law of
nations violations in the adjudication of a broad array of alien claims.
As discussed below, this set of understandings supplied the basis for
the way the Founders shaped the Judiciary Act of 1789.24 Before
turning to that history, however, it is necessary to explain the ways in
which the Articles of Confederation fell short of fulfilling the new
nation's obligations under the law of nations.
III. LAW OF NATIONS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

During the Articles of Confederation period, states violated the
law of nations in various ways, including by their failure to redress
private offenses to other nations. Certain states failed to comply with
the 1783 Treaty of Paris by impeding British creditors from recovering
debts. They also violated the law of nations by failing to punish or
otherwise redress acts of violence committed by their citizens against
British subjects. These violations of the law of nations were well
known to the British, straining relations between the two nations and
raising the possibility of British military retaliation. To avoid these
consequences, certain states strengthened alien rights in the late 1780s
to encourage commerce and avoid offense to Britain. These measures
were insufficient, however, to prevent violations by other states and
eliminate the threat of armed conflict. The states' ongoing violations
of the law of nations were instrumental in bringing about the Federal
Convention of 1787. The inability of the United States, under the
Articles of Confederation, to comply with the law of nations provides
important context for understanding the Constitution and the work of
the First Congress.
A.

Redressing Law of Nations Violations

After the United States won its independence, its viability as a
nation required increasing trade and maintaining peace with other
nations. Members of the Founding generation were well versed in the
law of nations and the English methods of preventing the actions of
individuals from triggering hostilities with foreign nations. In short,
they understood that maintaining peace required the United States to
redress private offenses to other nations. Because state remedies were
inadequate, the Second Continental Congress resolved in 1781 that
performed in the place where it is made; and it is natural to apply for redress to the judge of
that territory where the failure happens, provided the party who fails be found there.

Id.
244

See Part IV.
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state legislatures should take measures to redress violations of the law
of nations by private citizens. 2 45 A committee of Edmund Randolph,
James Duane, and John Witherspoon considered a motion "for a
recommendation to the several legislatures to enact punishments
against violators of the law of nations." The committee reported:
That the scheme of criminal justice in the several states does not
sufficiently comprehend offenses against the law of nations:
That a prince, to whom it may be hereafter necessary to disavow
any transgression of that law by a citizen of the United States,
will receive such disavowal with reluctance and suspicion, if
regular and adequate punishment shall not have been provided
against the transgressor:
That as instances may occur, in which, for the avoidance of war,
it may be expedient to repair out of the public treasury injuries
committed by individuals, and the property of the innocent be
exposed to reprisal, the author of those injuries should
compensate the damage out of his private fortune. 6
In other words, the committee found that (1) state courts were not
adequately punishing law of nations violations by individuals, (2) the
states' failure to provide adequate redress could lead the United
States into war, and (3) public and private redress of such law of
nations violations was necessary to avoid war or reprisals. The
committee plainly appreciated that a state's failure to redress private
transgressions of the law of nations provided just cause for war by the
offended nation.247
A resolution of the Continental Congress followed upon this
report:
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures of the
several states to provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate
punishment:
First. For the violation of safe conducts or passports, expressly
granted under the authority of Congress to the subjects of a
foreign power in time of war:

245 See Gaillard Hunt, ed, 21 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 1136-37
(GPO 1912) (resolving to provide a forum and a remedy for "those offences against the law of
nations which are most obvious ... [and] requiring that punishment should be co-extensive with
such crimes").
246 Id at 1136.
247 See notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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Secondly. For the commission of acts of hostility against such as
are in amity, league or truce with the United States, or who are
within the same, under a general implied safe conduct:
Thirdly. For the infractions of the immunities of ambassadors
and other public ministers, authorized and received as such by
the United States in Congress assembled, by animadverting on
violence offered to their persons, houses, carriages and property,
under the limitations allowed by the usages of nations; and on
disturbance given to the free exercise of their religion: by
annulling all writs and processes, at any time sued forth against
an ambassador, or other public minister, or against their goods
and chattels, or against their domestic servants, whereby his
person may be arrested: and,
Fourthly. For infractions of treaties and conventions to which the
United States are a party.
The preceding being only those offences against the law of
nations which are most obvious, and public faith and safety
requiring that punishment should be co-extensive with such
crimes:
Resolved, That it be farther recommended to the several states to
erect a tribunal in each State, or to vest one already existing with
power to decide on offences against the law of nations, not
contained in the foregoing enumeration, under convenient
restrictions.
Resolved, That it be farther recommended to authorise suits to
be instituted for damages by the party injured, and for
compensation to the United States for damage sustained by them
from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.'
All of the offenses that this resolution identified gave the
offended nation just cause for war, and the Continental Congress
urged states to adopt overlapping criminal and civil remedies to
redress these offenses. The first recommendation called upon states to
punish violations of express safe conducts.249 Typically, express safe
conducts were granted to certain alien enemies during wartime to
permit them to travel safely within the territory of the granting nation.
Violation of an express safe conduct, if not redressed, justified an
armed response, threatening the escalation of hostilities.'
248
249
250

Hunt, ed, 21 Journals of the Continental Congress at 1136-37 (cited in note 245).
Id at 1136.
See notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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The second recommendation called upon states to punish acts of
hostility against foreign citizens "in amity, league or truce with the
United States, or who are within the same, under a general implied
safe conduct."" Criminal punishment in such cases would have
satisfied the United States' obligation under the law of nations to
redress acts of hostility by its citizens against these groups of aliens.
Criminal punishment, however, generally would have been limited to
acts of hostility within a state's territorial jurisdiction (the limit of its
common law criminal jurisdiction) or within its admiralty jurisdiction
over piracy.'
The third recommendation urged states to punish "infractions of
the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers, authorised
and received as such by the United States in Congress assembled.""
Such offenses constituted serious violations of the perfect rights of
foreign nations, justifying war if not appropriately redressed.
The fourth recommendation urged states to punish "infractions
of treaties and conventions to which the United States are a party."M
The obligations that nations assumed in treaties were understood to
give treaty partners corresponding perfect rights." Accordingly,
violation of a treaty gave a treaty partner just cause for war under the
law of nations.
After calling on the states to punish these "most obvious" law of
nations violations, the Continental Congress offered two additional,
catch-all resolutions. The first of these encouraged states to establish
tribunals to hear other offenses against the law of nations "not
contained in the foregoing enumeration."26 The second resolutionan early precursor of the kind of civil remedy later established by the
ATS-called upon states to "authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the United
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign
power by a citizen."" This recommendation envisioned civil redress

for both the criminal offenses already enumerated and distinct private
Hunt, ed, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congressat 1136 (cited in note 245).
The first clause of this second recommendation was likely meant to cover acts of
hostility against foreign citizens protected by a treaty of amity, league, or truce. The second
clause was likely meant to cover acts of hostility against aliens under the protection of an
implied safe conduct.
253 Hunt, ed, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 1136-37 (cited in note 245).
254 Id at 1137.
255 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 164 at 174 (cited in note 103) ("As the
engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, they produce on the other
a perfect right. To violate a treaty, is then to violate the perfect right of him with whom we have
contracted.").
256 Hunt, ed, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 1137 (cited in note 245).
257 Id.
251
252
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law of nations violations that the criminal law did not reach. In this
way, the recommendation sought to supplement the proposed
criminal penalties, thereby providing additional assurance that the
United States would not be held responsible for the misconduct of its
citizens directed against other nations or their citizens.'
B.

Ongoing Law of Nations Violations

Notwithstanding these resolutions, states did little to redress
violations of the law of nations throughout the 1780s. Two sets of
violations are noteworthy. First, states failed to comply with the Paris
Peace Treaty of 1783 by obstructing claims of British creditors.
Second, states failed to provide redress for acts of violence against
British subjects. These law of nations violations threatened reprisals
by Great Britain. As the 1780s progressed, states took some measures
to redress these violations, but additional measures were necessary, as
delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 recognized. The law of
nations violations known to the Founders during this period provide
essential context for understanding how various provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1789-including the ATS-operated to avoid US
responsibility for its citizens' law of nations violations.
1. Obstructing claims of British creditors.
Article IV of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 provided "that
creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the
recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted."" Britain demanded this provision, and
American negotiators knew that ongoing trade with Britain required
enforcement of creditors' rights across the Atlantic.2 " Nonetheless,
this provision provoked controversy.' Debtor planters and farmers
resisted debt payment to British creditors, and states continued
various impediments to the recovery of such debts. 26 Pennsylvania, for
example, continued a 1781 law refusing judicial process to British
creditors seeking to recover debts.' Maryland and Virginia allowed
debtors to make discounted payments into the state treasury in
258 The committee that drafted these resolutions left no doubt that their purpose was "the
avoidance of war." Id at 1136.
259 See Paris Peace Treaty Art IV, 8 Stat at 82.
260 See Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States during the
Confederation,1781-178915-17 (Knopf 1965).
261 Id at 68-69.
262 Id at 277-79.
263 See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the FederalCourts, 1989 Duke L J 1421, 1438-39.
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exchange for certificates discharging their debts to British creditors.'
Private violence also impeded debt recovery by British creditors. In
1786, for example, a mob forced an attorney during a Maryland court
session to "strike off several Actions which he had brought for the
recovery of British Debts."'
American resistance to debt recovery by British creditors stifled
American commerce with Britain and threatened to renew hostilities
between the two nations. Unable to rely on American credit or
recover existing debts, British merchants withdrew from trade. In
August 1784, for example, five London merchant houses that traded
with the United States shut down.' Even more ominously, American
resistance to British debt recovery threatened reprisals-or war.
Under the law of nations, a treaty obligation was understood to give
treaty partners a corresponding perfect right enforceable by arms.267
American writers well appreciated that state resistance to British debt
recovery threatened to impede commerce and provoke reprisals, if
not war.2
The complaints of British merchants were well publicized in
England. In December 1785, for instance, the London Times
published a letter from a British merchant in Charleston who
complained bitterly about South Carolina's failure to afford British

See id at 1438.
William Smallwood, A Proclamation(July 14, 1786), reprinted in Aubrey C. Land, ed, 9
Journal and Correspondence of the State Council of Maryland, 1784-1789 123 (Maryland
Historical Society 1970) (ordering the cessation of such violent and disorderly conduct and
warning that subsequent violations would be met with penalties).
266 See Jensen, The New Nation at 188 (cited in note 260).
267 According to Vattel, "[a]s the engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect
obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. To violate a treaty, is then to violate the
perfect right of him with whom we have contracted"-and thus provides just cause for war. See
Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 164 at 174 (cited in note 103).
268 In 1784, a political writer, "Lycurgus," criticized Pennsylvania's refusal to afford
process to British creditors in a letter to The Freeman'sJournal:
264
265

The restraint layed in 1781 [in Pennsylvania], and continued last year upon the ultimate
process for debts, contradicting as it doth, the late definitive treaty between the United
States of America and Great Britain, which secures to the subjects of both, the fullest
remedy for their legal demands on each other, is very destructive to the credit of this
country in foreign parts, and may provoke reprisals.
Lycurgus, Letter to Mr. Printer,Freeman's J (Phila) 1 (May 5, 1784). In 1787, members of the
South Carolina assembly debated whether to continue obstructing debt recovery by British
creditors. David Ramsay argued that "to postpone still further the payment of debts" would be
"not only contrary to our honor, but to our natural interest." Debate in the Assembly of South
Carolina,Respecting a Bill for the Discharge of Private Debts by Installments, Mass Gazette 1
(Mar 23, 1787). Not only would British merchants hesitate to do business with the United States,
but, according to "the best informed citizens of the United States, . . . letters of marque and
reprisal would be speedily issued against us; and [ ] our property on the high seas would be
captured, and thrown into a common fund for the relief of our foreign creditors." Id.
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merchants appropriate legal process.' In February 1786, Lord
Carmarthen refused to engage John Adams on Britain's failure to
withdraw from its military posts in the United States-in violation of
the Paris Peace Treaty'-because the United States had failed to
remove impediments to debt collection by British creditors."'
Carmarthen attached a list of grievances of British debtors, which the
London Times published in September 1786.2 The grievances listed,
state by state, the acts, ordinances, and edicts that obstructed British
creditors from recovering debts in state courts. In Georgia, the
grievances specifically noted that "the Judges from the bench have
declared that no suit shall be proceeded on if brought by a British
subject, while, on the contrary, they allow British subjects to be sued
by their creditors."' In other states, "although the courts appear to be
open, the lawyers are afraid to prosecute for British debts."' In 1790,
the editor of A Review of the Laws of the United States of North

America, published in London, noted that, even where state courts
afforded process to British creditors, it is "too frequently evaded to
the injury of the British creditor.""' Regarding Georgia in particular,
the editor observed:
Every privilege and protection which belongs to American
citizens, as alien friends in Britain, equally appertains to British
subjects, as alien friends within the United States, with respect to
the security both of person and property, because the laws of
both countries are substantially the same. But nevertheless the
269
270
271

Copy of a Letter from Charlestown,Lond Times 2 (Dec 28, 1785).
Paris Peace Treaty Art VII, 8 Stat at 83.
Lord Carmarthen wrote:

The little Attention paid to the fulfilling this Engagement on the Part of the Subjects of the
United States in general and the direct Breach of it, in many particular Instances, have
already reduced many of the Kings Subjects to the utmost degree of Difficulty and Distress:
nor have their Applications for Redress, to those whose Situations in America naturally
pointed them out as the Guardians of public Faith, been as yet successfull in obtaining
them that Justice to which, on every Principle of Law, as well as of Humanity, they were
clearly and indisputably entitled.
Letter from Lord Carmarthen to John Adams (Feb 28, 1786), reprinted in Mary A. Guinta,
ed, Documents of the Emerging Nation: U.S. Foreign Relations, 1775-1789 166 (Scholarly
Resources 1998).
272 Substance of Lord Carmarthen'sAnswer to the Requisition of His Excellency John
Adams, Lond Times 4 (Sept 5, 1786).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 A Review of the Laws of the United States of North America, the British Provinces, and
West India Islands: With Select Precedents and Observations upon Divers Acts of Parliamentand
Acts of Assembly, and a Comparison of the Courts of Law and Practice There with That of
Westminster Hall 12 (Otridge and Otridge 1790). The editor hoped this work would prove "of some
service to Gentlemen of the Profession, as well as the Merchants of both Countries." Id at vi.
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judges in Georgia have, since the peace, determined, in the case
of one Perkin's, that a British merchant and alien friend, could
not maintain an action against a citizen of that State.'
These concerns prompted London merchants to engage in organized
political activity to pressure the British government to demand
satisfaction of American debts.'
2. Failing to redress acts of violence against British subjects.
In addition to thwarting the rights of British creditors under the
Paris Peace Treaty, states violated the law of nations by not redressing
tort injuries inflicted by state citizens upon British subjects." In the
1780s, state citizens increasingly made violent attacks upon the
persons and property of British subjects in America. Indeed, the
president of the Continental Congress, Elias Boudinot, feared that
postwar acts of violence by New York Whigs against the British were
so extreme as possibly to "involve us in another War."29
Acts of violence against loyalists and their property after the 1783
Paris Peace Treaty have been well documented.' Britain attempted
formally to protect loyalists in the Treaty, most notably in Article V.
Article V provided that Congress would "earnestly recommend" to
state legislatures that they restore property confiscated from British

Id at 11-12.
See Katharine A. Kellock, London Merchants and the Pre-1776 American Debts, 1
Guildhall Stud Lond Hist 109, 113 (1974).
278 By permitting their citizens to injure British subjects, states arguably contradicted the
Treaty as well. Article VI of the Treaty provided:
276
277

That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced against
any person or persons for, or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the
present war; and that no person shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage,
either in his person, liberty or property; and that those who may be in confinement on such
charges, at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America, shall be immediately set at
liberty, and the prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.
Paris Peace Treaty Art VI, 8 Stat at 83. Thus, if a state citizen injured a British subject in person
or property because of "the part which he ... may have taken in the present war," and the state
refused to provide redress, then Britain might have considered this to be a treaty violation.
279 Oscar Zeichner, The Loyalist Problem in New York after the Revolution, 21 NY Hist
284, 289 (1940).
280 See Jensen, The New Nation at 290-91 (cited in note 260) (noting that "[i]ncreasingly
violent attacks were made on British merchants and their American abettors"); Wallace Brown,
The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution 175-76 (Morrow 1969); A.L. Burt,
The United States, Great Britain, and British North America: From the Revolution to the
Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812 94-98 (Yale 1940). Before and during the war, British
merchants of course had feared such violence. For an account of one such merchant, see William L.
Roberts III, The Losses of a Loyalist Merchantin Georgia duringthe Revolution, 52 Ga Hist Q 270,
272-73 (1968) (describing a merchant's fear of "imprisonment or bodily harm" in 1776).
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subjects." The Treaty gave loyalists twelve months to return and
claim their property without interference.' In fact, confiscations
continued, and many loyalists were injured or killed upon returning to
reclaim their property.
A 1785 letter to the New York Packet from the writer
"Americanus" describes one such violent incident and its foreign
relations implications. The writer conveyed that a "supporter of the
British lion," returning to New Jersey from Nova Scotia, suffered an
"ill-treating" and "the cutting off an ear.""" The New York writer was
"sorry to say, that this is not the first outrage of the kind (though the
most serious) that has happened in our sister state of New Jersey."a
The writer recognized that such attacks offended the law of nations.
He stated that the United States could never "be respected as a
nation" if such acts "are suffered to pass unpunished."a If Americans
received such treatment in England, Americanus explained, the
English government would severely punish the perpetrators:
Should some of us go to England, we might, no doubt meet with
people there to whom, as having been "strenuous OPPOSERS of
the British lion," we might be no less obnoxious; than the most
violent Tory would be to us; I would ask, in that case, what
should we say of their government, if such an outrage was
suffered to be committed on one of us with impunity; but I do
not hesitate to assert that the reverse would be the case; that the
perpetrators of such a deed would meet with a very severe
punishment."
Americanus implored New Jersey to "endeavor to suppress rather
than appear to boast of actions which must reflect disgrace on our
government."* Violence against foreigners, in addition to being "in
the highest degree disgraceful to us as a nation," would deter
foreigners from "settl[ing] among us" and "venturing their
property."2
Failure to redress such violence gave Britain just cause for war
against the United States. In reality, however, Britain, like the United

281
282
283
284
285
286
2

288

Paris Peace Treaty Art V, 8 Stat at 82.
Paris Peace Treaty Art V, 8 Stat at 82.
Americanus, Letter to Mr. Loudon, NY Packet 2 (Oct 20, 1785).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Americanus, Letter to Mr. Loudon, NY Packet at 2 (cited in note 283).
Id.
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States, could ill afford another war at that time.29 Accordingly, it had
to resort to lesser forms of retaliation. In time, Britain would link both
the treatment of loyalists at the hands of United States citizens and
state-imposed impediments to debt recovery by British merchants to
its refusal to give up military posts in North America (as required by
the Paris Peace Treaty) .29
Britain was not the only nation with whom private violence
threatened to precipitate hostilities. In the 1780s, the danger of
clashes between American settlers and Spaniards on lands adjacent to
the Mississippi threatened hostilities between the United States and
Spain.291 Even before the United States and Spain entered into a
treaty, violence by Americans against Spaniards violated the law of
nations and-if not redressed-gave Spain just cause for war.
3.

State attempts to provide redress.

Over time, writers and public officials increasingly came to
appreciate that the peace and prosperity of the United States
depended on protecting the interests of foreign merchants and
redressing private violence against foreign subjects. Robust commerce
required respect for the commercial rights of foreign merchants. In
1784, Alexander Hamilton published a letter exhorting the states to
foster commerce by protecting the commercial rights of British
merchants.2 9 Certain states attempted to encourage commerce by
289 See Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America at 97 (cited in
note 280).
290 See id at 94.
291 At this time, Americans claimed that they had rights to navigate the Mississippi River
under the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which granted navigation rights to British subjects. Spain
contended that the treaty was inapplicable and refused navigation rights to Americans. In 1787,
the French charge d'affaires, Louis Guillaume Otto, observed that "[t]he inhabitants of
Kentucky and Frankland are insisting not only on the free navigation of the Mississippi, but they
threaten to commit hostilities against the inhabitants of Louisiana unless Spain renounces its
exclusive system." Letter from Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Mar 5, 1787),
reprinted in Guinta, ed, Documents of the Emerging Nation 210, 210 (cited in note 271). See also
Louis Guillaume Otto, Question of the Mississippi (1786), reprinted in Albert Bushnell Hart, ed,
3 American History Told by Contemporaries: National Expansion 1783-1845 150, 151-54
(Macmillan 1901) (describing the threat of hostilities and the potential subjection to England of
American settlers on the Mississippi). "Frankland" was the short-lived state into which the
western part of North Carolina had organized itself as early as 1786 after declaring
independence from North Carolina. See Z.F. Smith, The History of Kentucky 442 (CourierJournal 1892).
292 Hamilton argued that

every merchant or trader has an interest in the aggregate mass of capital or stock in trade;
that what he himself wants in capital, he must make up in credit; that unless there are
others who possess large capitals this credit cannot be had; and that, in the diminution of
the general capital of this State, commerce will decline, and his own prospects of profit will
diminish.
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strengthening aliens' ability to recover debts and granting aliens other
commercial rights. Georgia, Maryland, and New Jersey, for example,
authorized aliens to hold judicially enforceable security interests in
real property as a means of fostering lending.293 (In the coming years,
certain states would allow aliens to own real property.") In 1785,
Georgia enacted a statute providing that aliens could use its courts to
sue for debts and damages arising after 1782.' These formal measures
were insufficient to resolve the debt controversy, however, as they
were sporadic and sometimes disregarded. In addition, these
measures did little to redress violence against foreigners.
From the available evidence, it appears that Connecticut was the
only state to have acted in response to the Continental Congress's
1781 resolution calling on states to redress private acts of violence
against foreign citizens. Oliver Ellsworth, who would later become the
principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789, was a delegate to the
Continental Congress when these resolutions were passed, though he
was not present at that time.2 9 From 1780 to 1784, Ellsworth was also

Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (1784),
reprinted in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 3 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton: 1782-1786 483, 493
(Columbia 1962).
293 Georgia authorized alien lenders to secure debts by mortgage on real property because
the borrowing of Money on Interest from Foreigners, May benefit this State; and it is but
reasonable, that any Foreigner lending Money should be secured, on real Estates by Way
of Mortgage, and at liberty to institute, suits for the recovery of all sums as well principle as
Interest so loaned.
Safeguarding Investment of Foreign Capital (Feb 21, 1785), reprinted in Allen D. Candler, ed,
19 The ColonialRecords of the State of Georgia, pt 2, 417, 417 (Byrd 1911). Maryland justified its
law similarly: "[I]t may prove advantageous to the citizens of this state, were foreigners enabled
to lend them money on mortgages, and such loans may conduce much to the improvement of the
country." An Act to Secure the Payment, and to Give a Recovery, of Money Lent by Foreigners
to Citizens of This State on Mortgage of Lands (1784), reprinted in Virgil Maxcy, ed, 1 The Laws
of Maryland 519, 519 (Nicklin 1811). New Jersey provided the same: "[P]roviding security for
foreigners, the better to enable them to recover their debts at the day assigned for payment, will
greatly conduce to promote and encourage trade, and increase the credit of the citizens of this
State." An Act Empowering Certain Creditors to Secure Their Debts by Mortgage, and for
Other Purposes Therein Mentioned (1789), reprinted in William Patterson, ed, Laws of the State
of New-Jersey 93 (Day 1800).
294 See, for example, An Act to Enable Aliens to Purchase and Hold Real Estates within
This Commonwealth (1789), reprinted in Alexander Dallas, ed, 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania 645 (Hall & Sellers 1793) (authorizing aliens to purchase and hold real estate in
Pennsylvania, as this would "introduc[e] large sums of money into this state" and "induc[e] such
aliens as may have acquired property to follow their interest, and become useful citizens").
295 See Rights of Aliens and Admission of Citizens (Feb 7, 1785), reprinted in Candler, ed,
19 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, pt 2, 375, 375-76 (cited in note 293).
296 Evidence shows that Ellsworth was present in Congress in Philadelphia from June to
September 1781, but then absent until December 1782. See William Garrott Brown, The Life of
Oliver Ellsworth 53 (Macmillan 1905); Henry Flanders, 2 The Lives and Times of the Chief
Justices of the Supreme Courtof the United States 98-99 (Johnson 1881).
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a member of the Governor's Council, or Upper House, of the
Connecticut legislature.'
In 1782, during Ellsworth's tenure, the Connecticut legislature
enacted a statute criminalizing all of the offenses against the law of
nations that the Continental Congress had encouraged states to
punish. Specifically, the Connecticut statute authorized its courts to
punish violations of safe conducts and passports; acts of hostility
against citizens of nations in amity, league, or truce with the United
States; acts of hostility against those in the state under a general
implied safe conduct; and violations of the rights of ambassadors and
other public ministers.' In addition, the Connecticut act contained a
catch-all provision authorizing Connecticut courts to adjudicate "any
other Infractions or Violations of or Offences against the known
received and established Laws of Civilized Nations, agreably to the
Laws of this State, or the Laws of Nations."'
Perhaps of most relevance to the ATS, the last section of the
Connecticut act provided a civil remedy for injury to any foreign
nation or its subjects:

297
298

Flanders, 2 Lives and Times of the ChiefJustices at 116 (cited in note 296).
The statute provided in pertinent part:

Whereas any violation or Infraction of the Laws of Nations is not only unjust in itself but if
not prevented directly tends to the Dishonour and Ruin of any Nation, and therefore calls
for the most speedy and exemplary Punishment.
Thereupon Be it Enacted by the Governor Council and Representatives in General Court
Assembled and by the Authority of the same, That the Superior Court and the several
County Courts in this State within their respective Limits, be and they are hereby
Impowered and directed to proceed against and Punish all such Persons as shall be Guilty
of the violation of any safe conduct or Pasport, granted under the Authority of the
Congress of the United States of America or under the Authority of this State to the
Subjects of any Foreign Power in Time of War, And also against all such Persons as shall be
Guilty of the Commission of any Acts of Hostility against the Subjects of any Prince or
Power in Amity League or Truce with the United States of America, or such as are within
this State under a General implied safe Conduct; and also against all such as shall be Guilty
of any violation or infraction of the Immunities of Ambassadors or other Public Ministers,
authorized and received as such by the United States in Congress Assembled, or of any
violence offered to the Persons of such Ambassadors or Ministers their Houses Carriages
or Property under the Limitations allowed by the Laws and Usages of Nations, or that shall
any ways molest or disturb them in the free Exercise of their Religion.
An Act to Prevent Infractions of the Laws of Nations ("Act to Prevent Infractions") (1782),
reprinted in Leonard Woods Labaree, ed, 4 The Public Records of the State of Connecticutfor
the Year 1782 156, 156-57 (Connecticut 1942). See also An Act for Securing to Foreigners in
This State, Their Rights, According to the Laws of Nations, and to Prevent Any Infractions of
Said Laws ("Act for Securing Foreigners' Rights"), in Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut,
in America 82, 82-83 (Green 1784). Ellsworth was a member of the Upper House when these
acts were passed. See Labaree, ed, 4 PublicRecords at 130.
299 Act to Prevent Infractions at 157 (cited in note 298). See also Act for Securing
Foreigners' Rights at 83 (cited in note 298).
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[I]f any Injury shall be offered and done by any Person or
Persons whatsoever to any foreign Power or to the Subjects
thereof, either in Thier [sic] Persons or Property, by means
whereof any Damage shall or may any ways arise happen or
accrue either to any such foreign Power, to the said United
States, to this State or to any particular Person, the Person or
Persons offering or Doing any such Injury shall be liable to pay
and answer all such Damages as shall be occasioned thereby."
This provision did not depend on the foreign nation being in amity,
league, or truce with the United States under a treaty or on the alien
being under a general implied safe conduct. Rather, the statute gave a
broad remedy to those injured (including foreign subjects) by an
American and thus implemented the Continental Congress's
recommendation that states "authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the United
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign
power by a citizen.""

State efforts during the Confederation era to bolster commerce
and sustain peace by avoiding law of nations and treaty violations
turned out to be too little, too late to protect the interests of the
United States. In April 1787, in his influential pamphlet, Vices of the
Political System of the United States, James Madison warned of the
dangers that such violations continued to pose:
From the number of Legislatures, the sphere of life from which
most of their members are taken, and the circumstances under
which their legislative business is carried on, irregularities of this
kind must frequently happen. Accordingly not a year has passed
without instances of them in some one or other of the States. The
Treaty of peace-the

treaty

with France-the

Holland have each been violated....

treaty with

The causes of these

300 Act to Prevent Infractions at 157 (cited in note 298). See also Act for Securing
Foreigners' Rights at 83 (cited in note 298).
301 Hunt, ed, 21 Journals of the Continental Congress at 1137 (cited in note 245). Taken
literally, the language of the Connecticut statute was broad enough to encompass claims arising
domestically between foreign subjects. In this regard, the Connecticut statute differs from the
ATS, which limited jurisdiction to claims by an alien for a tort "in violation of the law of
nations." In context, as we explain, the inclusion of this phrase in the ATS was a shorthand way
of describing violence against aliens by citizens of the forum. See notes 342-51 and
accompanying text.
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irregularities must necessarily produce frequent violations of the
law of nations in other respects.
As yet foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadverting
on us. This moderation however cannot be mistaken for a
permanent partiality to our faults, or a permanent security agst.
those disputes with other nations, which being among the
greatest of public calamities, it ought to be least in the power of
any part of the Community to bring on the whole.3 n
When Edmund Randolph opened the Federal Convention of
1787, one of the first defects he identified with the Confederation was
its inability to prevent or redress "acts against a foreign power
He concluded that the
contrary to the laws of nations."'
Confederation "therefore [could not] prevent a war,"' and was
fundamentally flawed. One of the Convention's top priorities,
therefore, was to design a new constitution that would enable the
United States to act like an established European power and meet its
obligations under the law of nations.
A primary goal of the Constitution was to control state violations
of the law of nations by strengthening national political authority over
determinations of war and peace. The Constitution centralized such
authority in various ways. Most importantly, it transferred almost all
significant authority relating to foreign relations to the federal
government. In addition to granting Congress and the President
important foreign relations and war powers, the new Constitution
established an independent federal judiciary with jurisdiction to
adjudicate a variety of cases and controversies likely to implicate the
law of nations. Congress made quick use of this jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 by establishing lower federal courts and
granting them original jurisdiction over controversies important to the
peace of the United States.
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In light of the legal and political context surrounding its
adoption, the ATS is best understood as one of several means by
which the First Congress sought to ensure that the United States
would comply with its obligations under the law of nations and avoid
giving foreign nations just cause for war. Article III of the

302 James Madison, Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States (Apr 1787), reprinted
in Robert A. Rutland, et al, eds, 9 The Papers of James Madison 345, 349 (Chicago 1975).
303 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the FederalConvention of178724-25 (Yale rev ed 1966).
304 Id at 25.
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Constitution authorizes federal court jurisdiction over several
categories of cases likely to implicate the law of nations. Prominent
members of the Founding generation advocated federal jurisdiction
over such cases in order to prevent state courts from generating
foreign conflicts by disregarding such law.' The Founders sought to
mimic the jurisdiction of English courts by granting federal courts
jurisdiction over cases likely to implicate key aspects of the law of
nations. Such jurisdiction was necessary to foster commerce, redress
law of nations violations, and avoid war.' As finalized and ratified,
Article III extends the federal judicial power
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.'
The categories most likely to implicate questions of war and peace were
"Cases ... arising under ... Treaties"; "Cases affecting Ambassadors,

other public Ministers and Consuls"; "Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction"; and "Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." As explained, a
nation's violation of treaties, infringement of rights of ambassadors,
interference with open use of the high seas, or failure to redress injuries
that its citizens inflicted on foreign citizens gave the offended nation
just cause for retaliation.'
This Part explains the role that the ATS played-along with
other acts of the First Congress-in preventing and punishing law of
nations violations in order to keep the United States out of war. As
explained in the previous Part, state courts had been unable or
unwilling to redress private offenses against the law of nations. In
structuring a judiciary for the United States, it was imperative that the
See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 37-38 (cited in note 17).
See id at 37-46; Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? HistoricalFoundations
and Modern Justificationsfor FederalJurisdictionover Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J
Intl L 1, 6-17 (1996).
307 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
308 See notes 135-38, 155-56, 177,255, and accompanying text.
305
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First Congress enable federal courts to remedy the full range of
violations of the law of nations for which the United States otherwise
would be responsible. Accordingly, in 1789, the First Congress gave
federal courts jurisdiction over important civil cases implicating the
law of nations. (Congress also gave federal courts important criminal
jurisdiction but did not enact federal crimes until 1790.) First, it gave
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases by or against
ambassadors and other public ministers.' Second, it gave district
courts original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. 1 0 Third,
it gave circuit courts original jurisdiction over suits in which an alien
was a party and the amount in controversy exceeded $500."' Claims

for less than $500 had to be brought in state court, but the Act
provided for Supreme Court review if the state court judgment denied
enforcement of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.312 Thus, Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases
likely to involve law of nations violations that, if not redressed, could
lead the United States into war: (1) violation of the rights of
ambassadors, (2) piracy, (3) violations of treaties, and (4) claims by
aliens for more than $500.
Had Congress stopped there, it would have omitted an important
category of law of nations violations that threatened the peace of the
United States: personal injuries that US citizens inflicted upon aliens
resulting in less than $500 in damages. As explained, the law of
nations required countries to redress such injuries through criminal
punishment, extradition, or a civil remedy. The first Judiciary Act
gave federal circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction of crimes and offenses
"cognizable under the authority of the United States,".. but the ability
of federal courts to recognize and enforce federal common law crimes
was not yet established. Moreover, although Congress codified several
offenses against the law of nations in 1790, it did not include all
private offenses to foreign nations for which the United States could
be responsible under the law of nations. (Significantly, the law of
nations itself prevented nations from criminalizing private offenses
against foreign citizens committed abroad.) In addition, the United

309
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311
312
313

Judiciary
Judiciary
Judiciary
Judiciary
Judiciary

Act of
Act of
Act of
Act of
Act of

1789
1789
1789
1789
1789

§ 13, 1 Stat at 80.
§ 9, 1 Stat at 77.
§ 11, 1 Stat at 78.
§ 25, 1 Stat at 92.
§ 9, 1 Stat at 76-77.
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States had no treaties providing for extradition of fugitive criminals
until the Jay Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain."'
In the absence of other reliable means of redressing acts of
violence by US citizens against aliens, the ATS functioned to provide
a civil remedy for such misconduct and ensure that the United States
would not be held responsible for its citizens' violations of the law of
nations. An advantage of this mechanism was that it was selfexecuting-it placed the burden on injured aliens to bring suit and did
not require the still-forming US government immediately to marshal
the resources necessary to prosecute crimes. Taken in historical
context, the ATS was fully consistent with the jurisdictional
limitations of Article III, which authorized federal courts to hear
controversies between citizens of a (US) state and citizens of a foreign
nation without regard to the amount in controversy.
A. Enlisting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Avoid War
This section explains how various jurisdictional provisions of the
first Judiciary Act worked together to avoid or redress a range of law of
nations violations by the United States and its citizens. This section also
considers the specific role that the ATS played within that scheme.
1. Ambassadorial, admiralty, and foreign diversity jurisdiction.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred jurisdiction on the federal
courts to hear several important categories of civil cases implicating
the law of nations. Section 13 of the Act provided that "the Supreme
Court ... shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their
domestics, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the
law of nations."' This provision enabled the Supreme Court to
enforce the immunities of ambassadors, public ministers, and their
households under the law of nations. Section 13 also provided that the
Supreme Court had "original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over all
suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a
consul, or vice consul, shall be a party."3 " This provision authorized
ambassadors to pursue redress for infringements of their rights in the
Supreme Court, if they so chose. Thus, the first Judiciary Act gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to redress violations of the rights
314 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannic Majesty and
the United States of America, by Their President, with the Advice and Consent of Their Senate
Art XXVII, 8 Stat 116, 129, Treaty Ser No 105 (1794) ("Jay Treaty").
315 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat at 80-81.
316 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat at 80-81.
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of ambassadors, thereby allowing the United States to disavow any
violations of those rights by its citizens. These were among the most
serious offenses a private citizen could commit against other nations.
Moreover, § 9 of the Judiciary Act gave lower federal courts
''exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it."' This jurisdiction included prize cases-a crucial category of cases
that the law of nations governed and that could provoke war if not
properly resolved."' Prize jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the ATS
served similar functions in important respects. Both allowed aliens to
obtain redress from US citizens in federal court, thereby preventing
the United States from being held responsible under the law of
nations for its citizens' misconduct. The law of nations permitted
nations at war to make prizes of each other's ships, goods, and effects
captured at sea."' Nations often authorized their citizens to make such
captures, and prize courts allowed privateers to obtain title to seized
property through judicial condemnation in admiralty.320 Perhaps prize
courts' most important function, though, was to remedy any abuses
committed by privateers, such as the erroneous capture of a neutral
ship or neutral cargo. By providing such remedies, prize courts
avoided US responsibility for such misconduct. As Justice William
Johnson explained in 1808, "[a] seizure on the high seas by an
unauthorised individual, is a mere trespass."321 To avoid responsibility
for such trespasses, civilized nations constituted prize courts "with
powers to inquire into the correctness of captures made under colour
of their own authority, and to give redress to those who have been
unmeritedly attacked or injured."" The effect of such redress was to
disavow "the unauthorised act of an individual."'
The Judiciary Act also gave British creditors several ways to
vindicate their rights under the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty. The Act gave
circuit courts original jurisdiction, concurrent with state courts, of all
actions to which an alien was a party and the amount in controversy
exceeded $500.324 In such cases, federal courts could enforce the
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77.
See Clark, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1334-37 (cited in note 123).
319 Id at 1334.
320 Id.
321 Rose v Himely, 8 US (4 Cranch) 241, 282 (1808) (Johnson dissenting).
322 Id.
323 Id at 283.
324 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat at 78. In the case of debts owed to aliens, a $500
amount in controversy requirement was imposed as a compromise to keep most alien creditors
in state court. See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 44 (cited in note 17).
317
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Treaty against state laws obstructing debt recovery." The Judiciary
Act also provided that such actions were removable by an alien to a
federal circuit court from state court." In addition, even when the
amount in controversy requirement forced debt actions to be brought
in state court, an alien could seek appellate review in the Supreme
Court of the United States under § 25 of the Judiciary Act if the state
court obstructed debt recovery in violation of the 1783 Peace Treaty.'
In sum, all of these provisions of the Judiciary Act provided a federal
forum, original or appellate, in which aliens could seek civil redress
for offenses against the law of nations that, if not redressed, could give
rise to war.
Standing alone, however, none of these provisions would have
authorized federal courts to hear run-of-the-mill tort claims
implicating the law of nations-claims by aliens against US citizens
for acts of violence against their persons or personal property.
Although such acts may not have been as momentous for foreign
relations as violence against ambassadors or unauthorized captures on
the high seas, they occurred with enough frequency after the
Revolutionary War to risk friction with other nations and require
redress under the law of nations. Jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors would not reach cases affecting ordinary aliens.
Likewise, admiralty jurisdiction would not permit federal courts to
redress private acts of violence against aliens that occurred on land. In
addition, the $500 amount in controversy requirement for foreign
diversity jurisdiction would have denied a federal forum for most tort
claims at the time." Finally, as explained in the next section, federal
criminal law was not sufficiently established to redress acts of violence
by US citizens against aliens. The ATS filled this void.

325 In fact, federal courts began doing so in the mid-1790s. See Hopkirk v Bell, 7 US
(3 Cranch) 454, 458 (1806) (holding that the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty prevented prewar
operation of a state statute of limitations on British debts); Ware v Hylton, 3 US (3 Dail) 199,
285 (1796) (holding that the 1783 peace treaty required American debtors to pay British
creditors notwithstanding a Virginia act authorizing discharge); Georgia v Brailsford, 3 US
(3 Dall) 1, 5 (1794) (holding that the Paris Peace Treaty required American debtors to pay
British creditors notwithstanding the sequestration of debts by Georgia).
326 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 12, 1 Stat at 78.
327 Under § 25, a party could seek review of a state court judgment invalidating a treaty,
upholding a state authority alleged to violate a treaty, or construing a treaty against a right
claimed under it. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat at 85-86. The Supreme Court later affirmed
its power to enforce federal rights on appeal from state courts. See Cohens v Virginia, 19 US
(6 Wheat) 264, 353-54 (1821); Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 380-81 (1816).
328 See Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 900 (cited in note 33).
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Criminal offenses against the United States.

A nation's obligation under the law of nations to redress injuries
to aliens inflicted by its citizens theoretically could be satisfied
through criminal punishment or extradition of the offender. In the
early Republic, however, these solutions were imperfect at best. The
first Judiciary Act's criminal provisions did not clearly establish a
mechanism for redressing private offenses against foreign citizens.
The First Congress gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of crimes
and offenses "cognizable under the authority of the United States."329
What constituted a crime or offense against the United States was
unclear at this time. Congress had yet to codify crimes against the
United States, and the status of federal common law crimes was
unsettled. Indeed, from the late 1790s until 1812, public officials
would debate whether federal courts had jurisdiction to define and
punish common law offenses against the United States in the absence
of congressional action.' The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
federal common law crimes in 1812.33'
In addition, the United States had no clearly established
mechanism for extraditing criminal fugitives to other nations as a
means of redressing injuries to aliens. "Within the United States . . . it

was settled very early indeed that the extradition of fugitives
depended entirely on treaty or legislative provision, and that without
it there was no obligation whatsoever upon the government, or any of
its branches, to surrender fugitive criminals to foreign nations. 332
Without established federal criminal laws or extradition to redress
private offenses against foreign citizens, a civil remedy would provide
a reliable means of redressing such offenses and avoiding reprisals
under the law of nations.
Even after the passage of the Crimes Act of 1790, federal
criminal law still did not reach all private offenses that US citizens
might commit against aliens. In the Crimes Act of 1790, Congress
used its Article I power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations""'. to criminalize each of the principal offenses against the law
of nations that Blackstone described as a crime in England. First, the
329 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76-77 (providing district court jurisdiction); Judiciary
Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat at 78-79 (providing circuit court jurisdiction).
330 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex L
Rev 1321, 1404-19 (2001) (describing the debate and its resolution).
331 See United States v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
332 Benjamin Munn Ziegler, The International Law of John Marshall: A Study of First
Principles315 (North Carolina 1939).
333 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10.
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Crimes Act of 1790 made it a crime to violate "any safe-conduct or
passport duly obtained and issued under the authority of the United
States" or to "assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any other manner
infract the law of nations, by offering violence to the person of an
ambassador or other public minister."" Second, Congress established
that, upon conviction, those who prosecute, solicit, or execute any writ
or process against "any ambassador or other public minister of any
foreign prince or state .

..

shall be deemed violators of the laws of

nations, and disturbers of the public repose, and imprisoned not
exceeding three years."' Third, Congress made piracy a crime against
the United States, triable in the district where the offender was
apprehended.336
Blackstone described safe conduct violations, infringements of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy as "the principal cases, in which
the statute law of England interposes, to aid and enforce the law of
nations, as a part of the common law."' The Crimes Act of 1790
made these same transgressions offenses against the United States.
But just as Blackstone's three categories of offenses did not exhaust
all private offenses that could be imputed to nations, neither did the
offenses established by the Crimes Act of 1790. Notably absent from
the Crimes Act were private acts of violence by US citizens against
aliens who did not enjoy the protection of a safe conduct or
diplomatic immunity. Moreover, as explained, criminal laws did not
apply extraterritorially and thus were incapable of providing redress
for private offenses that US citizens committed against aliens within
the territorial jurisdiction of another nation." In 1789, such offenses
could occur in close proximity to the United States because the
European powers of Great Britain and Spain retained territory
adjoining the original United States. In England, mechanisms were
available to redress private offenses against aliens-namely, common
law crimes and tort actions. In the United States, however, common
law remedies were only generally available in the states, which had

334 Crimes Act of 1790 § 28, 1 Stat at 118. Thomas Lee has questioned whether this
provision encompassed all safe conduct violations or only those against ambassadors. See Lee,
106 Colum L Rev at 864-65 (cited in note 33).
335 Crimes Act of 1790 §§ 25-26, 1 Stat at 118.
336 Crimes Act of 1790 § 8, 1 Stat at 113-14.
337 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 73 (cited in note 9).
338 Accordingly, it is not true, as Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter (formerly Burley) has
argued, that "[t]he national Government could always appease a foreign sovereign by
prosecuting or even extraditing an offender." Burley, 83 Am J Intl L at 481 (cited in note 37).
The criminal laws of the United States did not reach or punish all offenses that might generate
law of nations violations, and extradition was not always an available or politically feasible
alternative.
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received the common law after independence... but had been
unwilling to use such law to remedy torts committed by their citizens
against aliens. The United States as a whole did not adopt the
common law, and many prominent Founders (especially AntiFederalists) believed that the Constitution prevented Congress from
doing so.' Congress could, however, use Article III foreign diversity
jurisdiction to enable federal courts to employ common law forms of
action to hear tort claims by aliens against US citizens, regardless of
the amount in controversy.
3.

Alien tort claim jurisdiction.

The ATS filled what would have been a significant gap in the first
Judiciary Act. Although the Act's other provisions for civil and
criminal jurisdiction went a long way toward satisfying the United
States' obligations under the law of nations, they did not provide all of
the remedies required by the law of nations for injuries to aliens
inflicted by Americans upon aliens. By authorizing federal district
court jurisdiction over claims by "an alien ... for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,"" the
First Congress ensured that the United States would provide aliens
with at least one form of redress for its citizens' violations of the law
of nations. For a new nation seeking to join the ranks of the European
powers but lacking established structures and resources, the ATS
provided the United States with a self-executing civil mechanism that
did not require any affirmative federal executive action. To be sure,
there was no guarantee that alien plaintiffs would prevail in ATS
suits. The First Congress, however, evidently had more confidence
that aliens would receive fair adjudication of their tort claims against
US citizens in federal court than in state court. If Congress was
correct, then adjudication of ATS claims in federal court would
provide the better means for redressing injuries that Americans
inflicted upon aliens or their personal property. If a foreign nation
concluded that its citizen had been denied adequate redress, it could
pursue satisfaction through diplomatic channels or reprisals.
a) The text of the A TS. Taken in historical context, the language
of the ATS most reasonably encompassed intentional tort claims by
alien friends against US citizens. More specifically, the phrase "a tort
only in violation of the law of nations" most reasonably meant an
intentional injury to an alien's person or personal property inflicted
339
340
341

See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 46 (cited in note 17).
Id at 53-55.
Judiciary Act of 1789 §9, 1 Stat at 77.
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by a US citizen and for which the United States would be responsible
to the alien's nation if it failed to provide appropriate redress. The
phrase "for a tort" referred to an intentional injury, actionable in a
common law tort form of action, to an alien's person or personal
property.4 2 The phrase "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States" limited torts actionable in federal district court to
those that would be attributed to the tortfeasor's nation if not
redressed in accordance with the law of nations. Such torts primarily,
if not exclusively, included torts committed with force by US citizens
against citizens of nations with which the United States was at peace.
Torts in violation of a treaty referred to torts committed by US
citizens against citizens of nations with whom the United States had a
treaty protecting aliens from such acts. (The United States had a small
number of such treaties in 1789.)" Torts in violation of the law of
nations referred to torts by US citizens against citizens of nations with
whom the United States might not have a treaty (or even formal
relations) but with whom the United States was at peace. When US
citizens committed torts against such aliens, they violated the law of
nations by threatening the peace of nations. In such cases, the victim's
nation would have expected the United States-in accordance with
the law of nations-to redress the injury or become responsible itself
for the violation.
Today, it is common to speak of a nation-or an official acting on
behalf of a nation -as violating the law of nations.3' In 1789, however,
an ordinary citizen was also said to violate the law of nations by taking
hostile actions against a friendly nation or its citizens.4' To constitute
342 Blackstone defined a "tort" as a "personal action," not founded upon a contract,
"whereby a man claims a satisfaction in damages for some injury done to his person or
property." Blackstone, 3 Commentariesat 117 (cited in note 9). As used in the ATS, the term "tort"
would not have been reasonably understood to include real property actions because the law of
nations prohibited a nation from exercising jurisdiction over claims asserting rights to real property
located abroad, and the common law generally disabled aliens from owning real property located in
a state. See note 196 and accompanying text. There is a question whether, as state law developed to
allow aliens to own rights to real property in US states, it would be appropriate to interpret the
ATS dynamically to encompass torts interfering with real property rights.
343 See notes 416-24 and accompanying text.
3" See Curtis A. Bradley, State Action and Corporate Human Rights Liability, 85 Notre
Dame L Rev 1823, 1824-25 (2010).
345 For example, in his famous neutrality proclamation, President George Washington
stated that a citizen of the United States could "render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture
under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the ...
powers" at war with each other but at peace with the United States. George Washington,
Proclamation (Apr 22, 1793), reprinted in Jared Sparks, ed, 10 The Writings of George
Washington 535, 535 (Russell, Shattuck, & Williams 1836). In addition, he instructed officers of
the United States "to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States violate the law of nations with respect to the
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a violation of the law of nations, a private act had to disturb the peace
of nations by subjecting the transgressor's nation to justified
retaliation if it failed to redress the act. "For in vain," Blackstone
explained, "would nations in their collective capacity observe these
universal rules, if private subjects were at liberty to break them at
their own discretion, and involve the two states in war."3 Blackstone
generally described two kinds of private wrongs-"the one without
force or violence, as slander or breach of contract; the other coupled
with force and violence, as batteries, or false imprisonment."" The
kind of torts committed against an alien that violated the law of
nations were those "with force"-that is, intentionally inflicted
injuries "attended with some violation of the peace." When Vattel
described citizens of one nation who "offend and ill-treat the citizens
of another,"" or "plunder, and use ill foreigners," 0 he appears to
have been referring to actions committed, in Blackstone's words,
"with force." Thus, "a tort only in violation of the law of nations"
most reasonably would have been understood to mean an intentional
act of force against an alien's person or property that subjected the
transgressor's nation to justified retaliation under the law of nations if
it failed to provide appropriate redress.
Rather than attempt to define the underlying misconduct for
which an action could be maintained (as the Connecticut statute did),
the First Congress simply combined two terms of art in the ATS -one
drawn from the common law ("tort") and the other drawn from the
law of nations ("violation of the law of nations"). This shorthand
approach employed in the ATS necessarily satisfied the United States'
obligation under the law of nations to redress intentional injuries
inflicted by its citizens against aliens. At common law, "tort" was a
broader concept in that it referred to a wider range of misconduct and
was indifferent to the citizenship of the parties. The phrase "in
violation of the law of nations" necessarily qualified the term "tort" to
Powers at war, or any of them." Id. Justice James Wilson, sitting as a circuit justice, took up the
President's charge by instructing a federal grand jury to consider indicting US citizens who
violated President Washington's neutrality proclamation and the law of nations. See Henfield's
Case, 11 F Cases 1099, 1104 (CC D Pa 1793). Acting on this charge, the grand jury indicted
Gideon Henfield for committing acts of hostility and violence against the citizens and ships of
nations with which the United States was at peace, all "in violation of the laws of nations and the
constitution and laws of the said United States of America, and against the peace and dignity of
the said United States of America." Id at 1112. The jury acquitted Henfield, arguably in part
because no federal statute made his conduct a crime. Id at 1122.
346 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 68 (cited in note 9).
347 Blackstone, 3 Commentariesat 118 (cited in note 9).
348 Id.
349 Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, §71 at 144 (cited in note 103).
350 Id at bk II, § 78 at 146.
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encompass only intentional acts of force or violence by US citizens
against alien friends. Only such "torts" violated the law of nations and
required the United States to provide a civil remedy. This
understanding of the text is fully consistent with the First Congress's
desire to avoid violations of the law of nations by the United States
and its citizens.35'
Within the phrase "tort only in violation of the law of nations," it
is unclear whether the word "only" modified the preceding term
"tort," the subsequent phrase "in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States," or both. The word "only" in the ATS is
commonly read as modifying "for a tort" -in other words, "only for a
tort." Under this reading, "only" emphasizes the exclusion of nontort
alien actions (for example, contract or debt actions)-actions that had
to be brought in state court unless the amount in controversy
exceeded $500. It is thus possible that "only" was meant to emphasize
that all breach of contract claims, even for violations of the law
merchant or a treaty of the United States, had to be brought in state
court if the amount in controversy was less than $500.35
Another possible reading, however, is that "only" modified "in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" to
emphasize that only those torts in violation of the law of nations fell
within the jurisdiction that the ATS conferred. A significant class of
tort claims by aliens would not have involved law of nations
violations, including claims by enemy aliens, claims for interference
with real property rights, claims for private wrongs without force or
violence (such as slander), or claims between aliens for injuries arising
outside the US. By placing "only" before "violations of the law of

See Golove and Hulsebosch, 85 NYU L Rev at 936 (cited in note 112).
There is some evidence suggesting that this limitation was significant. In a July 1789
letter, Edmund Pendleton asked James Madison, who was then a member of the House of
Representatives:
351

352

lWihat

is meant by a Tort? Is it intended to include suits for the Recovery of debts, or on
breach of Contracts, as a reference to the laws of Nations & Foederal treaties seems to
indicate; or does it only embrace Personal wrongs, according to [its] usual legal meaning, or
violations of Personal or Official privilege of foreigners? [I]n the last case it will probably
be unexceptionable, in the former, very inconvenient.
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), reprinted in Maeva Marcus,
ed, 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 444, 446
(Columbia 1992). In Moxon v The Fanny, 17 F Cases 942 (D Pa 1793), a federal district court
noted in dicta that the case before it did not fall within the ATS because "[it cannot be called a
suit for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought
for." Id at 948. As currently recodified, the word "only" appears to modify "tort," as "tort only" is
set off by a comma from the remainder of the provision: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 USC § 1350.
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nations," Congress may have wished to emphasize that federal courts
could not hear this broader range of tort claims under § 9. Moreover,
in other instances the drafters of the first Judiciary Act used the word
"only" to modify a subsequent prepositional phrase."
A final
possibility is that "only" modifies the language that appears both
before and after it. In any event, the meaning of the statute does not
turn on whether "only" was meant to emphasize only torts (and not
breaches of contract or debts) or only those torts in violation of the
law of nations (and not other torts). Under either reading, the statute
conferred jurisdiction only over torts that also constituted law of
nations violations.
Taken in context at the time it was enacted, the language of the
ATS did not encompass claims between aliens for acts occurring in
other nations' territories because such claims did not involve
violations of the law of nations by the United States or its citizens.
The language "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States" most reasonably referred to law of nations or treaty
violations by US citizens-violations that triggered US responsibility
to provide redress or risk retaliation by the victim's nation for the
offense. The First Congress had no reason to remedy tort claims
arising abroad between two aliens, tort claims against an enemy alien
or fugitive, or tort claims implicating permanent rights to real
property. The law of nations imposed no obligation on the United
States to do so. To the contrary, adjudication of some of these claims
by US courts would have violated the law of nations by interfering
with the territorial sovereignty of other nations. There is no apparent
reason why the ATS would have provided jurisdiction over such torts,
and, indeed, its limiting language ("in violation of the law of nations")
is best read to have excluded them.
The language of the ATS also seems to exclude torts committed
within the United States by one alien against another. We have found
no evidence that the law of nations attributed to a nation a tort
committed by one alien against another, even if the tort occurred
within its territory. To be sure, the law of nations obligated a nation to
treat all aliens within its protection fairly and to provide them with a
fair opportunity for redress, without prejudice or a manifestly unjust
353 The word "only" is used in the Judiciary Act six times. In four instances, it modifies a
prepositional phrase or subordinate clause that immediately follows it. See Judiciary Act of 1789
§ 23, 1 Stat at 85 ("in cases only where the writ of error is served"); Judiciary Act of 1789 § 30,
1 Stat at 89 ("shall be done only by the magistrate taking the deposition"); Judiciary Act of 1789
§ 32, 1 Stat at 91 ("except those only in cases of demurrer"); Judiciary Act of 1789 § 32, 1 Stat at
91 ("those only which the party demurring shall express as aforesaid"). In one instance, it
modifies a verb. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 27, 1 Stat at 87 ("take only my lawful fees").
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result." A denial of justice of this kind could offend the alien and his
nation. Any such offense, however, was distinct from the separate
obligation that nations had under the law of nations to redress injuries
to aliens inflicted by their own citizens."' Thus, a denial of justice in a
suit between aliens would not itself constitute, in the language of the
ATS, a "tort [ ] in violation of the law of nations." By contrast, a tort
by a US citizen against an alien would have constituted a "tort [ ] in
violation of the law of nations." The ATS, of course, was the very
means by which the United States sought to redress such violations
and avoid becoming responsible for them in the eyes of the victim's
nation.
One might ask whether the ATS could also be a means by which
the United States could avoid denial of justice claims. Apart from the
fact that the language of the statute does not fit such claims, there is
no evidence that states unfairly adjudicated alien-alien claims arising
in the United States or that foreign nations raised any claims of
unfairness in diplomatic discussions with the United States. Under
these circumstances, members of the First Congress may have been
content to leave the adjudication of alien-alien claims arising in the
United States to state courts. Moreover, as we explain in Part IV.B,
construing the ATS to reach such claims would have exceeded the
limits of Article III foreign diversity jurisdiction, which does not
encompass claims between aliens." Thus, had this been a real
354 See notes 153-54 and accompanying text. This obligation corresponds roughly to states'
modern obligation not to deny justice to aliens within their protection. See Jan Paulsson, Denial
of Justice in InternationalLaw 4 (Cambridge 2005).
355 See Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations at bk II, § 77 at 145-46 (cited in note 103).
356 Some scholars also have questioned the meaning of the word "alien" in the ATS. The
issue is whether "alien" meant something different from "foreigner," which appeared in an
earlier draft of the bill. See A Bill to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States 4, 6
(Greenleaf 1789), microformed on Early American Imprints, Series 1: Evans, 1639-1800,
No 45657 (Readex). One possibility is that the House used the word "alien" to denote "Citizens
or Subjects" of foreign states, in contrast to foreigners who could claim no country-namely,
outlaws. The word foreigner was used in certain contexts to encompass outlaws and stateless
persons, who were neither citizens nor subjects of any nation. In light of the language of
Article III, it would have been reasonable in 1789 to understand the ATS to provide jurisdiction
over claims by citizens or subjects of foreign nations, but not by outlaws under the protection of
no country. The purpose of the ATS was to disavow offense to other nations whose citizens or
subjects were injured at the hands of Americans. Moreover, the common law did not afford
outlaws any right to judicial process, so they could not have successfully invoked the ATS in any
event. See Hamburger, 109 Colum L Rev at 1922 (cited in note 118). It is, of course, possible
that the House changed the word "foreigner" to "alien" to ensure that the language of the bill
comported with the alienage jurisdiction of Article III, which authorizes federal court
jurisdiction over "Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects." US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
M. Anderson Berry has recently argued that the term "alien" in the ATS refers only to
citizens of foreign nations residing in the United States. See M. Anderson Berry, Whether
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concern, the First Congress would have had to create a federal cause
of action and confer "arising under" jurisdiction on the lower federal
courts.
b) The ATS and common law forms of action. Our reading of the
text of the ATS, as we have explained it, comports with common law
rules governing alien claims at the time of the statute's enactment.
The ATS was a jurisdictional provision; it did not create a cause of
action. At the time, municipal law, not the law of nations, determined
the existence of a cause of action. In common law systems, the
"substance" of a cause of action was predetermined by the form of
action that a plaintiff used to commence the action. To commence an
action, "[tihe plaintiff would have to set forth in strict legal form the
combination of facts or events that [by law] enabled a plaintiff to
invoke one of the forms of action for a remedy."" In § 14 of the same
act that established the ATS, the First Congress authorized federal
courts to employ "the traditional mandates which set in motion civil
litigation":" "[Clourts of the United States, shall have power to issue

writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law."359 At the time, common law writs were the means by
which individuals pursued legal remedies.' Accordingly, § 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred a power on federal courts to borrow
causes of action "agreeable to the principles and usages of law" in
cases within their jurisdiction.
The First Congress was not content, however, with leaving the
availability of causes of action in federal courts in such open-ended

Foreigneror Alien: A New Look at the OriginalLanguage of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 Berkeley J
Intl L 316, 320-21 (2009). Even if this understanding of the term "alien" is correct, it does not
follow that the ATS should be read to preclude jurisdiction over claims by aliens against US
citizens for injuries inflicted abroad. Courts have long determined party status under federal
jurisdictional grants as of the time of filing, not as of the time that the acts underlying the suit
took place. A foreign citizen resident in the United States, and thus within protection of its laws,
could pursue a transitory cause of action against a US defendant for injuries inflicted abroad.
See Hamburger, 109 Colum L Rev at 1903 & n 277 (cited in note 118). Philip Hamburger has
argued that only foreign citizens who were present in the United States had protection of its laws
and thus could avail themselves of judicial process. See id. If "alien" meant a foreigner resident
in the United States, the ATS still would provide jurisdiction over actions by aliens injured by
US citizens abroad who came to the United States, and thus within the protection of its laws, to
pursue redress.
357 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr, Article III and the Causeof Action, 89 Iowa L Rev 777,789 (2004).
358 Julius Goebel Jr, 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801 509 (Macmillan 1971).
359 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat at 82.
360 See Bellia, 89 Iowa L Rev at 789 (cited in note 357).
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terms." Just a few days later, Congress enacted the Process Act of
1789,' an interim measure directing federal courts to use the forms of
writs operative in the state in which the federal court sat.'
Specifically, the Act provided that "the forms of writs and executions
... in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be

the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the
supreme courts of the same."a At the time, states generally fashioned
their writs in accordance with common law forms of action. Thus, the
first Process Act, likely drafted at least in part by Ellsworth and
enacted five days after the ATS, instructed federal courts to employ
forms of action derived from state writ systems in ATS cases. In 1792,
Congress reaffirmed this interim measure, enacting more permanent
legislation that instructed federal courts to apply "the forms of writs,
executions and other process" and "the forms and modes of
proceeding" in actions at law of the supreme court of the state in
which it sat. Additionally, the Process Act of 1792 authorized federal
courts to make "such alterations and additions as the said courts
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such
regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall think
proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district
court concerning the same."
Goebel, History of the Supreme Court at 510 (cited in note 358).
362 Process Act of 1789, 1 Stat at 93-94.
363 Process Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat at 93-94. The Judiciary Act was adopted on
September 24, 1789. The "Process Act of 1789 reflected Congress's inability or unwillingness to
agree on uniform rules for the operation of the federal courts. It is apparent that the act was
intended as no more than an interim measure, . .. [b]ut efforts over the next few years to adopt
something more permanent came to naught." Marcus, ed, 4 Documentary History of the
Supreme Courtat 112 (cited in note 352).
364 Process Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat at 93-94.
365 Process Act of 1792 § 2, 1 Stat at 276. The static conformity of the Process Acts
continued in force until 1872, when Congress enacted a principle of dynamic conformity in the
Conformity Act of 1872. See Act of June 1, 1872 ("Conformity Act of 1872"), 1 Stat 196. Rather
than applying state law in existence at a fixed time, as the Process Acts required, federal courts
were to apply state law currently "existing at the time" in the courts of the state. Conformity Act
of 1872 § 5, 17 Stat at 197, repealed by Rules Enabling Act, Pub L No 73-415, 48 Stat 1064
(1934).
The Process Act of 1789 distinguished cases of admiralty, maritime, and equity jurisdiction,
providing that "the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, [ ] shall be according to the course of the civil law." Process Act of 1789
§ 2, 1 Stat at 93-94. In the Process Act of 1792, Congress provided that the "forms and modes of
proceedings" in causes of equity were to be "according to the principles, rules and usages which
belong to courts of equity ... as contradistinguished from courts of common law." Process Act
of 1792 § 2, 1 Stat at 276. After Congress enacted the Process Act, the Supreme Court, per John
Jay, its first chief justice, decreed that the "COURT considers the practice of the courts of
King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court," and
that it would "from time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render
necessary." Rule, 2 US (2 Dall) 411, 413-14 (1792). The Supreme Court did not formally
361
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The common law forms of action to which the Judiciary and
Process Acts referred federal courts were more than adequate to
provide aliens with the redress required by the law of nations. As
discussed, the common law recognized various actions for intentional
injuries to person or property. Although states deviated from English
common law in various respects, their forms of action largely
preserved the requirements for bringing common law tort actions.
The common law recognized alien tort actions for injuries inflicted by
citizens of the forum, thereby providing redress sufficient to prevent
the misconduct of individual citizens from being attributed to the
nation as a whole. The common law, however, did not recognize all
alien claims. In accordance with the law of nations, the common law
disallowed all claims by enemy aliens." In addition, it did not allow an
alien to maintain an action in ejectment or to recover a freehold in
real property located in the forum, as aliens could not own real
property.' As previously discussed, the common law also did not
recognize alien claims to real property located abroad, because such
claims were considered local to the nation in which the property was
located, and adjudication by a foreign tribunal would have been
inconsistent with prevailing notions of territorial sovereignty.
Moreover, common law judges and treatise writers suggested that
common law courts should not hear claims between nonresident
aliens for acts occurring abroad. These various limitations were
consistent with, if not required by, the law of nations.
As a jurisdictional provision, the ATS gave federal courts
jurisdiction over a category of tort claims recognized by the common
law. It did not change, but rather presupposed, the forms of
proceeding that the common law-incorporated through the Judiciary
and Process Acts -allowed aliens to bring. The ATS and these other
federal provisions therefore worked together to redress claims by
aliens against US citizens for all torts "in violation of the law of
nations.""

prescribe equity rules until 1822, when it adopted thirty-three specific rules against the
background of general chancery practice. Rules of Practicefor the Courts of Equity of the United
States, 20 US (7 Wheat) v, v-xiii (1822).
366 See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case against a Global Constitution, 95
Georgetown L J 463,527-28 (2007).
367 See Barges v Hogg, 2 NC (1 Haywood) 485, 485 (NC Super Ct L & Eq 1797) ("An alien
cannot maintain ejectment, or any action for the recovery of a freehold-aliens are not allowed
to acquire real property.").
368 Even if the common law did recognize claims between aliens for acts occurring abroad, it
does not follow that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over such claims, because the US was not
responsible for adjudicating these claims under the law of nations. In other words, an alien-alien
tort claim arising extraterritorially was not "for a tort only in violation of the law of nations."
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c) The A TS and other forms of redress. To be sure, the ATS was
partially redundant of other jurisdictional provisions in the Judiciary
Act that could sometimes satisfy the United States' obligation under
the law of nations to redress its citizens' torts against aliens. Tort
claims by aliens against US citizens for more than $500 could be
brought in federal court under either diversity jurisdiction or the ATS.
In addition, some alien torts might also have been subject to federal
criminal prosecution, especially as Congress enacted more crimes over
time. Notably, however, US criminal law could not have reached
offenses committed by US citizens on foreign soil (including
neighboring British and Spanish territory) because the law of nations
assigned exclusive jurisdiction to punish such crimes to the nation in
which they occurred. In the end, therefore, the ATS provided the only
fully reliable means of complying with the United States' obligation
under the law of nations to remedy all intentional harms inflicted by
US citizens on aliens. In 1795, Attorney General William Bradford
wrote an opinion that recognized this function of the ATS. Bradford
received information that, on September 28, 1794, American citizens
joined a French fleet in attacking the British Sierra Leone Company's
colony on the coast of Africa.' Bradford opined that
acts of hostility committed by American citizens against such as
are in amity with us, being in violation of a treaty, and against the
public peace, are offences against the United States, so far as
they were committed within the territory or jurisdiction thereof;
and, as such, are punishable by indictment in the district or
70
circuit courts."
The attacks in question, however, were committed in British territory.
"[A]s the transactions complained of originated or took place in a
foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts; nor
can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the
United States. ,71 "But," Bradford continued,
there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have
been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil
suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
Understood in context, the ATS provided jurisdiction over alien claims for harms that the common
law recognized and that the United States had an obligation to redress under the law of nations.
369 Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op Atty Gen 57, 58 (Jul 6, 1795) (William Bradford).
370 Id. At this time, there was strenuous debate over whether federal courts had jurisdiction
to entertain common law criminal prosecutions for violations of the law of nations. See Bellia
and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 46-55 (cited in note 17). The Supreme Court settled the debate
in United States v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), when it held that courts
cannot recognize and enforce federal common law crimes against the United States. Id at 34.
371 Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op Atty Gen at 58 (cited in note 369).
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expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for
a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the
United States.'
For acts of hostility committed abroad, the ATS provided the only
available means of avoiding law of nations and treaty violations that
the criminal law did not reach.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that ATS jurisdiction was rarely
invoked. Given the difficulties of travel at the time, it would have
been unusual for the kind of ATS plaintiff that Bradford describedan alien injured by a US citizen overseas-to pursue an action in the
United States. In addition, there is evidence that, in the United States,
alien victims of violence often left rather than remain to pursue a
remedy in US courts."' More fundamentally, violence against loyalists
(which ran high after the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty) subsided in the late
1780s and beyond. Many loyalists resettled elsewhere" or assimilated
into US citizenship,"' and the United States and its citizens had a
strong economic interest in reestablishing trade. Although the ATS
remained symbolically important, over time state courts may have
become more convenient and attractive fora for tort suits by aliens.
B.

Abiding by the Limitations of Article III

The natural import of the ATS in historical context-providing
jurisdiction over intentional tort claims by foreign citizens against US
citizens-not only satisfied US obligations under the law of nations,
but also respected the limits of Article III. Article III authorizes
federal court jurisdiction over "Controversies . .. between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.""
372 Id at 59. The acts of hostility he addressed violated not only the law of nations, but the
1794 Jay Treaty as well. Article XXI of the Jay Treaty provided:
It is likewise agreed, that the subjects and citizens of the two nations, shall not do any acts
of hostility or violence against each other, nor accept commissions or instructions so to act
from any foreign prince or state, enemies to the other party; nor shall the enemies of one of
the parties be permitted to invite, or endeavor to enlist in their military service, any of the
subjects or citizens of the other party; and the laws against all such offences and aggressions
shall be punctually executed.

Jay Treaty Art XXI, 8 Stat at 127.
373 See Brown, The Good Americans at 175-76 (cited in note 280).
374 Id at 192 (estimating that between eighty and one hundred thousand loyalists eventually
fled the United States after the Revolution).
375 Id at 177-79. Had US citizens persisted in committing acts of violence against British
citizens, and had the ATS proved insufficient to redress such violence, the United States and
Britain could have entered into a treaty to provide alternative remedies, such as assigning
disputes to binational panels. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and SupranationalJudicial
Review, 107 Colum L Rev 833, 851-52 (2007).
376 US Const Art IH1, § 2, cl 1.
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Controversies between US citizens and foreign citizens fall squarely
within this jurisdictional grant. Controversies between or among
foreign citizens do not.37
The Supreme Court made clear in the first decades following
ratification that the other alienage provision of the Judiciary Act of
1789-found in § 11-was limited to claims by or against US citizens.
Section 11, as discussed, conferred original jurisdiction on the circuit
courts of suits "where the matter in dispute exceeds . .. five hundred
dollars, and . . . an alien is a party."... From the beginning, courts

interpreted this provision to extend only to disputes between an alien
and a US citizen. In 1794, in Walton v McNeil,3 79 a Qu6bec inhabitant
brought an action in federal circuit court against another Qu6bec
inhabitant upon a promissory obligation arising in Qu6bec:
The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction; that the parties were
both inhabitants of Quebec; and that the cause of action, if any,
accrued in Canada, and not within the United States; and that
cognizance thereof belonged to the courts of Great Britain, and
not to any of the courts of the United States."
The court held this plea to be good and refused to exercise
jurisdiction over the case."' Similarly, a circuit court refused to
exercise § 11 jurisdiction over an alien-alien claim in 1799 in Fields v
Taylor.' The report of the decision indicates that the court refused to
exercise § 11 jurisdiction over a claim between two British subjects on
notes made in England.'" A reporter's note suggests that this decision
was founded "upon the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts under
the constitution and laws of the United States."A year later, in 1800, the Supreme Court held that § 11 must be
read in light of Article III limitations on federal judicial power. In
Mossman v Higginson," the Court explained:

377 Curtis Bradley has argued that the ATS was meant to implement the alienage
jurisdiction of Article III, requiring a US-citizen defendant, see Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 626-29
(cited in note 19), and that suits for violations of the law of nations would not have been
understood to fall within Article III "arising under" jurisdiction. Id at 597. We agree with those
conclusions.
378 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat at 78.
379 29 F Cases 141 (CC D Mass 1794).
380 Id at 141.
381 Id.
382 9 F Cases 41 (CC D Mass 1799).
383 Id at 42.
384 Id.
385 4 US (4 Dall) 12 (1800).
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[T]he 11th section of the judiciary act can, and must, receive a
construction, consistent with the constitution. It says, it is true, in
general terms, that the Circuit Court shall have cognizance of
suits "where an alien is a party;" but as the legislative power of
conferring jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is, in this respect,
confined to suits between citizens and foreigners, we must so
expound the terms of the law, as to meet the case, "where,
indeed, an alien is one party," but a citizen is the other.'
In 1807, in Montalet v Murray,' the Court considered whether § 11
authorized jurisdiction over a debt action between two foreign
citizens? "The Court was unanimously of opinion that the courts of
the United States have no jurisdiction of cases between aliens."'
Likewise, in Hodgson v Bowerbank," Chief Justice John Marshall
rejected the argument that § 11 of "[t]he judiciary act gives
jurisdiction to the circuit courts in all suits in which an alien is a
party.". "Turn to [Article III] of the constitution of the United
States," he explained, "for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction
beyond the limits of the constitution.""
The reasons for reading § 11 alienage jurisdiction not to reach
alien-alien claims apply equally to § 9 ATS jurisdiction. Section 9
jurisdiction over "causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations" rests on the same Article III
jurisdictional authorization as § 11 alienage jurisdiction: controversies
"between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects."" Article III provides no other general warrant for
jurisdiction over tort claims between aliens-even for violations of the
law of nations. As we have explained elsewhere, the Article III
Id at 14.
8 US (4 Cranch) 46 (1807).
388 The action was brought by a New York plaintiff upon assignment from a foreign citizen.
Id at 46-47. Under § 11, a district or circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over a "suit to
recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee,
unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no
assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." Judiciary Act of 1789
§ 11, 1 Stat at 79. The issue in Montalet was whether the New York plaintiff's action could have
been brought in circuit court had no assignment been made. 8 US (4 Cranch) at 47.
389 Montalet, 8 US (4 Cranch) at 47 (emphasis omitted).
390 9 US (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
391 Id at 304 (emphasis omitted).
392 Id. See also Jackson v Twentyman, 27 US (2 Pet) 136, 136 (1829):
386
387

The Court were of opinion that the 11th section of the act must be construed in connexion
with and in conformity to the constitution of the United States. That by the latter, the
judicial power was not extended to private suits, in which an alien is a party, unless a citizen
be the adverse party.
393 US Const Art III,

§ 2, cl 1.
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jurisdictional authorization over cases "arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority"" did not encompass
claims governed by the law of nations unless positive federal lawsuch as a statute or a treaty-incorporated it."
Early claims that the law of nations was part of the common law
do not contradict this conclusion when understood in the context in
which they were made. In the first years of the Union, public officials
debated whether US courts could apply a common law "local" to the
United States. It is anachronistic, however, to superimpose presentday conceptions of federal common law upon these debates. Even if
the law of nations was considered a form of general common law, it
was not understood to be supreme federal law inherently capable of
either preempting state law or supporting "arising under" jurisdiction
in federal court." Early federal common law crimes cases (including
offenses against the law of nations) do not contradict this conclusion.
As the Supreme Court correctly held in Sosa, the First Congress did
not understand the ATS to be more than a jurisdictional grant; it was
not meant to create a federal cause of action or incorporate the law of
nations as federal law." Accordingly, jurisdiction under the ATS must
rest on-and therefore be consistent with-alienage jurisdiction under
Article III.

US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
395 Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 38-40 (cited in note 17).
396 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the law of nations was considered to be a
form of general law, not federal common law. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations
in Early American Law, 42 Vand L Rev 819, 832 (1989). For this reason, the Supreme Court
traditionally held that it lacked jurisdiction to review cases arising under the law of nations. See
Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436, 444 (1886) (holding that the Supreme Court has "no right to review"
the decision of an Illinois court regarding "a question of common law, or of the law of nations");
New York Life Insurance Co v Hendren, 92 US 286, 286-87 (1875) (dismissing a writ of error
seeking review of the effect of the Civil War upon a private contract because the question rested
on the general law of nations and presented no federal question). See also Curtis A. Bradley,
The Status of Customary InternationalLaw in U.S. Courts-Before and After Erie, 26 Denver J
Intl L & Pol 807, 813-15 (1998) (discussing cases).
397 The ATS also provided jurisdiction over alien tort claims in violation of "a treaty of the
United States." Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77. An alien tort claim for a US treaty
violation presumably would have arisen under a treaty of the United States for purposes of
Article III. At the time the ATS was enacted, however, the treaty violations contemplated were
acts of violence by US citizens against aliens. See Paris Peace Treaty Art V, 8 Stat at 82 (giving
British subjects rights to be in the United States for a given time for specified purposes); Lee,
106 Colum L Rev at 836-37 (cited in note 33) (describing the implied safe conduct that the Paris
Peace Treaty created, the violation of which ATS jurisdiction encompassed). Thus, limiting the
ATS to personal injury claims by aliens against US citizens not only reflected contemporary
concerns, but also ensured that federal court jurisdiction of alien tort claims for violations of the
law of nations complied with the limitations of Article III.
394
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Avoiding Judicial Violations of the Law of Nations

In light of the foregoing, the natural import of the ATS was to
provide federal court jurisdiction over common law tort claims by
aliens for intentional harms inflicted by US citizens. Only such torts
committed by US citizens against aliens would have violated the law
of nations at the time. Torts by one alien against another did not
constitute law of nations violations by the United States or its citizens.
On the other hand, adjudicating tort claims between aliens for acts
arising abroad would have risked violating the territorial sovereignty
of the nation in which the acts occurred. Had the ATS been at all
unclear in this regard, separation of powers concerns almost certainly
would have led courts to construe it to avoid infringing the territorial
sovereignty of other nations.' In the first few decades after
ratification, the Supreme Court was careful not to take the lead over
the political branches in infringing the rights of foreign nations under
the law of nations." Violations of such rights could give other nations
just cause for war against the United States. When acts of Congress
did not clearly violate the sovereign rights of other nations, the Court
construed them to respect those rights. In this way, the Court avoided
generating conflicts that Congress had not clearly authorized and
ensured that the Court did not usurp Congress's exclusive power to
determine matters of war and peace.
The most famous case in which the Court construed an act of
Congress so as not to violate the law of nations was Murray v
Schooner CharmingBetsy. Congress enacted the Non-Intercourse Act
of 1800' during the undeclared hostilities with France. The Act
prohibited commercial intercourse between residents of the United
States and residents of any French territory." In CharmingBetsy, the
Court held that this Act did not authorize the seizure of an Americanbuilt vessel that an American captain sold at a Dutch island to an
American-born Danish burgher, who proceeded to carry the vessel
for trade to a French island.' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall explained that a federal statute "ought never to be construed
398 We use the phrase "separation of powers concerns" as a shorthand for the proposition
that, because the Founders vested specific foreign relations and war powers in Congress and the
President, judicial departures from certain principles of the law of nations could interfere with,
or usurp, those powers. See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 76 (cited in note 17). We do
not rest our claim upon the proposition that the Constitution adopted an abstract separation of
powers principle. See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation,124 Harv L Rev 1939 (2011).
399 See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 59-63 (cited in note 17).
400 Act of Feb 27, 1800 ("Non-Intercourse Act of 1800"), 2 Stat 7.
401 Non-Intercourse Act of 1800 § 1, 2 Stat at 8.
402 6 US (2 Cranch) at 64-65,120-21.
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to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains,
and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of
nations as understood in this country.""3 The Non-Intercourse Act, he
concluded, did not clearly authorize such violations: "If it was intended
that any American vessel sold to a neutral should, in the possession of
that neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities imposed on her
while she belonged to citizens of the United States, such extraordinary
intent ought to have been plainly expressed."' By applying this canon
of construction, Marshall ensured that Congress, rather than the Court,
would determine whether the United States should risk foreign conflict.
Neutral rights were perfect rights, and interference with such rights
gave the injured sovereign just cause for war.'
Under this canon of construction, unless the ATS clearly
authorized federal district courts to hear cases that rested within
another nation's exclusive territorial sovereignty, federal courts would
have declined to hear them. At the time, separation of powers
concerns led the Court to read acts of Congress to avoid law of
nations violations. Given that the goal of the ATS was to avoid US
responsibility for such violations, it is unlikely that courts would have
read the statute to authorize jurisdiction that even arguably violated
the territorial sovereignty of other nations under the law of nations.
D.

The ATS and Other Questions Surrounding the First
Judiciary Act

Scholars have analyzed several other questions surrounding the
role of the ATS in the first Judiciary Act, including its role in redressing
safe conduct violations and its relationship to ambassadorial and
admiralty jurisdiction. This section discusses these questions in light of
our reading of the ATS in historical context.
1. The ATS and safe conduct violations.
In an important article, Thomas Lee argues that the ATS was
intended solely to give federal courts jurisdiction over safe-conduct
violations.' We agree that safe-conduct violations constituted one

Id at 118.
Id at 119 (emphasis omitted).
See Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, § 112 at 40 (cited in note 102) (recognizing
the "entire liberty" of a neutral nation to engage in neutral trade).
406 See Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 836 (cited in note 33) ("[Tlhe ATS was enacted to allow
aliens to sue in federal district court for only one of the three violations Sosa identified, namely
transgressions of safe conducts.").
403
404
405
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part of the claims that the ATS was originally meant to encompass.
The text and history of the statute strongly suggest, however, that the
ATS conferred jurisdiction over a broader class of law of nations
violations.
As explained, in the eighteenth century a safe conduct was "given
to those who otherwise could not safely pass to the places where he
who grants it is master: for instance, to a person charged with some
misdemeanor, or to an enemy. ,. "All safe-conducts," Vattel explained,
"like every other act of supreme cognizance, flow from the sovereign
authority."' A safe conduct could be express (specifically issued to a
particular person) or implied (legally presumed to exist from a
municipal law granting safe passage to a class of persons).4
In historical context, the ATS phrase "in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States" (which modifies "tort")
encompassed more than safe conduct violations. To be sure, nations
had an obligation to honor the safe conducts they granted by
redressing their violations. In 1789, however, the law of nations more
broadly protected nations at peace with one another from any
violence by citizens of the one directed against citizens of the othernot merely violence against citizens under the protection of a safe
conduct. Individuals who performed intentional acts of violence
against foreign citizens disturbed the peace by requiring their nation
to redress the offense or face justified retaliation. In short, they
committed a tort in violation of the law of nations. This basic principle
applied regardless of whether the nations had a formal treaty of amity
or friendship or whether the transgressor's nation had granted the
victim an express or implied safe conduct.
Vattel described any act of violence by the citizens of one nation
against those of another at peace with the first as a law of nations
violation. In describing this general principle, Vattel did not mention
safe conduct violations; rather, he addressed safe conducts separately
in connection with his discussion of war." In 1789, England abided by
this principle of the law of nations. As Blackstone explained it, "Great
tenderness is shewn by our laws .. . with regard. . . to the admission of
strangers who come spontaneously. For so long as their nation
continues at peace with ours, and they themselves behave peaceably,
they are under the king's protection."411
407 Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III,

§ 265 at 102 (cited in note 102).
Id at bk III, §266 at 102.
409 See note 170 and accompanying text.
410 See Vattel, 2 The Law of Nations at bk III, §§ 265-86 at 102-07 (cited in note 102).
411 Blackstone, 1 Commentariesat 251-52 (cited in note 9). See also Comyns, 1 Digest of the
Laws of England at 302 (cited in note 180) ("Aliens not enemies, may safely dwell in the
408

532

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:445

To be sure, the ATS phrase "in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States" was broad enough also to encompass
tortious acts by US citizens constituting safe conduct and treaty
violations. In 1789, England-unlike the new United States-had
granted many aliens of nations at peace with it formal protection
through treaties of amity and implied safe conducts. Various English
writers described the Magna Carta as granting safe conducts to
foreign merchants.412 Other acts of Parliament granted implied safe
conducts as well, such as a fourteenth-century act providing "[t]hat all
the Cloth-workers of strange Lands, or whatsoever Country they be,
which will come into England, Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, within
the King's Power, shall come safely and surely, and shall be in the
King's Protection and safe Conduct, to dwell in the same lands,
[choosing] where they will."413 Treaties of amity also generally granted
citizens of treaty partners formal protection. English law recognized
the rights of aliens in amity to enter English territory with
protection,41 and specific statutes provided them with additional
rights. For example, a 1452 statute provided a remedy against any
British subjects who "offend upon the Sea, or in any Port within the
said Realm, under the King's Obeisance, against any Person or
Persons Strangers, being upon the Sea, or [any other Port] aforesaid
realm."). In an earlier passage, Blackstone wrote that "without [a safe conduct] by the law of
nations no member of one society has a right to intrude into another." Blackstone,
1 Commentaries at 251 (cited in note 9). Richard Wooddesson, in his Lectures on the Law of
England, criticized Blackstone for suggesting that "without safe-conducts, by the law of nations,
no member of one state has a right to intrude into another." Richard Wooddesson, 1 Lectures on
the Law of England 51 n n (Richards 2d ed 1834), quoting Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 251
(cited in note 9). William Carey Jones, in his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, argued that
Wooddesson's critique was unfounded. See William Blackstone, 1 Commentarieson the Laws of
England 259 n 13 (Bancroft-Whitney 1916) (William Carey Jones, ed). Blackstone did not mean
to refute "the doctrine that subjects of one state may come, without license, into any other in
league or amity with it ... or ... Vattel's rule that, in Europe, the access is everywhere free to
every person who is not an enemy to the state." Id. Rather, Blackstone plainly meant that if
there were an "express prohibition, individual or general," on admission, "the stranger could not
claim admission as a right ... without ... a safe-conduct from the sovereign." Id.
412 See Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 874-75 (cited in note 33). In relevant part, the Magna
Carta provided that
[a]ll merchants shall have safe conduct to go and come out of and into England, and to stay
in and travel through England by land and water for purposes of buying and selling, free of
illegal tolls, in accordance with ancient and just customs, except, in time of war, such
merchants as are of a country at war with Us. If any such be found in Our dominion at the
outbreak of war, they shall be attached, without injury to their persons or goods, until it be
known to Us or Our Chief Justiciary how Our merchants are being treated in the country at
war with Us, and if Our merchants be safe there, then theirs shall be safe with Us.
Magna Carta Art 41.
413 Act of 1337, 11 Edw III, ch 5, in 1 Statutes of the Realm 280,281.
414 See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng Rep 377, 383 (KB 1608); Comyns, 4 Digest of the Laws of
England at 429 (cited in note 180).
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by way of Amity, League, or Truce, or by force of the King's
Safeconduct or Safeguard in any wise."415 This provision protected
both foreigners in amity, league, or truce with England (pursuant to a
treaty) and those under the protection of a safe conduct (by virtue of
a statute or an individual grant). The common law protected aliens
more generally by allowing them to sue British subjects for torts
committed either at home or abroad.
Early American initiatives to redress law of nations violations
recognized the need to protect not only aliens under a treaty of amity
or who held express or implied safe conducts, but all aliens of nations
not at war with the United States. In the 1780s, the United States did
not have extensive treaties of amity with other nations or statutes
granting safe conducts. In 1781, the only nation with which the United
States had a treaty of amity was France. The 1781 resolution of the
Continental Congress, discussed in Part III, began by calling upon
states to punish "acts of hostility against such as are in amity, league
or truce with the United States, or who are within the same, under a
general implied safe conduct."1 " In other words, the resolution
recognized that states owed a duty to protect aliens in amity and
aliens in the United States under an implied safe conduct. The
resolution went further, however, recommending that states
"authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured, and
for compensation to the United States for damage sustained by them
from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.""' The civil
remedy that this provision recommended extended to citizens of any
foreign power injured by an American, not merely to citizens of treaty
partners or those protected by safe conducts. The 1782 Connecticut
statute discussed in Part III followed the same pattern. It punished
those committing "Acts of Hostility against the Subjects of any Prince
or Power in Amity League or Truce with the United States of
America, or such as are within this State under a General implied safe
Conduct."' In addition, it provided a civil remedy for injury to any
foreign nation or its subjects.420
The text of the ATS similarly gave federal courts jurisdiction
over claims by an alien "for a tort only in violation of the law of

Act of 1452, 31 Hen VI, ch 4, in 2 Statutes of the Realm 363, 363-64.
See Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and His
Most Christian Majesty, 8 Stat 12, Treaty Ser No 83 (1778).
417 Hunt, ed, 21 Journals of the Continental Congress at 1136 (cited in note 245)
(emphasis added).
418 Id at 1137.
419 Act to Prevent Infractions at 157 (cited in note 298) (emphasis added).
420 Id.
415
416
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nations or treaty of the United States." This language-by employing
terms of art such as "tort," "the law of nations," and "treaty"encompassed any acts of violence by a US citizen against a citizen of a
nation at peace with the United States (or otherwise under its
protection). Such acts of violence included three kinds of violations:
violations of treaties of amity, league, or truce; violations of safe
conducts; and violations of background principles of the law of
nations that protected aliens at peace.42 ' The United States, of course,
had a strong interest in preventing and redressing all three kinds of
violations.
In 1789, however, the third category of violations arguably posed
the most immediate danger to the United States' peaceful relations
421

Professor Lee argues that

a friendly or neutral alien ... injured within the United States ... could sue without either
[an express American safe conduct document that had been breached or a treaty term to
ground a specific implied safe conduct] because he was entitled to a general implied safe
conduct, the breach of which constituted a violation of the law of nations.
Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 880 (cited in note 33). This statement seems to suggest that a friendly
or neutral alien could be said to hold an implied safe conduct under the law of nations even
without any act of a sovereign conferring one. If by 1789 some conflated the phrase "implied
safe conduct" with the protection that a nation owed citizens of friendly or neutral nations
within its territory under the law of nations, it does not appear to have been an established and
uncontroversial usage. The 1781 Continental Congress resolutions and 1782 Connecticut statute
distinguished aliens in amity from those under the protection of a safe conduct, as English
statutes had done. See notes 248, 298-301, and accompanying text. Interestingly, Blackstone
seems to have broken with previous English sources by equating foreigners in amity, league, or
truce with those under a general implied safe conduct. He wrote that it was a crime to commit
"acts of hostility against such as are in amity, league, or truce with us, who are here under a
general implied safe-conduct." Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 68 (cited in note 9). Blackstone's
(perhaps inadvertent) equation of those in amity, league, or truce with those under an implied
safe conduct did not go unnoticed by subsequent writers. "The only inaccuracy" in this passage,
it was argued in 1825, was "calling peace an implied safe-conduct; when it is in fact the removal
of the temporary incapacity, superinduced by hostilities, and a restoration to that state, wherein
no safe-conduct at all, express or implied, is wanted." On the Alien Bill, 42 Edinburgh Rev 99,
120 (Apr 1825). It was argued, furthermore, that "[aill the ancient statutes on the subject show,
that the necessity of safe-conduct, as a protection, arose, and expired, with the war. 2. H. 5. S. 1.
c. 6. distinguishes truce from safe-conduct; so 14 E. 4. c. 4. divides the offence into branches of
truce, league, and safe-conduct. So 31. H. 6. c. 4. provides redress for 'any strangers in amity,
league, truce, or by safe conduct."' Id. For present purposes, we need not resolve whether
Blackstone actually meant to equate those in amity, league, or truce with those under protection
of a safe conduct. Suffice it to say that, under the law of nations, a sovereign had to redress acts
of violence against aliens protected by a treaty of amity, league, or truce; aliens under protection
of a safe conduct; and aliens of any nation at peace with the nation of the transgressor. The
drafters of the 1781 Continental Congress resolution, the 1782 Connecticut statute, and the ATS
appear to have well recognized the need to provide protection to both classes of aliens-and all
aliens of nations at peace with the United States. Moreover, given even the broadest usage of
the phrase "implied safe conduct," the ATS conferred jurisdiction over more than safe conduct
violations. The ATS conferred jurisdiction over claims by aliens that US citizens committed acts
of violence in another nation's territory-territory in which a foreign citizen could not be said to
hold an "implied safe conduct" from the United States under any usage of that phrase.
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with other nations. As a new nation, the United States had precious
few treaties of amity (or treaties otherwise providing safe passage in
the United States). In addition to the treaty of amity and commerce
with France, the United States had treaties of amity and commerce
with Morocco, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Sweden. 422 Notably,
however, it did not have a treaty of amity and commerce with Spaina powerful nation with territory bordering the United States and
whose citizens frequently came into contact with Americans.
Moreover, Article V of the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty with Great
Britain expressly granted British subjects only limited protection in
US territory,' providing them "free liberty to go to any part or parts
of any of the thirteen United States, and therein to remain twelve
months, unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the restitution of
such of their estates, rights and properties, as may have been
confiscated." 42 4 This protection was of limited duration and applied
only in US territory. Safe conducts had no application to foreigners in
foreign territories (such as the British and Spanish territories
bordering the United States), and the criminal laws of the United
States could not reach violence beyond the territorial limits of the
nation. To abide by the law of nations, the United States had to afford
a remedy for law of nations violations committed by its citizens in US
territory and in (often adjoining) foreign territory. Accordingly, to
signal its adherence to the law of nations, the United States provided
jurisdiction in the ATS not only for torts "in violation of ... a treaty
of the United States" but also for torts "in violation of the law of
nations" by US citizens-which included all acts of hostility (wherever
taken) by US citizens against citizens of nations at peace with the
United States. Had the ATS been limited to safe conduct violations, it
would not have redressed this broader category of violations.

422 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America, and His
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Morocco, 8 Stat 100, Treaty Ser No 244-1 (1786); Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between Their High Mightinesses the States General of the United
Netherlands, and the United States of America, 8 Stat 32, Treaty Ser No 249 (1782); A Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, between His Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of
America, 8 Stat 84, Treaty Ser No 292 (1785); Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Concluded
between His Majesty the King of Sweden and the United States of North-America, 8 Stat 60,
Treaty Ser No 346 (1783). For a discussion of the specific protections and rights that these treaties
recognized in favor of citizens of the treaty partners, see Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 875-79 (cited in
note 33) (arguing that the provisions of these treaties created implied safe conducts).
423 It is unclear whether the Paris Peace Treaty with Great Britain constituted a treaty of
amity and friendship, such that torts committed by US citizens against British subjects violated
the treaty. Either way, however, the ATS ensured that British subjects could sue US citizens in
federal court for intentional torts against them.
424 Paris Peace Treaty Art V, 8 Stat at 82.
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2. The ATS and ambassadorial and admiralty jurisdiction.
Several scholars have argued that the term "alien" in the ATS
should be read to include ambassadors on the assumption that
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act partly in response to two incidents
involving foreign ministers-Marbois and Van Berckel.4 2 In response,
Curtis Bradley has contended that neither incident in fact provided
the impetus for the ATS.42' There are strong reasons grounded in the
structure of Article III and the Judiciary Act to suggest that the ATS
would have been most reasonably understood in 1789 not to include
claims by ambassadors. Thomas Lee has identified several of them.
Many of these reasons are consistent with the canon of statutory
construction that "the specific governs the general."427 First, § 13 of the
Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court "original, but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public
ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party.""4n Lee
argues that this provision recognized concurrent jurisdiction over
ambassadors' suits in the Supreme Court and state courts.429 Limiting
federal court jurisdiction over ambassadors' suits to the Supreme
Court comported with the elevated protection that the law of nations
afforded ambassadors.'n That said, other scholars have argued that the
nonexclusivity of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over cases brought
by ambassadors suggests that the ATS was meant to give district
courts concurrent jurisdiction over tort actions brought by
ambassadors.3' Lee argues in response that it would not have occurred
to Congress to give district courts jurisdiction over cases by
ambassadors and other public ministers given the dignity owed them
and their presumed proximity to the national capital (and thus to the
Supreme Court).432 If Supreme Court justices were riding circuit and

425 See Collins, 42 Va J Intl L at 675-77 (cited in note 19); Dodge, 19 Hastings Intl & Comp
L Rev at 236 (cited in note 32); Casto, 18 Conn L Rev at 491-94 (cited in note 37). See also TelOren, 726 F2d at 815 (Bork concurring).
426 See Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 641-42 (cited in note 19).
427 For an excellent discussion of the specificity canon, see John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise ConstitutionalTexts, 113 Yale LI 1663, 1733-39 (2004).
428 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat at 80.
429 Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 855-58 (cited in note 33).
430 Id at 856.
431 See Casto, 18 Conn L Rev at 496-97 (cited in note 37). See also Collins, 42 Va J Intl L at
677 (cited in note 19) (observing that "[i]f foreign officials were excluded from the class of aliens
who can sue under the ATS, the only 'concurrent' jurisdiction alternative to the Supreme Court
in a suit against another alien, as in the Marbois case, would be in state court," creating a
"geographical inconvenience to foreign-citizen consuls").
432 Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 857 (cited in note 33).

2011]1

The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations

537

thus absent, state courts in proximity to the national capital would
have provided a natural alternative forum."
Second, Lee argues that the constitutional counterpart to "alien"
in the ATS is "foreign [ ] Citizens or Subjects" in Article III."
Article III separately authorizes federal court jurisdiction over "all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls,"
and over "Controversies . . . between a State, or Citizens thereof, and

foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."' It is unlikely, Lee contends,
that the drafters intended these provisions to overlap. Accordingly,
they likely understood the term "alien" to refer to its constitutional
antecedent-foreign citizens or subjects-not ambassadors.
Finally, Lee argues, the term "alien," as used elsewhere in the
Judiciary Act, does not refer to "ambassadors."437 Section 12
authorizes defendants to remove to federal circuit court suits
"commenced in any state court against an alien."4' Because Article III
(and necessarily the Judiciary Act) did not allow plaintiffs ever to file
suits against ambassadors in state court, "alien" in § 12 necessarily
excludes them. Lee concludes that, in 1789, the most reasonable
understanding would have been that "alien" means the same thing in
both sections.
With respect to admiralty jurisdiction, at first glance little might
appear to hinge on whether the ATS was understood to confer
jurisdiction over maritime torts (that might also constitute criminal
piracy). Section 9 of the Judiciary Act gave district courts jurisdiction
of both "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and
suits by "an alien [ ] for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."" It might appear to make little
difference whether an alien maritime tort claim fell within district
court ATS jurisdiction, as a district court would have jurisdiction over
such a claim in any event under its admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. In fact, however, there is evidence that Congress
intended to keep ATS and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
distinct.
As Thomas Lee has explained, courts long interpreted Congress's
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to district courts to be

Id at 857-58.
Id at 853, citing US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
435 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
436 Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 853 (cited in note 33).
437 Id at 854.
438 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 12, 1 Stat at 79.
439 Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 854 (cited in note 33).
440 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76-77.
433
434
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very broad, encompassing all maritime torts."' It is difficult to imagine
a case of misconduct on the high seas that a district court would not
have authority to redress under its admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.42 Lee persuasively argues that the First Congress
probably did not intend the admiralty and alien tort provisions of § 9
to confer overlapping jurisdiction." That § 9 made admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction "exclusive" of state courts and alien tort claim
jurisdiction "concurrent" with state courts "would appear to foreclose
such an interpretation."" Moreover, he argues, "the ATS also
afforded concurrent jurisdiction to federal circuit courts, and there is
no indication that those courts were intended to serve as prize courts
under any circumstances."
In 1795, in Bolchos v Darrel,described in Part I, a federal district
court appears to have appreciated that these two grants of jurisdiction
in § 9 of the Judiciary Act were mutually exclusive." In this prize suit
by a French privateer against a US citizen claiming that a ship and its
cargo was lawful prize, District Judge Thomas Bee concluded that "as
the original cause arose at sea, everything dependent on it is triable in
the admiralty."" "Besides," he remarked,
as the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress gives this court
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of
the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of
the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all
doubt upon this point.'

Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 866-68 (cited in note 33). In 1815, Justice Story observed that
41
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "must include all maritime contracts, torts and injuries." De
Lovio v Boit, 7 F Cases 418, 442 (CC D Mass 1815).
442 Consider Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 867-68 (cited in note 33) (attempting to derive such
a case but concluding that one would be rare and exceptional).
"3
Id at 868-69.
Id at 868. Lee persuasively argues against competing interpretations. See id at 868-70.
44
445 Id at 870. Professor Joseph Sweeney has argued, to the contrary, that § 9 of the Judiciary
Act required exclusive federal court jurisdiction over prize but not marine tort cases in which the
legality of capture was not in issue; for such cases, the ATS gave federal district courts
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts. See Sweeney, 18 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev at 482
(cited in note 34). Scholars have criticized this reading on several grounds. See, for example,
Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 870 (cited in note 33) (refuting Sweeney's reading on the ground that
"tort" was not a term used in the law of prize when the Judiciary Act was enacted); Bradley, 42
Va J Intl L at 617 (cited in note 19) (arguing that "a generally-worded grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts would have been a strange way" of fulfilling the purpose that Sweeney describes);
Dodge, 19 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev at 244 (cited in note 32) (rejecting Sweeney's use of
term "tort").
446 See 3 F Cases at 810.
447 Id.
"48 Id (citation omitted).
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The import of this last statement was that even if this action did
not lie with the district court's admiralty jurisdiction (because it arose
on land), the district court would have had jurisdiction under the ATS
for the seizure of personal property, which was made on land. The
predicate tort, as Thomas Lee has noted, would have been "Darrel's
seizure of the slaves on American soil."449
V. HISTORICAL MEANING AND PRESENT-DAY ATS APPLICATIONS
In keeping with the Supreme Court's approach in Sosa, the
primary goal of this Article is to explain how members of the First
Congress would have understood the ATS at the time of
its enactment. Most judges and scholars consider historical
understandings of the ATS determinative of-or at least relevant tohow courts should apply it today. Accordingly, it is worth pointing out
important historical misunderstandings and tensions in present-day
judicial explanations of the statute. Courts, including the Supreme
Court, have assumed that the ATS refers only to a narrow range of
specialized torts recognized by the law of nations at the time the
statute was enacted. On this assumption, the Sosa Court instructed
that courts should allow only claims under the ATS that are
"comparable to the features of the ... 18th century paradigms."4 " This
approach overlooks the full historical context of the ATS. At the time,
any intentional tort committed by a US citizen against the person or
personal property of an alien violated the law of nations. Accordingly,
members of the First Congress would not have understood the ATS to
single out particular kinds of torts that violated the law of nations.
Rather, they would have recognized that all intentional common law
torts committed by Americans with force against aliens violated the
law of nations and thus triggered jurisdiction under the ATS.
Although the justices in Sosa were not unanimous in interpreting
the ATS, all sought to limit its application to the kinds of tort claims
that it originally encompassed. The Court made four important
determinations about the ATS. First, the ATS is a jurisdictional
statute and does not create a cause of action. Second, ATS defendants
had to have been acting on behalf of a government instead of acting
on their own initiative. Third, the statute was originally meant to
confer jurisdiction over torts analogous to the three law of nations
violations that Blackstone described as crimes in England. Fourth, for
such violations, Congress assumed that the common law supplied a
cause of action in ATS cases. But the Court did not expressly consider
449
450

Lee, 106 Colum L Rev at 893 (cited in note 33).
542 Us at 725.
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two other contested aspects of the ATS's original meaning: whether
the statute conferred jurisdiction over claims by aliens against non-US
citizens and whether "the law of nations" referenced in the statute
constituted a form of federal common law, such that ATS cases arise
under federal law for purposes of Article III.
Recognizing that the Supreme Court is likely to adhere to its
historical approach of asking how the First Congress most likely
understood the statute, we evaluate Sosa's analysis in light of the
original meaning that we have identified.
A.

The Historical Determinations of Sosa

Sosa gave the Supreme Court its first significant opportunity to
interpret the ATS. As explained in Part I, Alvarez (a Mexican doctor)
sued Sosa (a Mexican national), other Mexican nationals, four US
DEA agents, and the United States for kidnapping Alvarez and
bringing him to the United States to stand trial for the alleged torture
and murder of a DEA agent in Mexico. The district court substituted
the United States for the DEA agents and then dismissed all claims
against the US. The Supreme Court upheld this dismissal and ruled
that the ATS claim against Sosa and the other Mexican defendants
should have been dismissed as well. The Court repeatedly suggested
that the statute should be construed in accordance with the First
Congress's original expectations. According to the Court, Congress
wished to grant lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear a limited
number of "private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the
law of nations."45 1 Such causes of action consisted of "those torts
corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses [against the law
of nations]: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy."452 Although the Court "found no basis to
suspect Congress had any [other] examples in mind," it assumed that
courts have a limited common law power to recognize new claims
"based on the present-day law of nations" so long as they "rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18thcentury paradigms we have recognized."'
The Court offered five reasons "for judicial caution" in exercising
this power.4 54 First, "the prevailing conception of the common law has
changed since 1789 in a way that counsels restraint in judicially

451
452

Id at 724.

Id.
453 Id at 724-25.
454 Sosa, 542 US at 725.
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applying internationally generated norms." 45 5 Second, there has been
''an equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in
making" common law since the Court's decision in Erie.4 6 Third, "a
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.""5 Fourth, "the
potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of
recognizing [new private causes of action for violating international
law] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs."4 ' Fifth, courts "have no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of
nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of the
judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater
judicial creativity." According to the Court, "[t]hese reasons argue
for great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights."
Applying this cautious approach, the Court concluded that
Alvarez's claim for arbitrary abduction and detention in Mexico did
not qualify as a tort "in violation of the law of nations" within the
meaning of the ATS." The Court noted that to establish a violation of
international law, Alvarez would have had to "establish that Sosa was
acting on behalf of a government when he made the arrest" and then
show that the government in question, as a matter of state policy,
practiced, encouraged, or condoned prolonged arbitrary detention.4
Even assuming that Sosa was acting on behalf of a government, the
Court concluded "that a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.""
Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts' refusal to dismiss
Alvarez's ATS claim.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court made four
important determinations. The Court's first key determination-that
the ATS is jurisdictional, creating no cause of action-accurately
reflects the ATS's original import. The Court explained that "[als
Id at 725.
Id at 726, citing Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938) ("[T]here is no
federal general common law.").
457 Sosa, 542 US at 727.
458 Id.
459 Id at 728.
460 Id.
461 Sosa, 542 US at 738.
462 Id at 737.
463 Id at 738.
455
456

The University of Chicago Law Review

542

[78:445

enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts 'cognizance' of
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction,
not power to mold substantive law."" This finding, the Court rightly
concluded, follows from the jurisdictional nature of § 9.
The Court's second and third key determinations, by contrast,
unduly narrow the statute. The second determination was that the
defendant had to be acting on behalf of a government rather than
acting on his own initiative. The third determination was that the ATS
conferred jurisdiction to hear only claims analogous to the three
criminal offenses against the law of nations that Blackstone
emphasized under English law. Specifically, the Court found that, in
enacting the ATS, the First Congress had in mind "those torts
corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy."" This approach incorrectly assumes that the torts actionable
under the ATS were limited to a small subset of torts that violated
international norms. This approach led the Court to construe the ATS
narrowly but leave the door "ajar" to recognition under the statute of
"a narrow class of international [torts] today."' Without purporting
to identify "the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject
to jurisdiction under" the ATS, the Court was "persuaded that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law
for violations of any international law norm with less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted."'
The ATS was not adopted, however, to grant federal courts
jurisdiction merely to hear a narrow class of torts committed by
individuals acting on behalf of a government and analogous to the three
international crimes that Blackstone singled out.' Rather, the statute
Id at 713.
Sosa, 542 US at 724. The Sosa Court may have drawn this idea from an amicus brief
noting that the enumeration of law of nations violations in the Continental Congress's 1781
resolution "followed Blackstone," who identified three principal offenses against the law of
nations. See Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, No 03-339, *5 n 4 (US filed Feb 27, 2004)
(available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 419425) (explaining that the Continental Congress passed a
resolution in 1781 to redress violations of the law of nations). The brief went on to say that the
First Congress "implemented the 1781 resolution's recommendation on civil suits" by enacting
the ATS. Id at *8.
466 Sosa, 542 US at 729.
467 Id at 732.
468 The ambassadorial and admiralty provisions of the first Judiciary Act already
encompassed claims for two of Blackstone's violations, offenses against ambassadors and piracy.
The federal criminal code, however, did not reach run-of-the-mill harms inflicted by US citizens
on aliens-harms that the law of nations required the United States to redress. See Part IV. The
464
465

2011]

The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations

543

was designed to redress ordinary torts committed by private US citizens
against aliens. The reason was simple: any intentional common law tort
committed with force by a US citizen against the person or property of
an alien constituted a violation of the law of nations and imposed an
obligation on the United States to redress the injury or become
responsible to the alien's nation. Thus, it was the basic party
alignment- rather than some specific characteristic of the underlying
intentional tort-that triggered jurisdiction under the ATS.
Under the law of nations, if the United States failed to redress
any intentional injury inflicted on an alien or his property by an
American citizen, then the United States itself became responsible for
the violation of the law of nations, giving the alien's home country just
cause for war.' The ATS was adopted to ensure the availability of a
civil remedy in all such cases and thereby prevent US responsibility
for its citizens' offenses against aliens.470 Accordingly, the ATS's
reference to "all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation
of the law of nations" was not historically restricted to conduct taken
on behalf of a government or to Blackstone's partial list of criminal
violations of the law of nations. Rather, it more broadly encompassed
any intentional harm inflicted on an alien that would have required
the perpetrator's nation to provide a remedy or accept responsibility
under the law of nations for the underlying offense. This reading of
the ATS-rather than the Court's narrower approach-more
accurately reflects the First Congress's assumption "that federal
courts could properly identify some international norms as
enforceable in the exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction.""
A hypothetical variation on the facts of Sosa helps to illustrate
why the Court's second and third determinations unduly narrow the
statute. In Sosa, Alvarez sued not only Mexican nationals, but also
four DEA agents (who were US citizens) for their part in his
abduction and detention. These defendants moved to substitute the
United States as the defendant pursuant to the FTCA.472 The lower
courts approved the substitution,4 " and the Supreme Court did not
ATS was enacted in part to supplement the criminal law and satisfy all of the United States'
obligations under the law of nations.
469 See notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
470 See Part IV.A.
471 Sosa, 542 US at 730.
472 The FTCA provides that the exclusive civil remedy for most wrongful conduct by
federal employees acting within the scope of their employment is an FTCA action against the
United States. See 28 USC § 2679(b)(1) (stating that 28 USC § 1346(b) and 28 USC § 2672
provide the exclusive remedy).
473 See Alvarez-Machain v United States, 266 F3d 1045, 1053-54 (9th Cir 2001) (reviewing
only the question whether 28 US § 2679 is the proper vehicle for the substitution, not whether
the substitution was proper).
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review this question. Therefore, when the case came before the Court,
it involved only a claim by one Mexican national against another.
Now consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that a private US
citizen-a relative of the murdered DEA agent-had travelled to
Mexico on his own initiative, abducted Alvarez, and brought him to
the United States to stand trial. Sosa would require federal courts to
dismiss an ATS claim by Alvarez against his abductor on the grounds
that the defendant was not acting on behalf of a government and that
(as in Sosa) the conduct in question was not actionable because it
alleged a violation of an "international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when [the ATSJ was enacted."... In 1789, however,
any common law tort of force-such as kidnapping or battery-would
have violated the law of nations if committed by a US citizen against
an alien. Moreover, the law of nations obligated the United States to
redress the harm or subject itself to retaliation by the victim's nation.
The ATS was enacted precisely to avoid such retaliation by giving
aliens injured by US citizens a reliable federal forum in which to
obtain redress for any and all intentional torts. This hypothetical
illustrates why the Sosa Court's attempts to impose a state action
requirement and to identify "a narrow class of international norms"
cognizable under the ATS unduly narrow the original meaning of the
statute.475
The Court's fourth historical determination-that the common
law provided a remedy for law of nations violations encompassed by
the ATS-is partially correct but warrants further explanation to
avoid confusion in future cases. The Court asserted that "[t]he
jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action
for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time."4 " The First Congress did not,
however, understand the common law-what the Court characterized
as "the ambient law of the era"4-to provide causes of action in
federal courts of its own force. Rather, in 1789, Congress itself gave
federal courts specific legislative instructions on how and when to

474 Sosa, 542 US at 732. In addition, under Sosa, an ATS suit would presumably be
unavailable in this hypothetical because the defendant was not "acting on behalf of a
government when he made the arrest." Id at 737 (suggesting that ATS claims made against a
defendant not acting on behalf of a government would be too broad to fit within the narrow class
of tort claims allowed under the statute).
475 Id at 729.
476 Id at 724.
477 Id at 714.

The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations

2011]

545

apply the common law forms of action in cases within their
jurisdiction. As explained, § 14 of the Judiciary Act authorized federal
courts to issue common law writs that "may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law."'" The First Congress soon thereafter
provided in the Process Act of 1789 that "the forms of writs and
executions ... in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law,
shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed
in the supreme courts of the same."479 Although the Sosa Court
correctly concluded that federal courts would employ the common
law forms of action in ATS cases, the Court was apparently unaware
that Congress had expressly directed federal courts to do so in these
statutes. Thus, when Congress conferred jurisdiction upon federal
courts to hear alien claims "for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or treaty of the United States," it fully expected them to
recognize and employ the common law causes of action then in use.
The practice of using state forms of action in federal court
continued until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938.' The Rules abolished reliance on the state forms of action
and proceeding and established that "in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States District Courts,"" "[t]here is one
Even today, however, Erie
form of action-the civil action."
requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the substantive law
of the state in which they sit.' Accordingly, in a suit by an alien
against a US citizen-a type of diversity action-state tort law
remains available to federal courts as a means of redressing torts "in
violation of the law of nations." Thus, today, as in 1789, state law
supplies an important means-a cause of action for intentional tortsby which federal courts exercising jurisdiction under the ATS can
remedy torts committed by US citizens against aliens.
B.

Unresolved Historical Questions

The Sosa Court did not directly address two important and
interrelated questions that have arisen under the ATS in the last three
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat at 82.
Process Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat at 93-94. In the Process Act of 1792, Congress reaffirmed
this provision and conferred some discretion on federal courts to alter such forms. Process Act
of 1792 § 2, 1 Stat at 276. See note 365 and accompanying text.
480 Prior to authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
in 1934, Congress enacted the Conformity Act of 1872, which instructed federal district courts to
follow the procedural rules of the state applicable at the time the case was filed. See note 365.
481 FRCP 1.
482 FRCP 2.
483 See Erie, 304 US at 78.
478
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decades: whether the Act applied to claims by aliens against non-US
citizens and whether the law of nations principles underlying ATS
cases constituted a form of federal common law capable of generating
Article III "arising under" jurisdiction. These historical questions,
which have been debated by lower courts and scholars for three
decades, are important because, both before and after Sosa, some
lower courts have allowed aliens to sue non-US citizens under the
statute, and the only way to establish jurisdiction over such suits
under Article III is to conclude that they arise under federal law.
The historical meaning of the ATS does not in itself support the
lower courts' practice of allowing aliens to sue other aliens under the
ATS for conduct occurring outside the United States. The ATS was
enacted to remedy harms suffered by aliens at the hands of US
citizens. These were the only torts that would have violated the law of
nations (from the United States' perspective) and that the law of
nations would have required the United States to remedy to avoid
responsibility for the torts. Because states had failed to provide aliens
with a reliable means of redressing such harms, the First Congress
gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear alien tort claims under the
ATS. Using the ATS to adjudicate suits between aliens for conduct
occurring outside the United States could have been perceived as an
intrusion on the territorial sovereignty of other nations-a perception
that the First Congress almost certainly wished to avoid.'
Moreover, Article III does not support the recent lower court
practice of permitting one alien to use the ATS to sue another alien in
federal court. Article III extends the judicial power to controversies
between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects.' It does
not extend the judicial power to controversies between citizens or
subjects of foreign nations unless they fall within one of Article III's
precise jurisdictional categories, such as cases affecting ambassadors,
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, or cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.' As Sosa
recognized, the ATS "is in terms only jurisdictional."' It did not
create a federal cause of action or adopt the law of nations as a matter
of federal law.' Such steps were unnecessary in 1789 because
diversity jurisdiction fully sufficed to give aliens a federal forum in
which to pursue tort claims against US citizens. Likewise, giving
484 See Part II.C.
485 US Const Art III,

§ 2, cl 1.
US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
487 542 US at 712.
488 Id at 724 (stating that "the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action").
486
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federal courts jurisdiction over such cases fully satisfied the United
States' obligations under the law of nations to redress the misconduct
of its citizens toward aliens.
Lower federal courts have provided little historical support for
their use of the ATS to adjudicate disputes between aliens. In
Filartiga, the Second Circuit began the modern practice of
interpreting the ATS to allow one alien to sue another for violations
of international law outside the United States. In that case, as
described in Part I, citizens of Paraguay sued another citizen of
Paraguay for torturing their son in Paraguay." The court concluded
that the alleged conduct qualified as a tort in violation of the law of
nations within the meaning of the ATS because "deliberate torture
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of
the nationality of the parties."4 " The court stated that its exercise of
jurisdiction was consistent with Article III because the case arose
under "the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal
common law."491 Most lower courts have followed Filartiga'slead in
allowing suits between aliens under the ATS,4 and this practice has
continued after Sosa.4 9
The Second Circuit's assertion that the law of nations has always
been part of federal common law is anachronistic and lacks a
convincing basis in the historical record. Federal common law is a
modern construct. Prior to the twentieth century, courts did not
recognize "federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced
by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or
constitutional commands."' To be sure, federal courts applied certain

489 Filartiga,630 F2d at 878.
Id.
491 Id at 885.
492 See, for example, Kadic v Karad&ii, 70 F3d 232, 250 (2d Cir 1995) (permitting aliens to
sue a Serbian leader for alleged torture and rape); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F3d
1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir 1994) (allowing aliens to sue the former Philippine president for torture).
But see Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 775 (dismissing a suit by aliens against the PLO for an armed
attack on a civilian bus).
493 Aliens continue to sue other aliens under the ATS for torts occurring outside the United
States. For example, in Amergi v PalestinianAuthority, 611 F3d 1350 (11th Cir 2010), the estate
of an Israeli citizen who was shot and killed while driving in the Gaza Strip sued the Palestinian
Authority and the PLO under the ATS and alleged that the defendants had deliberately
targeted and killed unarmed civilians. Id at 1353-54. Applying the strict Sosa standard, the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the claim on the ground that the allegations did not amount to a tort
in violation of the law of nations. Id at 1365.
494 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 685 (Foundation 5th ed 2003). See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum L Rev 731, 741 (2010) ("The modem
490
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rules derived from the law of nations in the exercise of their
Article III jurisdiction-particularly their admiralty and foreign
diversity jurisdiction.49' They did not apply such rules, however,
because they constituted a form of supreme federal law." Rather, as
we have recently explained, federal courts applied the law of nations
when necessary to uphold the constitutional prerogatives of Congress
and the President to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous
questions affecting war and peace.' Federal courts sitting in diversity
also interpreted and applied branches of the law of nations-like the
law merchant-as a form of general law not binding on the state
courts. Thus, there is no real basis for concluding that either the
Founders or the First Congress understood suits between aliens
arising under the law of nations to constitute cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States within the
meaning of Article III.
The Sosa Court did not have to confront either the Article III
issue or the party-alignment issue for two reasons. First, the Court
concluded that Alvarez had not alleged a tort "in violation of the law
of nations" within the meaning of the statute. Given this statutory
holding, the Court had no need to consider either the appropriateness
of the party alignment under the ATS or the constitutional issue that
such an alignment would have raised. Second, the district court had an
independent constitutional and statutory basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over Alvarez's original claims against the United States
(under the FTCA)498 and over Alvarez's claims against the US DEA
agents (based on diversity of citizenship).' Because Alvarez's tort
claims against Sosa, the United States, and the DEA agents all arose
from a common nucleus of operative fact, the claims formed part of a
single constitutional "case" for purposes of Article III." Accordingly,
the Supreme Court had no need to decide whether the claims brought
by Alvarez (an alien) against Sosa (another alien) arose under federal
law for purposes of Article III.-"0 Indeed, the Court's opinion in Sosa
conception of federal common law-judge-made law that binds both federal and state courtssimply did not exist circa 1788.").
495 See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 39-40 (cited in note 17).
496 See id at 34-37.
497 See id at 55-75.
498 See 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) (granting district courts exclusive jurisdiction over "civil
actions on claims against the United States" for wrongs caused by wrongful or negligent acts of
federal employees acting in the course of their duties).
499 See 28 USC § 1332(a)(2) (granting jurisdiction over suits between "citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state").
500 See United Mine Workers of America v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725 (1966).
501 See 28 USC § 1367(a) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over cases that form part of
"the same case or controversy").
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went out of its way not to endorse the idea that ATS claims
necessarily arise under federal law within the meaning of Article III
and federal jurisdictional statutes. As noted, the Court repeatedly
stressed that the ATS is purely a jurisdictional statute that creates no
federal cause of action.' In addition, the Court rejected Justice
Scalia's assertion that "a federal-common-law cause of action of the
sort the Court reserves discretion to create would 'arise under' the
laws of the United States, not only for purposes of Article III but also
for purposes of statutory federal-question jurisdiction.""O According to
the Court, its position did not imply that "the grant of federalquestion jurisdiction would be equally as good for our purposes as
§ 1350."' Thus, the Court did not conclude that the ATS created a
federal common law cause of action. Rather, the Court merely
concluded that the ATS "was enacted on the congressional
understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining
some common law claims derived from the law of nations."5
In 1789, judges and treatise writers appreciated that hearing suits
between aliens for acts occurring outside a nation's territorial
jurisdiction could implicate other nations' territorial sovereignty.
Interpreting the ATS to grant aliens a federal cause of action in such
cases would have undermined-rather than furthered-the First
Congress's goal of complying with the law of nations because that law
generally constrained a nation's ability to apply its laws
extraterritorially.' The Constitution's allocation of powers over
foreign relations provided an additional reason for avoiding any such
interpretation of the statute if at all possible.' Moreover, with the
502 See, for example, Sosa, 542 US at 724 ("[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action.").
503 Id at 745 n * (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id at 731 n 19 (majority). Indeed, the Court stated that its holding was "consistent with
50
the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts after Erie, ... [while] a more
expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might not be." Id.
505 Id.
506 See Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 Harv Intl L J 271, 284-92 (2009) (discussing the limits of prescriptive jurisdiction
under customary international law). In 1789, the United States was a weak nation and could ill
afford to violate the law of nations. See Jay, 42 Vand L Rev at 821, 839-45 (cited in note 396).
Given America's current status as a global superpower, modern Congresses may be less
concerned with how other nations will react to a decision to grant aliens a federal cause of action
against other aliens in exceptional circumstances. Consider, for example, TVPA § 2, 106 Stat at
73 (establishing a civil cause of action against individuals who torture or subject individuals to
extrajudicial killing). Unlike ATS claims, suits under the TVPA do not depend on diversity
jurisdiction because they arise under a federal statute and thus satisfy both Article Ill and
28 USC § 1331.
507 See Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) at 118. See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford
R. Clark, The PoliticalBranches and the Law of Nations, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 1795, 1803-04
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exception of cases affecting ambassadors and cases of maritime and
admiralty jurisdiction, Article III did not extend the judicial power of
the United States to claims between aliens that did not arise under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. For these reasons,
the ATS-taken in its full historical context-would not have been
understood to encompass alien-alien claims, especially claims arising
from acts occurring outside the United States.
Although most judges and scholars consider historical
understandings of the ATS at least relevant, they have struggled to
apply the statute today. Of course, analyzing present-day disputes in
light of the original scope of the ATS generates difficult problems of
translation and interpretation. First, customary international law
today treats international responsibility for injuries to aliens
differently than the law of nations treated it in 1789. In 1789, the law
of nations obliged a nation to provide some form of redress-criminal,
civil, or extradition-in order to avoid responsibility for acts of
violence by its citizens against aliens. Today, international
responsibility for private torts against aliens is generally limited to
cases in which there has been a "denial of justice."'" More generally,
the law of nations (today called customary international law) has
undergone a significant transformation. Today customary international
law recognizes violations-especially by a nation or its officials against
its own citizens-that were unknown in 1789. Not only did other
nations have no obligation to redress "violations" of this kind, but any
attempt to do so would have itself contradicted the law of nations'
traditional principles of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the predicate
law for present-day ATS jurisdiction bears scant resemblance to the
law of nations of 1789. Second, under customary international law
today, unredressed private harms to aliens no longer give the aliens'
nations just cause to wage war." Thus, a core underlying purpose of
the ATS has largely disappeared. Finally, the use of customary
international law as a rule of decision has changed. In Erie, the
Supreme Court rejected the concept of "federal general common
law,"o and the post-Erie status of customary international law
(2010) (describing "the judiciary's adherence to the law of nations as a means of preserving the
constitutional prerogatives of the political branches"); Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 64-74
(cited in note 17) (arguing that the Constitution allocates to the political branches the power to
make decisions with the potential to violate the law of nations).
508 See Paulsson, Denial of Justice at 4 (cited in note 354).
509 Id at 17.
510 See 304 US at 78. For a recent argument that general law continues to play a significant
role notwithstanding Erie, see Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum L Rev
503, 505-07 (2006) (arguing that "rules that are not under the control of any single jurisdiction,
but instead reflect principles or practices common to many different jurisdictions," play an
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continues to be vigorously debated.' These developments raise
difficult questions of statutory interpretation, including whether
courts should apply the original meaning of statutory texts or
interpret statutes more dynamically in light of evolving circumstances.
While it is not our goal to resolve the translation problems that these
developments generate for the ATS,512 we note that none of these
issues can be resolved without first recovering an accurate
understanding of the ATS in its full legal, political, and historical
context.
CONCLUSION
The current debate regarding the scope and meaning of the ATS
has lost sight of the historical context in which the statute was
enacted. In 1789, the law of nations imposed several important
obligations on the United States, including respect for treaties, the
rights of ambassadors, and judicious use of admiralty jurisdiction. The
law of nations, however, also obligated nations to redress all
intentional harms inflicted by their citizens on the citizens or subjects
of foreign nations. In common law nations, such harms could be
described as "torts" in violation of the law of nations. A nation's
failure to provide redress in such cases gave the other nation just
cause for war. The First Congress was undoubtedly aware of these
important role when federal courts decide cases "[i]n the absence of guidance from written
federal law" or "in the interstices of federal statutes").
511 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 816
(1997) (arguing that the "modern view" that customary international law has the status of
international law is contrary to notions of representative democracy, federal common law,
separation of powers, and federalism); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State
Law?, 111 Harv L Rev 1824, 1826-27 (1998) (rebutting the "revisionist view" of Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev 371, 371-72 (1997)
(arguing that Bradley and Goldsmith "neglect[] the effect of denying federal character to the
'old' customary international law, which addresses the rights of states against each other and, to
some degree, the treatment of foreign nationals" and that they "overlook[] the need to provide
rules of decision for lower-level executive officials and judges"); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 Fordham L Rev 393, 397
(1997) (criticizing Bradley and Goldsmith for assuming that customary international law was
part of the general common law that Erie rejected). For an excellent overview of this debate, see
generally Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 Va J
Intl L 365 (2002). We have recently argued that federal courts historically followed keys
principles of the law of nations in order to uphold the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs
and war powers to the political branches of the federal government. See Bellia and Clark, 109
Colum L Rev at 5-7 (cited in note 17).
512 For a recent argument that courts should resolve such problems by applying federal
common law to all aspects of ATS litigation, see Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and
FederalCommon Law: A New Approach, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 1931, 1932-33 (2010).
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principles of the law of nations, and it enacted both federal criminal
statutes and the ATS in order to comply with them. From this
perspective, current judicial approaches to the ATS reflect some
misperceptions about its original meaning. In Sosa, the Supreme
Court endorsed the idea that only a narrow handful of "international"
torts-analogous to three criminal offenses against the law of nations
under English law in 1789-are actionable under the ATS. In fact, the
ATS was originally meant to give an alien the right to sue a US citizen
in federal court for any intentional tort to person or personal
property, because any such tort-if perpetrated by an American
against an alien-would have violated the law of nations and required
the United States to redress the harm. The historical context also
suggests that the ATS was not originally meant to encompass suits
between aliens, as some lower courts have assumed it does. The
United States had no clear obligation to provide redress in such cases,
and adjudication of such disputes itself could violate the territorial
sovereignty of foreign states under the law of nations. The ATS was
designed to remedy the states' failure to provide adequate redress to
aliens injured at the hands of early Americans and, in so doing, to
satisfy the United States' obligations under the law of nations.
Recognizing the full historical context of the ATS is necessary if
courts are to achieve the Supreme Court's goal of faithfully
interpreting the statute in accordance with the expectations of the
First Congress.

